
Class U- i u . • 

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COPmiCHT DEPOSm'^'"' 



"1^ 



THE WAR OF THE FUTURE 



' THE 
WAR OF THE FUTURE 

IN TPIE LIGHT OF THE 
LESSONS OF THE WORLD WAR 



" BY 
GENERAL von BERNHARDI ^ 

AUTHOR OF "GERMANY AND THE NEXT WAR," ETC. 




% TRANSLATED BY 

F. A. HOLT, O.B.E. 



'd. appleton and company 

NEW YORK MCMXXI 



CoWbp 









COPYRIGHT, 1921, BY 

D. APPLETON AND COMPANY 



PBINTED IN THB CNITED BTATXS OF AMERICA 



^ 



FEB 10 1921 
'g)CLA60S302 



PREFACE 

The following pages were written either dur- 
ing the late war itself or shortly after it ended. 
The conclusions which they contain are entirely 
the product of the war. The immediate pur- 
pose of the book was to give to all officers who 
were not in a position to see the war from a 
central point a survey of the nature of modem 
war: to present them with a frame into which 
they could fit their special knowledge. Fur- 
ther I intended to suggest the principles on 
which the future development of the Army 
should be based. 

That purpose has now become utterly vain. 

A large proportion of our magnificent Corps 
of Officers lies on the battlefields ; another part 
has been compelled to give up the splendid pro- 
fession by wounds or disease ; the rest has been 
dissolved side by side with the Army and is 
trying to pick up a precarious livelihood in 
other walks of life. Thus the number of my 
readers in that circle can be but small. 

But that is not all. There is no longer a Ger- 
man Army, for the few men we are allowed to 



vi PREFACE 

keep after the Peace Treaty cannot be consid- 
ered as such. Our colonies are a thing of the 
past. Our fleet is at the bottom of the sea. It 
would be sheer madness to think of preparing 
for war now, even if only in theory; for it is 
utterly impossible for us to make war. It 
would be a crime to hanker after war now when 
peace has just been concluded and it is the duty 
of us all to work for the economic recovery of 
our people. Moreover, our present Govern- 
ment is doing everything to elhninate war from 
international intercourse, and there can be no 
doubt that the success of this attempt will be 
very welcome so long as the interests and 
honor of the German nation can thereby be 
preserved. Whether this ambition will actually 
succeed is another question. I do not think so 
unless Germany submits blindly to the will of 
the hostile states around her, or human nature 
entirely changes. But no obstacles should be 
placed in the way of this effort ; it should pro- 
ceed in the most favorable conditions possible, 
and in these circumstances it would be a mis- 
take to hint at a coming war. 

If in spite of all this I am publishing my 
work and have found a publisher willing to take 
on the thankless task of printing it for the 
benefit of the public, I am pursuing a twofold 



PREFACE vii 

aim. In the first place I shall hope to show how 
a war — that is a war on modern lines — is ut- 
terly unthinkable for Germany, impoverished 
and broken. Secondly, it must be remembered 
that the military interest in the World War, 
which, with its subsequent effects, is undoubt- 
edly ushering in a new period of world history, 
will very soon revive in all quarters. It is thus 
our duty to consider the important lessons of 
this great struggle, under the impressions of 
which we are still laboring, to visualize and 
grasp them so that coming generations who 
may have to apply them cannot charge us with 
irresponsible negligence and carelessness. This 
book is to meet that theoretical need and pro- 
claim our helplessness. It is, therefore, far 
from any desire or intention to sharpen the 
sword of vengeance. Its purpose is only to 
show that as things are we are no longer 
physically able to do so; it will teach about the 
war which we are no longer in a position to 
make. 

For the rest, there will doubtless be many 
gaps in my work. That is inevitable, because 
to all intents and purposes I am basing my ob- 
servations on personal experience, and that 
must necessarily be limited. I shall be grateful 



viii PREFACE 

to any one who feels called on to supplement 
what I have to say. 

Mountain warfare is left undiscussed of set 
purpose, as I have had no personal experience 
of it. Some one with greater qualifications must 
write on that subject. From my own personal 
experience I can only say here that there are 
doubtless many points of comparison with 
trench warfare in France, so that my remarks 
on this aspect are in many respects applicable 
to that also. 

VON Bernhaedi 

General 

CUNNERSDORF 



CONTENTS 



CBAPTKR PAOB 

Preface v 

Introduction xi 

L The Determining Factors in Modern Wab: 1 

I. Masses 2 

II. Military Technics 16 

II. Tactics 53 

I. Infantry 54 

II. Artillery 86 

III. Cavalry and Aircraft 125 

IV. Fortifications, Engineers, and Eailway 

Troops 146 

III. Attack, Defense, and the Initiative . . . 167 

IV. The Principles of the Offensive .... 182 
V. The Sources of Power 192 

VI. The Influence of Politics and Economics . . 208 

VII. The General Distribution of the Troops . . 229 

VIII. The Battle 245 

I. The Struggle for Local Advantage in 

Trench Warfare 254 

II. The Barrage 275 

III. The Decision in Trench Warfare . . 279 

IV. Attack and Defense in Open Waepaeb . 290 

IX. Conclusion 305 



IX 



INTRODUCTION 

In my book Vom heutigen Kriege,^ which ap- 
peared in 1911, I showed that the great funda- 
mental laws of war remained the same at all 
times and in all circumstances, because they 
were based on human nature and the very es- 
sence of the use of force. I demonstrated, 
however, that their outward manifestations fre- 
quently varied in accordance with the political 
structure and culture of the warring nation, 
and indeed with the means and methods cm- 
ployed in war. These very external manifesta- 
tions have a compelling character and involve a 
certain adherence to rule, though only an ad- 
herence which changes periodically with the 
changing circumstances of life and military 
eifort. 

Thus the art of war moves between perma- 
nent laws and those which change periodically 
and are ever undergoing fresh development. It 
is only within these limits that our art offers 
the prospect of success to military undertak- 
ings. 

' Modern War 

xi 



xii INTRODUCTION 

Neither the unchanging nor the periodic laws 
may be infringed with impunity, and it is the 
task of him who leads an army to give effect 
to the general and eternal elements of circum- 
stances which have temporary peculiarities and 
features. 

This is just where the difficulty lies, for there 
is always the danger that the commander will 
regard something which under certain given 
circumstances was in accordance with the rules, 
and therefore justifiable, as an eternal verity 
and therefore applicable even though the con- 
ditioning circumstances have already changed, 
so that he is acting under the impulse of pre- 
conceived opinions which, in view of the 
changed situation, must bring him to ruin and 
defeat. 

Thus, in 1806, the Prussian army took the 
field with the old linear tactics which could no 
longer cope with the changed battle forms of 
the Napoleonic period, and in spite of all its 
heroism suffered a severe defeat. So again in 
1866 the Austrians had been too late to realize 
the importance of the breech-loading rifle : they 
kept to their old percussion rifle and their Na- 
poleonic columns and shock tactics, and were 
simply decimated by the Prussian infantry, 
which relied on its weapon and fought in open 



INTRODUCTION xiii 

formation. Examples of this kind can be mul- 
tiplied at will. In such circumstances it is the 
commander who has to bear the consequences 
of insufficient preparation and energy on the 
part of the governments which have not real- 
ized the progress and development of the art 
of war or learned to keep pace with that de- 
velopment by prompt reforms. 

But the commander is faced with the further 
danger of being overawed by external phe- 
nomena and under their pressure neglecting to 
give full effect to the great fundamental and 
eternal principles of war, either because he has 
an insufficient grasp of these principles himself 
or because his control of the war-machine is in- 
sufficient to enable him to apply his knowledge. 
The last Russian campaigns offer eloquent ex- 
amples. In the war with Japan, for instance, 
Kuropatkin utterly underestimated the impor- 
tance of the initiative and the offensive and con- 
fined himself to defensive operations — without 
any offensive reaction — from the outset. On 
the other hand, he was unable to maneuver and 
employ the mass of the Russian army, unwieldy 
and mentally inert as it was, in such a way as 
to do justice to his plans. Apart from the lack 
of the offensive spirit and many other defects, 
his schemes broke down time after time on the 



xiv INTRODUCTION 

want of judgment and resolution displayed by 
his subordinate commanders. He patently 
failed to remedy the friction in the military ma- 
chine, friction which is a phenomenon of every 
war and was particularly noticeable in the 
great masses of the Russian army. Nor could 
he make the latter conform to the great laws of 
war. 

These difficulties, which are of the very es- 
sence of war, have increased materially in re- 
cent times, for we also are living in a period 
of many changes in the external phenomena of 
war, a period of great development and trans- 
formation of many military values which seem 
calculated to confuse judgment and lead us on 
wrong paths. In the main this development be- 
gan during the war itself and on many points 
has taken us by surprise. Of course, develop- 
ments had been foreseen in some directions 
without our fully realizing how far they would 
go. In other directions we had foreseen noth- 
ing and got on wrong lines. But the voices 
which told us we were straying were not 
heeded. 

That heavy artillery would play a more im- 
portant role was expected and, within certain 
limits, allowed for. But we did not realize how 
great that role would be. The strength of for- 



INTRODUCTION xv 

tresses was utterly exaggerated because the 
power of the hostile artillery was underesti- 
mated. 

Nor had we foreseen what enormous masses 
of combatants would have to be called up for 
the World War. No measures were therefore 
taken for such a wholesale levy. The policy of 
peace at any price which we pursued, and our 
wholly baseless confidence that we should be al- 
'lowed to pursue it, had blinded the eyes of our 
leading statesmen. All who raised a warning 
voice were denounced as unscrupulous fire- 
brands or officially cautioned, and the army bills 
in the last years before the war were totally 
inadequate. 

The importance of cavalry was totally mis- 
understood. It was considered an offensive 
weapon in spite of the obvious effects of mod- 
ern firearms. 

We hopelessly underestimated the impor- 
tance of aircraft and, in naval operations, the 
submarine arm, the development of which was 
at the outset held up for the benefit of the bat- 
tle-fleet. Lastly, we absolutely misunderstood 
the importance of the economic side, although 
warning voices were raised on this matter. We 
had made no sort of preparation for the block- 
ade of all our ports and frontiers, or for a sit- 



xvi INTRODUCTION 

uation in which we should be completely cut off 
from maritime communication with our import- 
ing and exporting countries. The wholesale 
transformation of our economic system which 
those eventualities inevitably involved had to 
be improvised. Indeed, we had not even 
thought of warning and recalling our merchant 
vessels which were in foreign waters, so little 
did we believe in the possibility of war even 
when Russia was in the throes of mobilization. 
It might be said that as a result of our total 
failure to realize the world situation we walked 
blindfolded into the trap which our enemies had 
set for us. However, we entered upon the 
struggle itself with the extended military and 
political views, so to speak, which had devel- 
oped out of the war of 1870, and to a certain 
extent the experiences of the Russo-Japanese 
war. In the General Staff, indeed, thanks to 
tireless work, many of the requirements of the 
times had been realized, if not all. Unfortu- 
nately our efforts thoroughly to exploit our 
knowledge failed time and time again, owing to 
politically false judgTQents of the situation 
which not only prevailed in political circles but 
were reenforced by the chronic shortsightedness 
and prejudice of the Reichstag, which allowed 
itself to be swayed by domestic party contro- 



INTRODUCTION xvii 

versy and liad lost all vision for the peril with- 
out. Before the war every one who pointed out 
the true significance of political developments 
was exposed to complete and hopeless miscon- 
struction in these circles. 

Thus, when the war assumed a scale which 
had never been foreseen, we found ourselves 
unprepared and faced by absolutely novel con- 
ditions, so that to cope with them we had to im- 
provise in the very middle of the war. Both the 
army and the fleet have shown that they were 
quite equal to this colossal task and able to gain 
the upper hand in every department, even in a 
war against practically the whole world — 
a world which had prepared for this war for 
years. German science also has performed 
brilliant feats in assisting the combatant forces 
and, in the early years at any rate, German 
labor, with relatively few exceptions, proved 
itself an auxiliary force of the first rank in pro- 
ducing the weapons of war. The only failures 
were the civil government — notwithstanding 
devoted efforts on the part of many officials — 
and the politicians, who were too often influ- 
enced by the Reichstag, and by their defective 
measures made the nation's task in its heroic 
struggle considerably more arduous. 

I shall not go in any detail into these matters 



xviii INTRODUCTION 

in this book, which deals with the purely mili- 
tarj'' aspect alone, though it is only natural that 
the direct effects of politics and economic ques- 
tions on the operations, as they have developed 
in present-day circumstances, must be exam- 
ined and discussed, as those effects are of far- 
reaching military importance. 

Otherwise my essential purpose is to inquire 
into the significance of all the novel phenomena 
of modern times which determine the form of 
military operations, phenomena some of which 
facilitate them, while others make them more 
arduous. Secondly, I have to consider how, in 
the changed circumstances, the great fundamen- 
tal and vital principles which mean success in 
war can be vindicated even to-day : retaining the 
initiative; using the offensive as the decisive 
form of action ; concentration of force at the de- 
cisive point; the determination of that point; 
the superiority of the moral factor to purely 
material resources ; the proper relation between 
attack and defense ; the will to victory ; the un- 
conditional dependence of policy on the require- 
ments and results of strategy or military ef- 
fort. 

It is of vital importance to every army, and 
therefore every state, to be perfectly clear on 
these points. Thus, and thus alone, can policy 



INTRODUCTION xix 

and war be successfully conducted. In that 
way only will states be in a position to develop 
their full powers unhindered. 

There is a certain beautiful dream of nations 
living in peace side by side, voluntarily impos- 
ing restraints upon themselves and recognizing 
their obligation to have regard for the just 
needs and wishes of other states. It is a dream 
in which the peoples which are morally and in- 
"tellectually the strongest will be in a position 
to assert themselves as the arbiters of culture, 
even though such a thing is impossible without 
a more or less autocratic authority, which is in- 
compatible with equal rights. 

But it is none the less a dream only. As long 
as men remain men, force in its widest sense 
will determine the political and cultural im- 
portance of states. In the last resort it is the 
foundation of all intellectual and moral prog- 
ress. 



THE WAR OF THE FUTURE 

CHAPTER I 

- THE DETERMINING FACTORS IN MODERN WAR 

When we look over the whole range of the 
lessons and experiences of the World War, we 
soon realize that they fall into two great 
groups, which are the determining factors in 
modem war : on the one side the employment of 
colossal armies such as the world had never 
seen, with all their attendant phenomena, and 
on the other the immense development of the 
mechanical side and chemistry, which have re- 
sulted in the appearance of a whole series of 
new weapons or weapons the power of which 
has been greatly increased. Both together have 
revolutionized war conditions. 

The first group has mainly influenced 
strategy, though it is not without a certain tac- 
tical importance, while the new triumphs in 
military mechanics have primarily brought 
about tactical changes and have affected 

1 



2 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE 

strategy and maneuver to a secondary degree, 
and that to a certain extent indirectly. 

I. — Masses 

When we mobilized in 1914 we put a mighty 
army into the field. A large number of reserve 
divisions had been formed according to plan 
and a number of Landsturm battalions called 
up as frontier and railway guards. But it would 
be impossible to speak of a general summons of 
the nation to arms. We were not prepared for 
anything like that. We had neither the arms 
nor the equipment. Still, our army seemed 
strong enough to carry through our plan of 
campaign. This plan, in its main lines, was 
based on our belief in a slow Russian mobiliza- 
tion, and aimed at overthrowing France deci- 
sively at the outset and then concentrating 
against Russia which would meanwhile have 
been kept in check by a few army corps and an 
Austrian offensive. 

This plan broke down because the Russian 
mobilization — though not perhaps officially — 
was actually in progress for a long time while 
we were still thinking it possible to preserve 
peace and taking steps with that end in view. 
East Prussia was overrun by the enemy before 



THE DETERMINING FACTOES 3 

we had thought it possible. Troops had to be 
brought from the west to protect the very core 
of Prussia, and the result was that in France 
our armies were not strong enough to exploit 
strategically the tactical successes they had 
gained. We had to fall back on the defensive 
and extend our front to the sea in order to save 
our right wing from envelopment. 

As the Russians had meanwhile deployed all 
their armies and were pressing forward on a 
broad front, it became imperative to strengthen 
our armies, and we now proceeded to call upon 
the man-power of the whole nation for the bene- 
fit of the army. New army corps were formed 
of men who had not previously been called up, 
all the Landsturm were summoned to arms, and 
even depot troops were sent to the front to fill 
the yawning gaps. The enemy, however, re- 
plied with similar measures. In France the last 
man was called up. Savage peoples were 
brought to the European battlefields. Italy 
joined the ranks of our enemies. Rumania and 
finally America followed her example. Com- 
pulsory service was introduced in England. In- 
dia had to send her dusky sons and Africa her 
black children to Europe. 

Thus gradually those giant armies came into 
being which were compelled to stretch their line 



4 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE 

from sea to sea, on the one hand to be safe 
against envelopment, and on the other to make 
full use of their weapons. It was a distribution 
of force which can be described by the expres- 
sion '' linear strategy." Then, with a view to 
increasing the powers of resistance of these 
far-flung lines — safe against envelopment — 
against frontal attacks by a superior force, and 
with the further purpose of keeping down the 
losses inflicted by shell fire in a long and stub- 
bom defense, the process of fortifying the posi- 
tions began. Deep trenches and shell-proof 
shelters were constructed to provide cover for 
both attacker and defender without preventing 
either from using his own weapons. Obstacles 
were erected to make it difficult for the enemy 
to approach and hold him do^vn under the fire 
of the defender. 

This form of battle had a vital influence upon 
the attacker also. In the first stage, in his en- 
deavor to keep on enveloping the enemy lines, 
threaten their tactical flanks and upset or cut 
their communications, he was compelled to 
reach out ever farther until the sea or land 
frontiers stayed his progress. Then he had to 
change his method entirely. 

Before the war the envelopment of one or 
both of the enemy's wings was considered the 



THE DETERMINING FACTORS 5 

decisive form of operation. The real problem 
of the commander was to bring about strategic 
envelopment and finally carry it through tac- 
tically. We entered the war imbued with those 
ideas. Our operations were in accordance with 
them at the beginning of the war, and every one 
knows how brilliantly Field Marshal von Hin- 
denburg translated this theory into action in 
his great and annihilating victories in the east. 

Unfortunately, in view of the new linear 
strategy, this form of operation is feasible 
only under particularly favorable conditions. 
Where there are no flanks to be turned there is 
nothing for it but to attack the enemy frontally. 
We had never expected that in peace time. The 
voices — among others my own — which said that 
even break-through battles ^ were possible, and 
might become inevitable under modern condi- 
tions, were either ignored or not heard. As a 
matter of fact it was in that direction that mat- 
ters developed. 

In the trench warfare of to-day there are no 
flanks to envelop. Almost everywhere we find 
ourselves facing a long continuous front. The 
flank to be enveloped has first to be produced 
by an irruption into the enemy's lines, and the 
enemy stops at nothing to prevent such a breach 

* Vurchiruchsschlachten. 



6 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE 

and close any gaps with reserves. Thus the 
frontal battle has become the inevitable and 
characteristic feature of mass warfare. To 
prepare for it and carry it out successfully is 
the great and vital — though extremely difficult 
— problem of the commander, a problem which 
both we and our opponents have often vainly 
endeavored to solve. The art of war has thus 
assumed a totally different aspect, for it is now 
a matter — at any rate in the opening stage — 
not of strategy but of concentrating and em- 
ploying by surprise so large a force at a given 
point of the enemy's front that success is as- 
sured. As we shall see later, this is no simple 
task. 

But if, as a result of mass armies, the frontal 
attack has become a permanent feature of 
operations, we must guard ourselves against 
the assumption that it must always be so. This 
view of the form of action must not become 
axiomatic. We can realize that by remember- 
ing the first battles of this war, not to mention 
the actions in Rumania or the last stage of the 
fighting in Russia. Indeed, this method of 
operation will become inevitable only where the 
enemy really succeeds in establishing a continu- 
ous front which cannot be enveloped at any 
point; such a front as the French from the 



THE DETERMINING FACTORS 7 

Swiss frontier to the North Sea, or the Italian 
from the Swiss frontier to the Adriatic. If 
the enemy cannot do so, former conditions will 
be reproduced and it will once more be a ques- 
tion primarily of strategical and tactical en- 
velopment. There is even a definite relation be- 
tween the size of the theater of war and the 
strength of the army to be employed in it. 

The purely frontal action became inevitable 
in France because the Franco-British armies 
were large enough to hold a continuous front, 
and where any gap occurred close it again with 
reserves. In Russia, on the other hand, the 
same course was possible only within certain 
limits, because the front was too long in itself 
and became even longer as the theater of war 
extended eastwards with the successive en- 
forced retirements of the armies of our enemy. 
The combined Russo-Rumanian armies man- 
aged to form some sort of continuous line 
from the mouth of the Danube along the Car- 
pathians and northwards to the mouth of the 
Dvina, even though apparently they were with- 
out the necessary reserves. But when that line 
was once broken, geographical circumstances 
forced the hostile armies apart, and it was no 
longer possible for them to reestablish a single 
front. The conditions of a war of movement 



8 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE 

once more came into their ovm, and we saw how 
relatively weak German forces destroyed first 
the Rumanian and then the Russian army with- 
out their even being able to oppose a permanent 
and continuous front to their enemy. 

This relation between mass and space must 
therefore always be borne in mind in consider- 
ing war under modern conditions. Otherwise 
there is a danger of slipping into linear strateg^^ 
■without adequate reserves, a proceeding which 
contains the germ of defeat. 

There are thus, broadly speaking, two forms 
of modem operations : trench warfare with the 
frontal "break-through" battle, and maneuver 
warfare, which always comes into its o\sti where 
the defender, for geographiciil or numerical 
reasons, is unable to establish a front which 
cannot be enveloped, or, ha\'ing originally had 
such a front, finds it sundered and broken 
through once and for all by the attacker. Yet 
it ^^'ill always be the task of the commander to 
produce the conditions of maneuver warfare, 
as the chances of a decisive victory are far 
greater by this method than in a purely frontal 
battle. The result is that in the last resort 
the idea of envelopment must remain the dom- 
inant motive even in the strategic frontal action. 

The first stage will be a constant endeavor to 



THE DETERMINING FACTORS 9 

envelop salients in the enemy's lines. But en- 
velopment must also be the final goal of the 
frontal attack. The enemy's line must be 
broken through at some point, in order that the 
portions of the line adjacent to the point of 
irruption (which will then have become wings 
and unsecured flanks) may be enveloped and the 
process of rolling up the rest of the front which 
is stationary may be begun. 

If the enemy, in spite of being defeated and 
thrown back, succeeds in closing the gaps and 
preserving the continuity of his line at the point 
of breach by throwing in reserves and thus pre- 
venting the adjacent parts of his front from be- 
ing rolled up, the success of the attacker may 
be described as a serious tactical victory, but 
not as a decisive victory in the strategic sense. 
If, on the other hand, the attacker succeeds 
in getting at and enveloping the flanks of his 
opponent, then operating where possible against 
his communications, and finally rolling up the 
part of the enemy's front which still holds 
(either eccentrically or concentrically) he may 
expect a complete strategical and tactical vic- 
tory. 

As we can see, Schlieffen's principle of en- 
velopment holds good for military operations 
under all circumstances. This has always been 



10 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE 

80, however various the forms it has taken — 
whether the oblique order of battle of Epami- 
nondas and Frederick the Great, Hannibal's 
double envelopment at Cannae, Napoleon's 
break-through battle, or Hindenburg's encir- 
cling strategy at Tannenberg and in Masuria. 

In modern war, indeed, it may often be 
brought about indirectly as the result of a 
break-through. 

But the influence of masses on strategy is not 
exhausted with its effects on strategic opera- 
tions and the area of the theater of war. It 
makes itself felt in all questions relating to the 
supply of the armies with food and war mate- 
rial. 

As late as 1870-71 it was still possible to live 
mainly on the country, and supplies from home 
were, generally speaking, only supplementary 
to the supplies obtained on the spot. Of course 
in long sieges, such as the siege of Paris, the 
reverse was true, but this was an exception to 
the rule, and even on that occasion a good deal 
of food was contributed by the country itself. 
Every one who went through that siege will 
still have memories — rather disagreeable mem- 
ories — of the French mutton which, with the 
solidified pea-soup sent from home, formed our 
daily ration. 



THE DETERMINING FACTORS 11 

Those conditions have entirely changed. Only 
very fertile regions are in a position to keep a 
modern mass army going for a short time. 
Once the war has passed over a particular dis- 
trict, or the army finds itself compelled to re- 
main in one place for a considerable time, its 
requirements must be supplied from home and 
a complicated network of roads and railways, 
.as well as an enormous amount of rolling stock, 
will be needed to solve the supply problem. The 
demands on the network of communications will 
be increased — as we shall see — by the demand 
for war material of the most various kinds, a 
demand which has grown to enormous propor- 
tions in comparison with former wars, and of 
itself imposes the heaviest burden on the lines 
of communication. The latter will further be 
subjected to an additional strain by the move- 
ments of the troops themselves. 

In view of the enormous size of the modem 
theater of war and the masses which have to be 
moved backwards and forwards over great dis- 
tances, it is impossible to carry out such move- 
ments on foot. Marching would mean relatively 
slow movement, which would be exposed to en- 
emy reconnaissance in the highest degree. It 
is therefore absolutely necessary to carry out 
strategic movements of troops by rail if at all 



12 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE 

feasible, and if possible to conceal what is going 
on from the knowledge of the enemy. 

A developed road and railway system which 
would be equal to these requirements is cer- 
tainly not to be found in any part of the world. 
It is thus essential to construct new railways 
and roads and keep them continually in order. 
This, however, means great swarms of labor 
troops, and these in turn increase the mass of 
the armies and the demands for food and other 
military supplies, while at the same time re- 
quiring a giant apparatus of administrative au- 
thorities and officials, so that the impedimenta 
of a modem army has become simply colossal, 
especially considering all the troops which are 
required, particularly in enemy country, to 
guard the lines of communication. 

The movements of the army itself are made 
extraordinarily difficult by all these complica- 
tions. An amazing apparatus, which is system- 
atized down to the last detail, is required to 
carry out the strategic movement, concentra- 
tion and diversion of a single army group. 

In all these questions there is a further ob- 
structive element in the influence which the 
mass levy has had, and was bound to have, on 
the tactical value of the troops themselves. The 
more new formations of recruits and older 



THE DETERMINING FACTORS 13 

classes of men with previous military train- 
ing there are, the lower must be the percentage 
of active^ N.C.O. 's and men among them and the 
smaller the number of active officers with 
the individual units. Their places are taken by 
reserve and Landwehr officers and N.C.O. 's, and 
with the best will in the world these elements, 
owing to their inferior technical training and 
[pss experience, never make so solid a frame- 
work for the unit or lead it so well in battle as 
men to whom soldiering is their life-work. 
Further, as such units consist of men some of 
whom are recruits mth a very short training, 
while others are older men who have left the 
military profession for a considerable time, it 
is only natural that their tactical value cannot 
be equal to thajt of regular regiments which are 
mobilized in the normal way. 

If the war lasts for a long time and the men 
of the peace establishment gradually disappear 
as the result of death and wounds, the tactical 
level of all regiments, regular as well as new 
formations, tends gradually to become the same 
and the old regular units have only one advan- 
tage, though it is certainly an advantage of 
great importance for the tactical efficiency of a 
unit. It is tradition and the spirit which ani- 

"As opposed to reserve. (Tr.) 



14 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE 

mated the men of the peace establishment. The 
latter cannot easily be replaced in units which 
are new formations because these do not get the 
men from home who are the representatives and 
heirs of that spirit. It is only very gradually 
that this defect can be made good in the course 
of a long war and only after a series of glorious 
achievements has created a tradition, though a 
new one, of its own which gives birth to an 
esprit de corps which will tolerate nothing weak 
or unworthy. 

In the same way the corps of officers which 
does not consist of professional officers can 
only gradually attain the highest standard of 
efficiency as the result of war experience and 
will seldom reach that standard, as death in 
battle is ever tearing bloody gaps in the ranks 
and usually carries off the best and most 
capable officers, those who wish to set their 
subordinates a brilliant example and therefore 
freely expose themselves to the bullets of the 
enemy. The same is true of the N.C.O.'s, who, 
in ordinary circumstances, are the sheet-anchor 
of the unit. We must further remember that by 
the calling-up in mass of all men who are in any 
degree physically fit, morally inferior elements 
get into the army, elements which degenerate 
still more under the influence of war and fre- 



THE DETERMINING FACTORS 15 

quently have the most harmful influence upon 
their weaker comrades. 

Finally, it is inevitable that the standard of 
physical efficiency among the older classes 
should be lower than that of young healthy 
men. They also lack the energy and enthusiasm 
of youth, although, on the other hand, they are 
often less excitable and more reliable. Yet, 
notwithstanding these advantages, the value of 
a unit for general purposes can be very mate- 
rially reduced by a heavy percentage of older 
men. Units which consist of practically noth- 
ing but these older men can, in general, be em- 
ployed on a few special war services only. 

Thus the commander of a modern army has 
to struggle with the greatest difficulties, even in 
employing his troops on the various tasks which 
face him. On the one hand, special units only, 
as a rule, can be employed for special purposes 
and on the other, war service and intensified 
training have to go hand in hand in order that 
the drafts (which arrive not always fully 
trained) may be familiarized with their fighting 
tasks and welded with the field troops into a 
tactical whole. This is particularly true of a 
long war where an exhausted unit has to be 
brought up to strength again time after time. 
Hence the remarkable fact, never before ob- 



16 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE 

served to the same degree, that the theater of 
war is not only a battlefield but simultaneously 
a maneuvering ground on which efforts are con- 
tinuously being made to solve the changing 
problems of modem war — trench and open war- 
fare, defensive and offensive tactics. 

This is all the more necessary as with the 
progressive improvement in arms and war ma- 
terial — a phenomenon which was continuous in 
the World War — greater and greater demands 
have to be made on the tactical efficiency of the 
troops. Let us now turn our attention to this 
aspect of the matter. 

II. — MiLiTAEY Technics 

In all the novelties in the department of mil- 
itary mechanics, the multiplication and im- 
provement of weapons form the starting-point 
for all changes in tactics, while these in turn 
frequently have a decisive influence on ma- 
neuver and strategy. Other discoveries have, of 
course, had a vital influence on the art of war in 
many respects. We shall naturally have to deal 
with them' also. But their influence has not been 
as far-reaching as that of modem fire effect. 
The latter has become an absolutely determin- 
ing factor in a modern action. 

It is, therefore, of great interest to inquire 



THE DETERMINING FACTORS 17 

not only how these new effects make themselves 
felt, but also how effect and counter-effect have 
conditioned and intensified one another, for it 
is only by the study of their mutual relation that 
any inference can be drawn as to future devel- 
opments. Yet that is always the vital problem 
in the science of war. It is only when we have 
solved it successfully, even to a limited degree, 
that we are secure against surprises from some 
opponent who has been more farsighted, or 
be in a position to face subsequent decisions 
with confidence. 

As I have said, even before the war, the steps 
to a sound development had been taken in our 
army. The logical inferences, however, had 
not been drawn. In many respects we were be- 
hind requirements, in others we had started 
from false premises, while in some directions 
the course of development was open to dispute. 

We very distinctly overestimated the effects 
of artillery fire, and thus believed that we 
should not require more than a limited number 
of batteries. I, myself, fell into that error. On 
the other side, we underestimated the defensive 
power of modem quick-firing weapons, and thus 
had not shown sufficient energy in increasing 
them. We had certainly made a beginning with 
the introduction of heavy artillery as well as 



18 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE 

the macliine gun for the field army, thus setting 
our feet upon a promising path. But, as I shall 
show only too soon, we did not go anything like 
far enough in these directions. 

Heavy, flat-trajectory fire had been very much 
neglected in peace. We had not realized its 
great importance. We were hopelessly wrong 
in our calculations of ammunition requirements, 
and this led to serious crises more than once. 

Our cavalry was trained on thoroughly wrong 
principles. Battles of position had frequently 
been seen in the Russo-Turkish and still more 
the Russo-Japanese War, and had revealed how 
important such operations might be in certain 
circumstances. Actions for the possession of 
fortified positions had been the subject of dis- 
cussion and maneuvers with us in Germany. 
But they had been considered only in connec- 
tion with strategic movements, and temporary 
field fortifications alone had been contemplated. 
No one had ever thought of genuine frontal 
trench warfare. The few mortars, heavy field 
howitzers and 10 cm. and 13 cm. guns which the 
army had were considered enough for field oper- 
ations, and heavier and the heaviest guns were 
provided for use against enemy fortresses only 
with a view to enabling us to smash through 
the ring of forts as soon as possible. Yet 



THE DETERMINING FACTORS 19 

even that meant a great step in the right direc- 
tion, as it secured us a great superiority over 
our enemies at the outset. But this certainly 
does not mean that the importance of artillery 
for the coming war was fully appreciated. It 
was the events of the war itself which first 
brought it home to us. 

The result was that we entered upon the war 
with views and systems which were to a certain 
extent imperfect and had not been thoroughly 
thought out. The means and resources at our 
disposal were the logical outcome of them. Just 
as we had failed to realize what masses of men 
the war would require, and thus had to im- 
provise them after it began, we soon found our- 
selves far short of requirements in the matter 
of armament, just because our ideas of the ef- 
fect of modern weapons did not correspond alto- 
gether to reality. In our first victorious battles 
our infantry suffered very heavy losses which 
swept away the flower of our youth, while our 
cavalry was sacrificed in futile attacks, to some 
extent against obstacles, because their wholly 
erroneous peace training had been devoted prac- 
tically exclusively to this form of operation. 
All this has already been discussed.' 

When our front extended more and more 

* See Introduction, p. xv. 



20 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE 

after the battle of the Marne and we were com- 
pelled to defend ourselves against hostile 
mass attacks in long, thin lines, we found our- 
selves under the necessity of digging in, in 
order to escape the destructive effects of the 
enemy's fire and keep down our losses, thus in- 
creasing our power of resistance. Efforts were 
also made to protect the troops against the en- 
emy's fire by the provision of steel helmets and 
the construction of armored shelters. All this 
made the task of the attacker more difficult, 
especially as before long the defender found 
means to intensify his own fire by an in- 
creased use of machine-guns. The attacker 
now saw himself compelled to take counter- 
measures. Infantry rushes against an en- 
trenched defender were seen to be anything 
but hopeful, because they produced heavier 
losses than an attack in open warfare. Meas- 
ures had to be thought out for keeping down 
the fire of the defender. 

For that purpose machine-guns alone were 
inadequate in an attack. The natural result was 
the increase and improvement of the artillery. 
The enemy's trenches and obstacles had to be 
destroyed, his infantry kept underground, his 
artillery fought down and if possible silenced, 
if the way for the attack was to be prepared. 



THE DETERMINING FACTORS 21 

Further, flat-trajectory field-guns had to be re- 
placed in ever increasing measure by high- 
angle fire if the enemy was to be reached when 
behind cover. 

The defender, however, immediately replied 
by strengthening his trenches with shell-proof, 
concrete dug-outs, then by increasing his artil- 
lery which was assigned the task of not only en- 
gaging the attacker's artillery but directing an 
annihilating fire at the enemy's avenues of ap- 
proach, his assembly trenches and concentra- 
tion points, and by sweeping the area imme- 
diately before the defender's trenches, laying 
a curtain of fire in front of its own infantry, a 
curtain which the enemy could penetrate only 
at the cost of the heaviest losses. (The bar- 
rage.) 

The attacker on his side now saw himself 
compelled to assign further tasks to his artil- 
lery. His problem was not merely to destroy 
the enemy's defense works and get his infantry 
under a destructive fire. He had to neutralize 
the defender's artillery also, completely, if pos- 
sible, in the hope of preventing its disastrous 
effects on his own artillery and particularly his 
infantry. 

Finally, hostile aircraft had to be fought from 
the earth also, and it was found that artillery 



22 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE 

was indispensable even in really mountainous 
regions. Thus both the number and types of 
gnns had to be increased, and adequate supplies 
of ammunition had to be furnished for them. 
This again had its effect on the defender, and 
thus this arm acquired a growing importance 
for both sides. The most varied types of guns 
were introduced for the various purposes, and 
supplied with correspondingly varied natures of 
ammunition. 

It has already been said that the enemy's 
concrete dug-outs and fortified trench-systems 
had made a great increase of high-angle fire 
necessary, from the lightest up to the heaviest 
calibers. In addition it was shown to be neces- 
sary to destroy or damage the enemy's roads 
and cantonments, depots and important indus- 
trial establishments, neutralize or silence his 
artillery at long range and sweep extensive 
areas with flanking fire, if possible with the 
widespreading cone of shrapnel. Thus the 
field-piece remained a useful weapon, though 
it was replaced by a weapon of longer range. 
Side by side with it developed the construction 
of long-range high-angle fire batteries, and 
heavier flat-trajectory batteries of even longer 
range. The development attained an impor- 
tance which had not altogether been foreseen, 



THE DETERMINING FACTORS 23 

and finally culminated in the construction of the 
gun with which we bombarded Paris from a 
distance of about 120 kilometers. 

Apart from this special achievement, guns 
were constructed the great majority of which 
were not above 15 cm. caliber, though there 
were calibers up to 38 cm. Some were sup- 
plied with motor transport, while others were 
•made mobile by rails so that they could be 
fought as railway guns without being removed 
from the rails. 

For defense against aircraft guns were con- 
structed with elevations up to 85 degrees. Some 
of these were on a fixed base, while others were 
mounted on motor-lorries and were thus mobile. 
Lastly, mountain artillery, such as had not been 
seen before the World War, was produced for 
special purposes. In the Carpathians and the 
Alps, where German troops also fought and 
conquered, it was absolutely necessary to sup- 
ply the men with artillery which they could 
take with them anywhere. This purpose was 
achieved by the construction of a special type. 

But though ample provision was made for 
long-range fire by all these measures, it also 
proved necessary to obtain effects at the short- 
est distances from our own lines — particularly 
in trench warfare — effects which were equal to 



24 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE 

those of artillery, without diverting that arm 
from its proper task (firing at distant targets 
and doing all the damage possible to the enemy 
troops and particularly to his artillery) for the 
sake of dealing with targets close at hand. 

This purpose was served by the trench-mor- 
tar, which was placed in or immediately behind 
the forward infantry lines and assigned the 
task of taking the nearest enemy trenches under 
annihilating fire. Here again various calibers 
were constructed, and trench mortars were di- 
vided into heavy, medium and light, according 
to their effect and mobility. The latter were 
such as to accompany the infantry even in an 
attack and could also be employed as flat-trajec- 
tory guns at short ranges when the infantry 
in the course of their advance came up against 
targets with which they were unable to deal with 
their own weapons. 

The same necessity gave rise to the batteries 
of infantry-guns which were light, flat-trajec- 
tory field-pieces. Their task was to accompany 
the infantry closely and destroy hostile strong 
points by direct fire, whereas the light trench- 
mortar could perform that duty at ranges of 
800 to 1,000 meters at the outside, though it 
could also be employed as a high-angle weapon, 
as we have observed. Even the medium trench- 



THE DETERMINING FACTORS 25 

mortar, which had a very violent detonating 
and explosive effect, could be made mobile and 
used against targets which were difficult to deal 
with. The heavy trench-mortar, on the other 
hand, was principally for use against fortified 
works and had to be firmly built in. 

To strengthen the defense against hostile at- 
tacks on trench lines recourse was finally had to 
trench-guns, quick-firing weapons of 3.7 cm. up 
to 5 cm. caliber, which had a considerable effect 
at short range owing to their high rate of fire. 

When we turn to the question of gun anununi- 
tion, high explosive has recovered its impor- 
tance as compared with shrapnel even against 
isolated living targets, partly because of its 
greater moral effect, partly because it is more 
easily and rapidly served, and further because 
mass production in war-time failed to produce 
time-fuses so reliable that accurate settings 
were possible. This was owing to the shortage 
of many kinds of raw material. High-angle 
fire is primarily required against targets in 
shell-proof emplacements or "blind" targets. 
It is true that time-fuse ammunition was also 
produced for this purpose because the burst is 
not only forwards but also backwards and down- 
wards, but in general its use was impossible 
for the same reason as that of shrapnel, i. e., 



26 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE 

the difficulty in war-time of producing reliable 
fuses in large numbers. Thus, generally speak- 
ing, we relied on the tried high-explosive shell, 
which was also easy to handle. The fuses, how- 
ever, were delay-action fuses, so that the shell 
did not burst until it had penetrated the target. 
Others were extremely sensitive, so that the 
burst occurred the moment the shell came into 
contact with the target, thus increasing lateral 
fragmentation. Shells with hardened caps were 
used also against targets with a high power of 
resistance. Finally, certain special natures 
were produced for exceptionally long-range 
work (stream-line and false cap shell). 

In this book, which deals only with broad out- 
lines, there is no need to discuss minute points 
of gun construction, which are mainly of tech- 
nical importance. On the other hand, in speak- 
ing of artillery we must not omit to mention a 
new weapon, gas, which attained great impor- 
tance especially as associated with artillery. 
Poisonous gases and irritants of various compo- 
sition were first used as an independent weapon 
during the war. Such gases were originally 
condensed in steel cylinders. The latter were 
placed in position in the trenches, and when the 
wind was favorable the gas was released 



THE DETERMINING FACTORS 27 

towards the enemy, upon whom it had a ter- 
rible effect — if he was taken by surprise. 

In the long run, however, this system proved 
impracticable. It depended too much upon the 
wind, which in certain circumstances might blow 
back the gas into our own lines. Our troops 
were also exposed to danger when the hostile 
artillery destroyed the gas cylinders. All the 
same, considerable successes were obtained by 
this method so long as the enemy was not pre- 
pared against this weapon. Finally, however, 
the disadvantages outweighed the advantages, 
and we therefore proceeded to produce artillery 
and trench-mortar gas shell. 

This had the advantage that we were less de- 
pendent upon the wind than hitherto, as the 
point of impact of the shell could be arranged 
behind or at the side of the target^ — according 
to the wind — and even if the wind direction was 
unfavorable there was far less danger to our 
own men than when the gas was released from 
our own lines. Moreover, we could now gas or 
infect troops and areas far behind the enemy's 
front, and this was particularly important, see- 
ing that the hostile artillery was always a long 
way back. 

The gases produced effects according to their 
nature, either by irritating the respiratory or- 



28 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE 

gans, nose and eyes, and thus putting the victim 
hors de combat for a certain time, or by caus- 
ing death on inhalation, or by infecting a whole 
area which had been heavily gassed for a con- 
siderable period so that no one could enter it 
with impunity for several days. Such gases 
are not only frequently fatal on inhalation but 
have a deleterious effect on the skin with which 
they come in contact and also produce blind- 
ness, while the effect of the first-mentioned 
gases is certainly injurious from a long dis- 
tance, but the effect does not last long. 

Gas masks have now been introduced uni- 
versally as a defense against gas. They ab- 
sorb the dangerous elements on inhalation and 
thus render it harmless. Of course they are 
not a protection against all gases, and if worn 
for a long time on end they prevent both the 
hostile infantry and artillery from taking very 
much part in the action. 

A form of warfare which is related to gas 
though quite different in its effects is the use of 
smoke shells and bombs. They do the enemy 
no direct harm but often effectively hinder him 
from using his ovm weapons. In particular, 
they conceal the attacker's movements from the 
eyes of the enemy so that it is possible to ap- 
proach his lines under cover, so to speak, and 



THE DETERMINING FACTORS 29 

thus the factor of surprise is much increased. 
Of course, it frequently hinders the attacker's 
o\vn movements also, as it is not always easy 
to keep direction or indeed use his own weapons 
in an area shrouded in smoke. 

In addition to the far-reaching changes in 
the composition and range of action of the ar- 
tillery, shooting itself has also undergone very 
material modifications. Before the World War 
we were, generally speaking, restricted to 
ground observation and this is the case to-day, 
at any rate in open warfare. Good observa- 
tion posts have become much more important. 
But in view of the immense range of modem 
guns, ground observation is certainly not pos- 
sible in all cases, and, generally speaking, is 
limited to actions at close quarters. The artil- 
lery also makes the fullest possible use of cover 
to escape observation. Distant targets can thus 
usually defy direct observation. In such cases 
the latter is replaced by observation from the 
air, captive balloons or artillery aeroplanes 
which report by wireless or telephone the posi- 
tion of the shots from the battery in action, so 
that correction is possible. 

Even this system is not always feasible, 
partly owing to the action of hostile aircraft 
and also because it is very difficult to pick out 



30 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE 

individual shots when a number of batteries are 
in action close together. It thus becomes neces- 
sary to fire at a target with some prospect of 
success even without direct observation. This 
aim has been acliieved by the use of various 
types of range-finders. In the first place the 
emplacement of the battery which is to fire is 
fixed trigonometrically, the survey posts are 
established, also by trigonometry, at various 
points in the neighborhood. From these points 
bearings are obtained at various angles upon 
the flashes from the enemy guns and thus the 
emplacement of the battery in action is estab- 
lished (flash-spotting). In other cases the posi- 
tion of the hostile battery is determined by cal- 
culating the time which the sound waves take 
from the moment of firing to reach the ranging 
posts. These calculations enable the position 
of the batteries firing to be determined quite 
accurately (sound-ranging). By this method it 
is also possible to determine the fall of the shots 
from one's owti batteries by the reports of their 
bursts, and thus fix them on the map. By con- 
tinuing the process they will be corrected to the 
target. In flash-spotting, on the other hand, 
bearings are taken if possible on the smoke of 
the bursts, the point of impact determined ac- 
cordingly and the corrections made. 



THE DETERMINING FACTORS 31 

Where the area in which the shells are falling 
cannot be seen from the survey posts, the fall 
of the shots can be determined with the help of 
the altimeter system in which a shot is fired in- 
tentionally with a very high time-fuse burst. 
From this the prospective point of impact of 
the shell if it had completed its trajectory is a 
matter of calculation. Corrections are made 
accordingly. 

When observations of the shell-bursts are im- 
possible from the ground or in any other way, 
we have to fall back on shooting without obser- 
vation altogether, but this is always exceptional. 
The conditions precedent to any measure of 
success are accurate knowledge of one's own 
position and that of the target, good maps and 
attention to the atmospheric "errors of the 
day" as well as the ''special errors" which in- 
fluence the trajectory of the shell. In these cir- 
cumstances our whole ranging and map system 
has reached a high degree of development. The 
army meteorological service had also been very 
useful. 

The direction and strength of the wind, the 
humidity of the atmosphere, air pressure and 
other factors influence the trajectory of the 
shell to a very considerable degree. In shoot- 
ing it is essential to take these ** errors of the 



32 THE AVAR OF THE FUTURE 

day'* into account. Meteorological observation 
posts are therefore established which note these 
atmospheric influences every day and report 
them to the batteries, so that these are in a 
position to take the influence of these various 
factors into consideration in practical shooting 
(which is put in tabular foiin). In this w^ay 
accuracy in shooting has been very greatly in- 
creased. 

There are, however, other special "errors'* 
which vary with the individual gun, and are 
due essentially to the different degrees of wear 
and tear. These special errors are determined 
at intervals by firing every single gun at a given 
range, so that the sighting for each piece is 
worked out for all ranges (the Pulkowsky sys- 
tem). This certainly makes shooting rather 
more difficult, but results in a considerably 
higher degree of accuracy for the whole battery. 

We have seen that the fire-power of the de- 
fending infantrj' and the fact that they have 
to hold a long and fortified trench system gave 
the first impetus to an extraordinary increase 
in the amount of artillery, and in the course of 
the war to the introduction of the most varied 
types of guns and a complicated system of 
shooting. "We shall now see that the infantry 
itself witnessed far-reaching changes in its own 



THE DETERMINING FACTORS 33 

weapons and thus in the whole sphere of tactics. 

Before the war the high rate of fire, range, 
trajectory and accuracy of the modem infantry 
rifle, which promised annihilating effects at 
short range, justified the supposition that fight- 
ing would mainly be at long range and that the 
attacking infantry would only gradually succeed 
in acquiring a superiority of fire and getting 
within storming distance of the defender. Our 
whole system of tactics was based on that as- 
sumption, and the first actions in the World 
War certainly took that form. We may also 
assume that, in future also, similar conditions 
will lead to similar actions in the case of en- 
counter battles in open warfare. 

But conditions changed completely when 
trench warfare began. The two opponents now 
came extremely near to each other, and the busi- 
ness of both attacker and defender was either 
to get at the enemy, who was protected by his 
trenches and wholly or partially invisible, or 
from the shelter of their own trenches to keep 
the enemy under fire when he stormed forward 
across the narrow space between, and this with- 
out exposing themselves too openly to the en- 
emy's fire. At first we had snipers armed with 
a rifle with telescopic sights who, from the cover 
of an armored shield, could hit even the small- 



34 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE 

est targets. Next the hand grenade was intro- 
duced, a weapon which was in use even before 
Frederickian times, and had been employed sys- 
tematically in the Russo-Japanese "War. It was 
now the principal infantry weapon at close 
quarters, as it was absolutely indispensable 
when working round the traverses which pro- 
tected the trenches against enfilading fire. It 
was equally necessary for surprise attacks on 
isolated posts and strong points. 

This, however, does not conclude the chapter 
on changes in infantry armament. The more 
enemies entered the field against us Germans — 
Italians, Rumanians, the newly-formed English 
national army, Asiatics, Africans, and finally 
Americans — and the more our losses accumu- 
lated in countless battles and actions, the more 
urgent did it become for us in defending our 
long battle-line to economize reserves in order 
to be able to bring them up to threatened points. 
This, and the requirement of concentrating our 
own fire-power in the attack, brought home to 
us — and by reaction to our enemies, who wanted 
to annihilate us by sheer force of numbers — 
the necessity of increasing the fire-power of the 
infantry while at the same time exposing as 
few men as possible to the enemy's fire in the 
front-line trenches in order to minimize losses. 



THE DETERMINING FACTORS 35 

These apparently contradictory demands 
were met by the introduction of the light ma- 
chine-gun, which gradually became the princi- 
pal infantry weapon and, as we shall see, has an 
immense influence upon its tactics. This light 
gun, which could be carried by one man, was 
equivalent to the fire of a whole platoon equip- 
ped with infantry rifles, and therefore enabled 
us to hold our front lines with a relatively 
small number of men both in attack and de- 
fense, and so economize reserves. This satis- 
fied our requirements. Even though it was 
necessary that the gun should be accompanied 
by a number of ammunition carriers, the total 
number of men emj)loyed was far less than 
would have been the case if the same fire-power 
had to be obtained by rifle fire alone. 

The heavy machine-gun, to which was as- 
signed the task of firing at the enemy from dom- 
inating or flanking positions as well as from 
long range, was of course retained and to-day it 
forms — through its indirect fire also — a mate- 
rial support for the infantry, especially in the 
defense. Further help in the defense was given 
by the stick-bomb thrower, which was useful for 
intensifying the barrage, and by the rifle gre- 
nade, which is certainly rather a primitive 
weapon. 



36 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE 

Yet it soon appeared that it was necessary to 
intensify the power of the infantry, especially 
in the attack, after this problem had been solved 
as regards defense by the introduction of trench 
guns and mortars. 

Realizing this fact and taught by experience 
that the advanced trench system could be so 
overwhelmed by the attacker's artillery and 
trench-mortars that it would be quite impossible 
to keep the defender's infantry in a position to 
resist, the latter proceeded to convert the whole 
area behind the front lines into a deep, defen- 
sive zone. There were not only several lines and 
positions one behind the other, but in the inter- 
vals between them, strong points and machine- 
gun nests were established, if possible, on a 
chessboard pattern, most of which would be 
hard for the hostile artillery to find and which 
would keep holding up the enemy as he ad- 
vanced. Thus the attacking infantry, even 
when they had captured the front lines, would 
find themselves continually being faced with 
fresh obstacles with which they could not deal 
with their owni resources. Yet their own artil- 
lery, which was a long way back, could not al- 
ways give them effective support, owing to the 
confusion of the action and the distribution of 
the strong points. The attacking infantry would 



THE DETERMINING FACTORS 37 

still have some in front of them while others 
would have been passed or left behind. 

In such circumstances observation and accu- 
rate shooting from the usual emplacements of 
the artillery is not always possible. The artil- 
lery cannot follow the successive phases of the 
infantry action very closely, and so cannot in- 
tervene at the decisive point soon enough. It 
is, therefore, necessary that the attacking in- 
fantry should have the appropriate weapon 
^vith them. They must thus be supplied with 
artillery escorts — light field batteries and bat- 
teries of '^ infantry*' guns of similar construc- 
tion — and very mobile portable trench-mlortars 
which will be able to settle the hostile centers 
of resistance with the help of ground observa- 
tion and direct fire. For the same purpose the 
infantry is now equipped with flame-throwers 
which shoot a mass of flaming liquid at the 
enemy and thus annihilate him, though, of 
course, only at short ranges. 

But even these measures did not seem to 
strengthen the attack enough to make it cer- 
tain of getting right through. Automobiles 
were therefore constrncted, our enemies being 
first in the field in this department, which were 
armored cars completely closed in and armed 
with machine-guns and quick-firing guns. 



38 THE WAR OF THE FUTUEE 

These were the so-called tanks, which were fit- 
ted with very strong petrol engines and, be- 
ing proof against infantry fire, were sent for- 
ward against the defender's lines with a view 
to opening a road for the infantry following up 
behind. They were constructed in such a way 
that they smashed through obstacles, climbed 
over trenches and artificial cover quite easily, 
and brought an overwhelming enfilading fire 
to bear upon the enemy's broken lines. 

This tank, which was somewhat clumsy and 
rather slow at first, was gradually improved 
very materially, and to-day must be regarded 
as the principal weapon in the armorj'- of the 
Entente. At the moment it is quite impossible 
to say where this development will lead and 
whether the tanks will permanently prove their 
value. However that may be, they were con- 
structed in thousands by our enemies and at 
first gained great successes by surprise. 

They were of the most varied types. The 
original type of clumsy and slow-moving tank 
was subsequently used only for transporting 
ammunition and other material into the front 
lines. The real battle tanks, on the other hand, 
were constructed in practically two types, the 
heavy battle tank and a lighter and faster tank 
which was commissioned to rush forward into 



THE DETERMINING FACTORS 39 

the enemy lines as fast as possible and cause a 
panic on the lines of communication. Further, 
there were yet larger tanks, which were not 
for fighting only but designed to carry a con- 
siderable number of men and machine-guns 
which could be deposited behind the enemy lines 
when these had been broken through, so that 
they could take the defenders in the rear. 

Tanks were divided into male, female, and 
hybrid tanks according to their armament. The 
males were those which had two quick-firing 
guns in addition to machine-guns, females those 
which had machine-guns only, while the hybrids 
had machine guns and only one quick-firing gun. 
Taking them all round, these armored cars are 
a weapon which must not be underestimated. 
They may, however, be perhaps compared with 
the elephants which Pyrrhus originally brought 
into the field against the Romans. He sent 
them out in front of his infantry and at first 
they produced an immense military and moral 
effect upon his enemy. Before long, however, 
the surprised Romans found the right antidote, 
and the elephant attack failed before their in- 
telligent courage. 

Similar armored cars were constructed in 
Germany also, and they must certainly be re- 



40 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE 

garded as in no way inferior to those of the 
enemy. 

These contributions to the armory of the at- 
tack naturally led to counter-measures on the 
part of the defense. Infantry ammtmition was 
produced which could pierce the armor of the 
tanks. Special anti-tank guns were introduced 
for the purpose of achieving that object with 
greater certainty. Special guns were placed in 
the defensive zone for the purpose of fighting 
tanks. They were supplied with armor-piercing 
shell and assigned the task of destroying the 
advancing tanks by direct hits at close range. 
Narrow passages which the tanks had to pass 
through were fitted with concrete slabs which 
the dreaded war-machine could not get past 
(especially in the back areas). Lastly, the de- 
fenses, known as ** tank-traps," were con- 
structed in such a way that it was very difficult 
for the tanks to climb over them. We thus suc- 
ceeded in paralyzing the influence of this war- 
machine to a very material degree. We cap- 
tured or destroyed large numbers of them. All 
the same, when properly employed, they were 
a useful weapon. 

But though the arming of the infantry, and 
more particularly the artillery, with the new 
weapons assigned to these two principal arms 



THE DETERMINING FACTORS 41 

has settled the form of conducting a modem 
action and determined the character of the de- 
cisive battle, there are other discoveries in the 
realm of armament which have in many respects 
a very vital influence. Aviation must be given 
the place of honor here. 

Even before the war a decided beginning had 
been made with the development of the air 
arm. Dirigible airships had already reached a 
stage approaching perfection. The captive bal- 
loon was certainly not appreciated as it should 
be, but aviation, the growing importance of 
which was certainly not fully realized, was un- 
doubtedly making gratifying progress though 
it was still in its infancy. This all changed very 
quickly when the war began. The captive bal- 
loon recovered its place of honor as an observa- 
ation post both in trench and open warfare, 
and before long aircraft attained high strate- 
gical and tactical importance with which the 
construction of the machines themselves kept 
pace, while that of dirigibles, which had still 
played a certain part at the beginning, became 
more and more secondary as we succeeded in 
constructing aeroplanes with a great radius of 
action and an increased carrjdng capacity. 

To-day this problem has been completely 
solved. The following types are now distin- 



42 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE 

giiished: recomioitering squadrons, bombing 
squadrons, battle and pursuit flights, all of 
which have their special tasks to perform either 
individually or in regular tactical units — the 
necessity of which I had already emphasized in 
my book. Modern War. 

The principal task of the reconnoitering 
squadrons is to photograph the hostile lines 
and find out what the enemy is doing far be- 
hind his front. Aeroplane photography has 
reached a very advanced stage of development. 
Photographic work can also be done from cap- 
tive balloons. Thus air reconnaissance, espe- 
cially for strategical and tactical distant recon- 
naissance, is a substitute for cavalry which in 
the nature of things has no place in trench war- 
fare and in open warfare receives very material 
assistance from air reconnaissance. Air craft 
are also responsible for close reconnaissance, 
where they work with infantry patrols, while 
this duty falls exclusively to the infantry in 
trench warfare. 

Another duty of reconnoitering planes is to 
assist the artillery to find their targets by spot- 
ting and reporting the bursts. They also keep 
the front infantiy lines in touch with their com- 
mand posts in the rear. In certain conditions 
they are able to carry ammunition and food to 



THE DETERMINING FACTORS 43 

infantry in action (infantry flights). In order 
to keep in touch with the troops, the machines, 
especially the artillery machines, are fitted with 
wireless telegraphic and telephonic apparatus 
while the troops are supplied with a similar 
apparatus. 

The bombing squadrons consist of machines 
with very great carrying capacity so that bombs 
up to 1,000 kg. can be carried. There are large 
bombers and giant bombers, the latter being the 
largest of all. They carry bombs and their 
function is to attack hostile billets, supply 
dumps, railways, hangars and important indus- 
trial establishments from the air. The effect of 
their bombs is sometimes very extraordinary. 
They may have very sensitive or delay-action 
fuses according to whether their purpose is to 
obtain a great, low and wide lateral burst or 
sm'ash through a target offering much resist- 
ance. On special occasions bombing squadrons 
were accompanied by smaller machines, to 
which were assigned such tasks as attacking 
trains, for which purpose they had to dive down 
over the target in order to hit and destroy it 
with the so-called aeroplane ''mines." 

The battle flights, on the other hand, were 
deputed to intervene directly in the battle of the 
other arms going on below. The pursuit flight 



44 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE 

had the duty of protecting the other categories 
when at their work, to attack hostile machines 
wherever found and fight for the mastery of the 
air. They were constructed specially for that 
purpose and were therefore particularly fast 
and handy. 

All aeroplanes are armed, some in front for 
offensive purposes, others in such a way as to 
be able to beat off hostile attack from the air. 
The reconnaissance, battle and bombing ma- 
chines each have one fixed and one mobile ma- 
chine-gun. The armored infantry planes, which 
are thus as safe against rifle and machine-gun 
fire as it is possible to make them, form an ex- 
ception. At first they had a pair of coupled 
machine-guns in the floor of the observer's seat, 
these for shooting vertically downwards, in ad- 
dition to a mobile machine-gun for the observer. 
Subsequently, the coupled machine-guns proved 
unsuitable and were replaced by a single one. 
Finally the pursuit machines were armed with 
two fixed machine-guns. 

In addition to their special functions all air- 
craft were used for purposes of signaling and 
communication, whether by wireless messages 
to the headquarters or units (e. g., batteries) or 
by dropping smoke indicators — which can be 
seen from a great distance — which contained 



THE DETERMINING FACTORS 45 

messages in a special case. Carrier pigeons 
could also be sent out from aeroplanes. 

Tlie air arm with its many functions thus 
represents an extremely important discovery 
for all armies, and seems destined to exercise 
an influence which will be decisive in many re- 
spects on the development of strategy and tac- 
tics. Even the question of fortresses will be 
affected by it— as I prophesied before the war. 
It has already given a very important proof 
of its influence on strategy in the fact that we 
are now compelled to carry out all strategic and 
operative movements at night, in order to con- 
ceal them from aerial observation. It has also 
led to numerous camouflage measures in order 
to make battery emplacements, defenses and 
so on unrecognizable by enemy airmen. 

The mechanical side of war has had a vital 
influence in another very important department 
—the intelligence and signal service— and for 
the first time made possible the control and 
command of modern mass armies in theaters of 
war as large as those the World War has seen. 

The usual Morse telegraph system, which is 
still employed for minor telegraphic communica- 
tion (and for long after 1870-71 formed the only 
means of communication between the different 
armies and units), has otherwise completely 



46 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE 

vanished from the army. The telephone is the 
ordinary means of communication between the 
different units of the army and between the 
army and home. It is the indispensable means 
of communication between the division and all 
its subordinate units, and where necessary, con- 
versation is in code so that if the enemy over- 
hears it no harm is done. Between the division 
and the corps the so-called "tapper" is in use, 
a device which enables six hundred words an 
hour to be transmitted. It is a telegraphic ap- 
paratus which gives taps corresponding to the 
Morse code, and these are heard by the receiv- 
ing station. 

Between the corps, army and army group 
headquarters the telegraph is used, which, 
thanks to a clever American invention, is able to 
transmit one thousand words in writing per 
hour, so that the receiving station gets the com- 
munication in the form of a written telegram 
which no one else can read. Between the group 
headquarters and general headquarters, as well 
as between the latter, the central authorities at 
home and other theaters of war — possibly very 
far away — the Siemens high-speed telegraph is 
employed, a system which transmits five thous- 
and words an hour, the receiving station again 
getting the communication in the form of a 



THE DETERMINING FACTORS 47 

written telegram. The apparatus required is 
fixed, and specially-sprung rolling stock is 
necessary when it has to be moved. 

To such extraordinary heights and perfec- 
tion has ordinary telegraphy attained. 

Side by side with it wireless telegraphy is 
also in current use in the army. According to 
the apparatus employed, it permits communica- 
tion one or both ways. In the first case, mes- 
sages can only be received; in the other, both 
received and transmitted. A wireless detach- 
ment is assigned to every division, and with its 
help the latter can keep in touch with its subor- 
dinate organizations, brigade, regimental and 
battalion headquarters, as well as artillery com- 
mand posts. It is advisable, however, to im- 
pose certain restrictions on its use, as other- 
wise the individual exchanges get out of order 
very easily. For instance, artillery aeroplanes 
should have transmitting apparatus only when 
they are spotting for the artillery ; the batteries 
concerned should have only a receiving appa- 
ratus. 

The larger units also are in wireless com- 
munication with each other. 

The divisional wireless detachments are given 
power-buzzers, which, by using the conductivity 
of the earth, establish wireless communication 



48 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE 

without any special apparatus being necessary. 
The earth itself transmits the communication. 
The installation, which is a very simple affair, 
can be used both for transmitting and receiv- 
ing. An amplifier valve makes it possible for 
the human ear to catch even comparatively 
weak currents which pass through the ground. 
The same principle is utilized for the listening 
set stations, which enable the occupants in cer- 
tain circumstances to listen to the enemy's con- 
versation by telegraph or telephone, because 
the electric currents which the enemy is using, 
and which are to a certain extent running at 
large through the ground, may be caught up 
in the receiving apparatus. 

In addition to these electrical hearing and 
communication systems, lamp signaling is still 
resorted to. Powerful electric lamps flash sig- 
nals which correspond to the Morse code from 
the front to the rear, and vice versa. They are 
generally used by the division, and put it in com- 
munication with all parts of the line down to 
companies in the front line, trenches and artil- 
lery observation posts. According to the power 
of the lam'p and its corresponding range, the 
apparatus is classified as large, medium and 
small. Unfortunately, its radius of action is 
very limited in wet or foggy weather. 



THE DETERMINING FACTORS 49 

Where all these resources fail, messenger 
dogs and carrier pigeons are employed and 
supplied to the troops. The pigeons return to 
their homing lofts very quickly and the mes- 
sages they carry are then sent on by telephone. 
Carrier pigeons have often done very good 
work where all other means of communication 
failed. Generally speaking, they were particu- 
larly reliable. 

Message shells can also be used in appro- 
priate circumstances. Specially constructed 
projectiles were fired from trench-mortars 
(light) or bomb-throwers in the front line to a 
receiving station behind ; on impact they burst 
open, giving off a good deal of smoke, and thus 
deliver the message which is contained in a 
special case. Finally, signals which have pre- 
viously been agreed upon can be given by light- 
balls of various colors and shapes — demands 
for artillery fire at a certain spot ; lengthening 
or shortening the range, etc. Further, sound 
signals, sirens and similar devices which carry 
a long way can be used as alarm signals, for ex- 
ample, or to convey some message which has 
been agreed upon beforehand. 

These communication systems, every detail of 
which has been thought out, make it possible, 
generally speaking, to get safe and compara- 



50 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE 

lively reliable conuHunication between the va- 
rious headquarters in the rear and the troops 
in the line, even during the most violent artil- 
lery drum-fire. On the other side, they assure 
certain communication between headquarters 
which are separated by immense distances. For 
example, the Siemens high-speed telegraph in- 
sured rapid communication between Berlin and 
Constantinople. 

Apart from rapid communication between the 
central organization and the individual units 
of the mass army, the latter itself has to be 
made as mobile as possible. I have already 
referred to the importance of railways and 
roads in this connection. After the rapid re- 
construction of the main lines and their subse- 
quent extension in the theater of war, field 
railways, which are quickly laid, are an indis- 
pensable aid to the transport of modem armies 
to-day. However, seeing that such a railway 
network cannot be made movable, but is always 
more or less a fixture, some extension had to 
be found which could not be supplied by horse- 
transport alone. 

This gap was filled by the automobile, both 
motor-cars and lorries, which materially facil- 
itated and, indeed, alone made possible the sup- 
ply of the army, at any rate, in regions where 



THE DETERMINING FACTORS 51 

good roads were to be found. This invention 
has made it possible to convey considerable 
loads in relatively few vehicles, thus shortening 
the columns, to expedite transport very mate- 
rially, and lastly— in theaters where there is a 
large network of good roads— to economize 
horses, which are thus to a great extent released 
for roadless regions where the use of heavy 
motor transport is impossible. 

Motor transport is put to special uses in con- 
nection with artillery. It is employed very 
largely for bringing up ammunition and also 
used for moving heavy guns. Such guns are 
also mounted on motor lorries, which then serve 
the double function of emplacement and means 
of locomotion. Motors are, moreover, very use- 
ful for accelerating the removal of the wounded 
and for taking superior officers on long jour- 
neys. Thus, in their different forms and meth- 
ods of employment, they are a very considerable 
help in conducting the operations and move- 
ments of a modern army. In an emergency 
whole units can be transferred from one part of 
the front to another by mechanical transport. 
Our enemies in the West frequently made use 
of this system. Indeed, it is worth considering 
whether it would not be possible to make much 



52 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE 

groator iiso of petrol veliiclos for luoviiig artil- 
lery, perhaps ovoii on tlie battletield. 

We have already seen hoNV the tiuiks were 
used iu au advance. 



CHAPTER II 

T ACT ICH 

It is obvious that a revolution in the mili- 
tary art Huch an the Groat War witnoKSod 
muHt also have had an onormouH infiuoncc on 
the manner in which the different arms were 
employed. The introduction of now weapons 
chan^cid the form of operations completely; on 
the other hand, the fact that the relation be- 
tween the size of the armies and the area of 
the theater of war inevitably involved new 
methods in the conduct of those operations (as 
I have already shown), and the further fact 
that the very variety of armament and the dif- 
ferent standards of training which the mass 
levy made inevitable had the same effect, in- 
troduced a factor of uncertainty into fighting 
which must always be borne in mind if military 
action is to be effective. 

Thus, before we can get a proper idea of 
modern tactics, we must first ascertain what 
influence all the discoveries of the World War 
have had on the movement and employment 

63 



54 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE 

of tho individual arms. Only thus mil it be 
possible to formulate tactical principles which 
"svill be able to lay some claim to universality. 
In many directions this has already been done. 
In so doing it is essential to start with the 
infantry, even though the role of the artillery 
has become much more important in modern 
times. The infantry is undoubtedly the arm 
which by its attack makes victory tangible, even 
tliongh the way was paved by its sister arms, 
ajid gives practical expression to it by gaining 
ground or taking a large number of prisoners. 
It is the infantry again to which the strategic 
exploitation of tactical successes is mainly as- 
signed. "SVe must therefore give the place of 
honor to the intluence which the new discoveries 
of the war have had upon it. 

I. — Infantry 

The idea that the infantry action would begin 
at long range and only gradually lead to fighting 
at close quarters has now proved erroneous, 
for the stronger the artillery became in com- 
parison with the infantry and the weaker the 
latter became (at any rate in Germany), owing 
to the losses incurred in years of lighting, the 
greater was the prominence which the action at 
close quarters attained. The attack presup- 



TACTICS 55 

pOBes numerical superiority in both arms and 
moral superiority at any rate in the infantry. 
In this way — as we saw — the attacker's artil- 
lery is in a position to keep down the hostile 
artillery, while at the same time cooperating 
with the trench-mortars in so innning the de- 
fender's infantry down to their cover that they 
can make no use of their weapons during the ar- 
tillery preparation, and will not be able to do so 
until the attacker's artillery "lifts" to allow 
his infantry to go forward. The latter, under 
the protection of their superior artillery, 
presses on against the enemy without suffer- 
ing too heavy losses, but can itself make effec- 
tive use of its weapons only when the defender's 
infantry appears behind its cover in order to 
fire. Thus the infantry action generally be- 
gins at very close quarters. 

Yet this certainly does not mean that the 
process may not often take a different form. 
When there is no definite superiority on one 
side, for whatever reason, and particularly in 
open warfare, the character of the infantry 
action will probably change, and it seems quite 
possible that the fighting in these circumstances 
would again begin at long range and victory 
would be brought by some means other than a 
superior artillery. One method of making a 



56 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE 

successful frontal attack without such a supe- 
riority has already been tried. 

Our enemies have repeatedly attempted to 
enable their infantry to get forward, without 
the necessity of silencing the defender's artil- 
lery as a preliminary, by making their attacks 
as great a surprise as possible. Several 
''waves" of tanks, follo^^'ing closely on each 
other, covered the advance of the infantry and 
tried to claim the defender's attention so com- 
pletely and draw his fire so effectively that it 
would be possible for the attacking infantry, 
under the protection of these armored vehicles, 
not only to get to close quarters with their op- 
ponents but to break through their lines and 
roll them up. The attack was also frequently 
shrouded in artificial fog to conceal it from the 
enemy. This method gained our enemies sev- 
eral important successes, and in turn demanded 
new counter-measures appropriate to the cir- 
cumstances. 

Infantry methods were also affected by the 
fact that the machine-gun has become its prin- 
cipal weapon. The requirements of defense 
first led to an increase in the number of heavy 
machine-guns, and then — in order to get on 
level terms with the attacker again — to the in- 
troduction of the light machine-gun, which en- 



TACTICS 57 

abled a really great fire-power to be developed 
in the attack by even a thin line in open order, 
so long as the required ammunition was at hand. 
They gave the defender the further advantage 
that they are quite independent of the terrain 
and permit a rapid concentration of fire at the 
decisive point. As I have said, the supply of 
heavy machine-guns to the troops was also in- 
creased; these represent a very great addition 
to the fire-power, particularly in the defense, 
and are able to inflict most serious losses on an 
imprudent attacker. 

This has led to changes in the whole tactical 
grouping of the infantry. As compared with 
former times, the distribution has been com- 
pletely revolutionized. 

If the requirements of defense and subse- 
quently of a more powerful attack led to the in- 
troduction of the machine-gun as the main 
weapon of the infantry, the situation thus pro- 
duced involved the necessity of equipping the 
infantry with new weapons for its task in the 
attack. This increase of offensive power was 
also required as a reply to certain tactical 
measures which were designed to supplement 
the intensified fire-power of the defense. 

The chief of these measures was the estab- 
lishment of a defensive zone to which I have al- 



58 TllK WAIJ OV TllK FUTURFi 

ready ivt'orrod. It had boon ooutimially tJu> 
oaso that tho attackiiii:: infantry simply t>vorran 
tho front lino and oaptnrod tho i::arrison. 

Tho ilofondor awordiiigly distribiitod his 
trv^ops in depth and while holding his front lino 
relatively lightly, spread his men over a oom- 
plox of strong points, niaolii no-gun nests, 
treneli mortar groups and single battery oni- 
plaeoments some way hixok. Those did not fi>rni 
a continuous line and therefore oould not be 
subjected to siinultaneous bombanhnent if they 
wore distributed skillfully and ineonspieuously 
over the area in question. Thus tho attaeking 
infantry, even when they had taken the front 
linos, found themselves faeed with fresh cen- 
ters of resistance whidi could often be over- 
<.Hnne only by artillery, anil when at length they 
had masteroii this fortitieii zone they came up 
against the defender's main line of resistance 
and u\et tho full force of a counter-attack by 
tho hostile reserves as well as the tire of the 
defender's artillery (which was far biick), and 
this frequently without their owii artillery be- 
ing able to give them adequate support. 

Thus the problem before the attacker was to 
got through this defensive zone — oven when his 
own artillery had not completely prepared it for 
assault by tho preliminary bombardment — and 



TACTIC8 59 

to hit ahht to haai off the hostile coant^r-atta/jk, 
aprain with h/V; ariiWcry . 

A-6 I hav^j haid b^^forc, all thin imuic' it rj';r:/;»- 
uary that the nUmmu'^ Inf^tdry nhouUl ha n^ii^- 
plUui w'tih ''Uifauiry f^un'* to acc/>mpany thcrfl, 
OH wall aw ftorbihUi light trerich-mortar« whirii 
c^iuI/1 d^jhtroy the ^in^jmy'K *'rK;8t«'' by dinxit 
fire if poHHihUt at «hort range, and b^.-ing entirely 
at the <liHp()6iil of the infantry groups would be 
at han/i at any raoment they were required. 
ThuK Kt/jHTj groijpH were formed, consisting of 
infantry, nj;iehine-gun se^Hions, field artillery 
and treneh-rnortar deta/ihrnents, which enjoyed 
a c^irtain tactical indef>^indence. The defender 
however, c^mnterfjd them with groups similarly 
composed. 

7'hiH arrangement naturally presupposed cer- 
tain definitfj cr^nditions, c/mditions which per- 
mitted the main line of resistance to be estab- 
lished behind the rear-mont line of the defensive 
zone, so that this ry^uld be abandoned to the 
enemy in case of ne^^d. Where this is not the 
case and a definite line— say a water-course or 
a line of heights— has to be held and there is 
no a/lvaneed zone which can be occupied, a dif- 
ferent system muni, of courne, be adopted. But 
even in these clrcumstanc^^s the direct cooper- 
ation of infantry with trench-mortars and bomb- 



60 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE 

throwers, artillery in the form of trench-guns, 
and hea\y machine-guns has proved advanta- 
geous. The same applies to the encounter battle 
in open warfare. 

It all depends upon circumstances. It is 
only the situation at the moment which can 
decide what measures must be taken. In these 
circumstances there is no room for tactics which 
are universally applicable like those before the 
war. On the other hand, certain individual 
principles may be laid do^vn by which action 
should be determined in particular circum- 
stances, and which, with a few formal manuals, 
form the basis of the rules. In such conditions 
it would be a mistake for the rules to go too far. 

The first principle which must be accepted as 
of universal application in infantry tactics is 
that the light machine-gun (which is undoubt- 
edly capable of improvement) is the principal 
weapon of the infantry, that every man must be 
perfectly familiar with its use and yet must be 
trained with the rifle also. The latter require- 
ment is indispensable. It will not always be 
possible to employ the machine-gun, and tar- 
gets will often present themselves with which 
that weapon is unfitted to deal. On reconnoi- 
tering patrols and similar enterprises the ma- 
chine-gun would be a hindrance rather than a 



TACTICS 61 

help. It requires big targets to give full effect 
to its fire-power. Further, every man must be 
familiar with the use of the hand grenade, for 
there is no soldier who will not find himself 
in need of it some time or other. It is inval- 
uable against targets behind cover, e. g., in 
trench or street fighting. 

Next we may be quite certain that infantry 
fighting (i. e., infantry against infantry), apart 
from small raids due to special circumstances, 
will never again be possible without artillery 
support, because the fire-power of infantry 
which have not been rendered helpless by artil- 
lery is far too great and destructive for it to 
be overcome even by a superior force of in- 
fantry without the help of the sister arms. 
Thus the attacker especially cannot possibly 
dispense with powerful artillery support, and 
it will be a necessity for the defender also if 
his own infantry is prevented from making 
full use of its weapons by the hostile artillery 
fire. 

Given these general principles for the tactical 
employment of troops, two broad groups of 
fighting methods must be presumed, groups 
which correspond to totally different conditions 
-—fighting for a fortified position and the battle 
in open warfare. These two characteristic 



62 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE 

p:ronps can also bo distina^nished in real moun- 
tain warfare, but in tliis ease the ])eeuliarities 
ol" the terrain^ frecjuently liave sneli a decisive 
influence that this kind of warfare requires spe- 
cial and separate consideration. In this book 
I \vill confine mj^self to war in hilly or flat coun- 
try. 

In the first place, we must clearly realize that 
the first group permits of numerous variations, 
while the second will never be entirely ^vithout 
the use of field fortifications. The defender will 
always tiy to dig in, and a pure encounter bat- 
tle will be seen only when two attacks collide, 
and then only until one of the two opponents 
decides to act on the defensive, and thus resorts 
to the intrenchinj::-tool once more : that is, if the 
maneuvers of his enemy do not compel him to 
defend himself like^vise by maneuvering, e. g., 
meeting the threat of envelopment by a counter- 
attack. 

It is thus impossible to lay do^^^l fixed and 
uniform rules even for these two great groups. 
There must always be a margin within the lim- 
its of which there must be liberty to take the 
special local circumstances into consideration. 
xVt the same time certain rules will always hold 
good under all conditions. Of these the most 
important are : 



TACTICS 63 

1. That whatever tactical systems or forms 
are employed, the increased power of artillery 
fire (which is quite extraordinary in compar- 
ison with past times) mlist he allowed for to 
the fullest extent. 

2. That wherever unmounted troops are 
employed, there must be a certain distribution 
in depth. 

3. That no attack may be initiated which 
has no definite center of gravity. 

The whole enemy front must not be attacked 
in equal strength at all points. The main force 
of the attacker's fire and offensive power must 
be concentrated at one point, so that victory 
may be won at that point, a victory the effect of 
which will rapidly spread to the rest of the bat- 
tle-front. In the same way no one must ever 
act on the defensive without reserves with which 
to meet the decisive thrust of the enemy. These 
definite principles will determine the depth of 
the distribution, the comparative strength of 
the individual elements of the defensive organ- 
ization and the task which falls to each of those 
elements. 

We will take the attack first. 

In real open warfare the fundamental prin- 
ciple of the organization in depth will be the 
same as hitherto. The first wave must remain, 



64 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE 

but it will consist of lines of men in open order 
and as thin as possible, in order to keep do^\Ti 
losses, and a very large number of machine- 
guns, so that the greatest possible lire-power 
can be developed. Behind them will come the 
supports, whose business it is to replace the 
losses in the front line and strengthen it if 
circumstances require. They must also be in 
extended order, and must always dig in if they 
have to stay in one place for any considerable 
time. They may also go fonvard in waves if 
circumstances make it necessary. 

Still farther back \xi]l be the reserves, which 
will be used to feed the action when all the sup- 
ports have been dra^vn in ; if the battle is fluctu- 
ating they ^vdll be employed to force a decision 
by a resolute attack in close order, or perhaps 
to beat off a hostile counter or flank attack. 
They may also use open order if the enemy's 
fire makes it necessar3^ Escort batteries and 
infantry gims must accompany the reserves, to 
enable them to intervene quickly and support 
the storm troops innnediately their own artil- 
lery is prevented, by defective observation or 
any other cause, from helping the infantry at- 
tack directly and at all points with its fire. 

In attacks against a fortified position two 
cases must be distinguished, according to 



TACTICS 65 

whether the defender is compelled by local cir- 
cumstances to hold his front line, or is occupy- 
ing a forward zone— an outpost zone, so to. 
speak— with a view to gradually falling back 
fighting on his main line of resistance, and even 
if that is broken through, continuing his re- 
sistance in a prepared battle zone behind. 

In the first case the enemy will always at- 
tempt to put down a curtain of fire— barrage or 
annihilating fire— in front of his own lines, in 
order to prevent a rapid advance of the attack- 
er's infantry, and enable his own troops 
promptly to leave the cover to which the at- 
tacker's artillery fire has driven them. 

When this happens the business of the attack- 
ing infantry is not so much to develop a great 
fire-power in their first wave— as it will usually 
be unnecessary for them to subdue the defend- 
ing infantry by their own fire— as to get through 
the hostile barrage or destructive curtain as 
quickly as possible and with the minimum loss. 
In such cases it will frequently be necessary 
to organize the front fighting line in several 
well-separated waves, with big intervals be- 
tween the individual riflemen and machine-gun- 
ners. In this case the successive waves will 
have different tasks. Generally speaking, the 
first will have to advance to a definite point— 



tk» TUK WAlx OK rilK FT ri RK 

«»n«a\y*S! t\r?«t pv^^siuou. How it will 
tVnvd by tiio $t>«HUui Tho other wuvos will 
IwYO to **nK>p uv^** tho wpturxxi trvnoht^^ aiul 
iUwl with any of tho dotViuior^ sJlill in thoan. 
Others will havo to hriw^ up out:ivuohiii^ 
tvHvK amniunitioti at\d machin«>-^iu$ «;> quiokl>>* 
as jHVjiij^iWo* in oixlor to adv^^pt tho o^^^tunxl 
tr^m^OiS' fivr dotVuso without dolay. If tho tVout 
of tho attaok is limittxi s^nvial storm trxH^vs 
will K^ assi»nu\l tho ts^sk of sovniriu^ tho tlauks 
of tho oc»pturv\i iH^sitiou in orvlor to bo safo 
against Kx\^l ommtor-attaoks by th^ o«on\y. 
Liistly« rosor\*os will follow to o:xtond tho su«s 
cess iraint\i» if at all v^vi^iblo, carry on tho 
attack aiivi o^unplotol^- soourv tho oapturod 

jTWHlud. 

Tho object of tho organiiation in dopth. and 
thoroforv^ its distribution* will Iv otherwise 
wUoro the attack is dealiu^r with an enojivv who 
is not inervl\- endeavoring to hold a certain 
line, but has arnwigovl a mobile defense dt^ 
signtxl to bring the attack to a head in the 
forwaixi Kone» brt\Hk its foiw therx\ atul vleal 
the divisive blow with the mavtt forvv only when 
tho attacking trvH^ps haw roacht\l a line much 
farther back. The attacking infantry in this 
case must ad\*anco in sever ' w vo«i. each wav\? 



OTfrfinhcj] in ii<:\,i\i; Uk-, tiUTfi})<',r of lh<j v/uvch 
wJJi i)<t <lit'.U;n(i'nii:<\ hy Iho dcpUi of the ^jrj<;rny'H 
forward zoik-.h and the Htmnj^^h of hiH (hA'cMhivc 
Hyniam. 

In KinmniHifinojiH Kuch an thcHO thic attackor 
muHi bft pnjparod to '■.nc/mnicr a lar^^e nurribor 
of rrjachin'; p^ijjj and ircncAi mori'dr uc/niH, v/hich 
will (;nd<;avor f.o hold up hin advanw;, and which 
wiJI f^ananxWy ha very hard to ovrjrc^;mo, ;jij 
machine; pfun finj cjjnnot uHually b^; qtjollod by 
a frontal attack. Jlc will alno frcfjucntly find 
artillery ^roupH, HcctionH, and even inolated 
gun»— ail of which will be very hard to get 
at— in the forward zone. The attacker'H taftk 
Ih not to let hi8 advanr^; be held up, but to get 
forward aH quickly aH poHHible and in the great- 
CHt poHHible Htrength. \n thewe circurnHtanc^^s 
— ^afl r have already nhown — r;Hc^>rt batteries 
and light trench -mo Ha fh rnuHt follow hard on 
thr; heeln of tfie Htorrn troopH in order to defitroy 
the enemy 'h wnterH of rcMminncAi without delay. 
The infantry of the firnt wave must not allow 
itH(;lf to be heM u^) by the (MauHCH of the 
enemy. They rnuxt mjikr; i-^vcry f;ffort to turn 
the hoHtile ntrong pointw, aH frontal attackK 
wonld co8t too heavy Iohhch, and not allow their 
progreHH to be hindered by them. Their cap- 
ture muflt be left to later waven, which must 



()8 TllK. W Alx OK TllK FrTUUE 

try to (v^tlnro thorn from Iho tlnnks, or. if pos- 
siblo, tlio roar, aftor tlio infantry i»'nns ai\d lij^lit 
tronohinortars liavo proparoii thoni for assault 
by dirool tiro. 

FiVory possiMo otVort must bo luaclo to arrive 
before the enemy's main line o\^ resislanee in 
the ii'reat est [>ossibU> stroniilh and fnrthor to 
have fresh rosorvos at hand at this moment. 
for a hostiU^ eonntor-attack. or a position which 
is parlienlarly stronj>-ly const rnetod and heUl, 
nmst now be expected. The position may con- 
sist of a series of strong' points or of one contin- 
uous lino, and can therefore bo dealt with only 
by a strong" force. It is also obvious that the 
attacker's artillery must prepare this line for 
assault as soon as possible, and also subject 
the area bchiuil it to a ho.wy bombardment, to 
prevent the .approach of the enemy's reserves 
and break up their counter-attaok. 

In these circumstances a very deep distribu- 
tion of the attacker's infantry in two, three or 
more w.avos is oi' vital importance, as I h.ave 
said. Generally speakii^ii". it will be necessary 
to divide the individual comi\anios into three 
parts — a front line in open order, supports to 
follow them, and lastly an assault detachment 
at the disposal o( the company conuuauilor. an 
clement desig:ned io secure him some intlnonce 



TACJTICS 69 

on the courHo of th(! fM^ht Tho hoavy machino- 
^uriH will he. id po'inin which command or cn- 
iWndv, iho fi(;J(J of action, and the commander 
will endeavor to direct their fire to the point 
w}j(!n! ifio docinion in bein^ Hought. They must 
b(! (;oncenlrat(!(l aH I'ar an poHnible, in order to 
make full ijhc of their great fire-power. 

The tank attack, to which I have already re- 
ferred, will aJHO be UHeful in such circum- 
HtanccR. The tanks advance fifty to one hun- 
dred paces ali(!ad of the infantry, in order 
to destroy all obstacles, break through the 
enemy's lines, and thus enable the infantry to 
get througli. They will also endeavor to throw 
the enemy into confusion and attack him from 
the rear. The effect of their fire is relatively 
small — especially in rough country, and as a 
result of the artificial fog, which is designed to 
protect them against th(» enemy's fire — as ac- 
curate shooting is nvndered very difficult by 
their movement and the conditions mentioned. 
On the other hand, they are, to a certain extent, 
capable of putting down men and machine-guns 
behind the enomy's brok(!n lines, and thus 
threat(!ning him in the rear. 

Before them goes an artillery barrage, de- 
signed to keep the enemy's infantry under 
cover and frustrate the fire of the anti-tank 



70 THK WAIC OK TUK KlTrKK 

jjuns, Vot this K'\n\M>io onn soKloiw bo voiy 
ovonl^* div'^tributvHl v>r uuifonw. as all tho tanks 
v'.v.not j?\H forwnnl at tho samo paoo in nnovon 
cinintry — thoy niovo factor mor tirnt. Knol 
iironmi thaw on a ditVunilt tt'miht — iiuvi thns 
thoY soon fail to koop in lino. Whon at last, 
in orvlor to uj^o thoir arnuunont, thoy appoar 
out of tho fo>r whioh has oiMnvalod thoir ap- 
prv\\i>l\, tlio barraijv^ whioh has a^VvMnpaniini 
thoir advaniv has boon loft bohind auil thoy 
oomo within rai\ir\^ of tho tiro of tho ant i tank 
vr\ins: thoy an^ o'norally soon shot to piooos 
or ^vmpollovi to rot urn. as tho tank squadrons 
cannot bo U\l vm- oontrollod any loui^M*. 

Takiivv: all thoso thing-s into oonsidoration, 
it is plain that thoir otYoot is mainly moral. 
Thus tho duty of tho attaokor's infantry, whioh 
is following: up tho tanks, is primarily to ex- 
ploit tho otTtvt whioh thoso havo on tho dotond 
ors. Thoy must, thori^foro. koop as oloso up to 
tho tanks as possible, to inoroaso tho confusion 
thoy havo spri\'ul. and break throuiih tho out^ 
my's linos. If thoy koop t'ar behind they will 
lose the benetits of tho barraj^\ For thoso 
rwnsons infantry yvirtios will often advance 
between the tanks to develop the suoooss of the 
attack without delay, prevent the defenders 



TACTICS 7J 

from w/'Wirif/^ out of ihair way, and Inienmtj fbe 

All thr;H<; a/Jva;»taj<r;H arc, t^> a c^;rtain (fxienif 
('/juniMrhaliiric/'A by f,h<i fa/;t thiat th<j cIz/iK/r the 

niUu'M'iftif Inf/'infry kf;<rp to th<; tarjkH, th<; more 
Uicy vvIJ) have to HiiiT<',r frhui iUh ftriMU-ry i'lra 
{lir<'.f^,('.(\ apfalrixt thr-nc umchifK'M. Th^j rc/rtuH i» 
that evcTj in an niihck of thi» kind th/; infantry 
mtjHt not fuivmica in a c/tniinuouH thick line, Imt 
rnfjHt be (l\'Ain\)\ii<'A 'in neparate nHHfiuh detach- 
Uic.niH which have Ichh to fear from artillery fire. 
7'hf;y muHt be or^aniz^;d in df^Hh, to a ry^rtain 
(ixUtnif W) that Iohhch can be mxwJe good frr/rn 
the rear and niroup^ fK>intH captun^j which have 
not been dc/niroycd by the tankn in pa«Hing — 
and thi.H without there being any need to delay 
the advanc/; of the front line which rnuHt Htill 
be able U> follov/ the tankn a/;roHH the lines 
which have been hu c/'/tHHi'uUy broken throrjgh. 
Further, art-iilery rnunt awornpany the latfjr 
infantry waveH, in order to fa/;ilitate the cap- 
ture of Htrong pointH Htill intact and deal di- 
rectly with the anti-tank gunn. 

Ah the (•/>T)ir(>] and direction of the tanks are 
practically impoHHible during the HfdUm itnelf, 
the tank line rnunt be given a definite objective, 
and a point rnuHt be fixed to which the attack- 
ing infantry ban to })<-. led. The tanks will then 



72 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE 

have to return to reserve, as they are not, of 
course, suitable for defense. The light tanks 
only will still try to get across the captured po- 
sition and reach the area behind the enemy 
front in the hope of spreading confusion in the 
enemy's rear and doing as much damage as 
possible. Even then their operations will have 
to be limited to a certain extent, as otherwise 
their retreat will be most seriously menaced, 
especially if the enemy is prepared for them. 

Just as the attacker has to allow for all 
conceivable methods of defense, the defender 
on his side has to prepare for all possible 
methods of attack. 

If this idea be properly examined, one is soon 
led to the conclusion that the defense will have 
to adopt offensive methods to a greater degree 
than has been the case hitherto. In modem 
war it must be assumed that the attacker will 
always have a very powerful, and generally 
a very superior, force of artillery, and the in- 
evitable result is that every defender who con- 
fines himself to holding a certain position 
purely defensively accepts the risk that his line 
will have been so shattered by the attacker's 
artillery that he will not be in a position to 
hold it with infantry. 

This will always be the case in open warfare 



TACTICS 73 

where the attacker is able to make systematic 
preparation for the assault on the hostile posi- 
tion. The defender must therefore devote all 
his efforts to upset such preparations to the 
best of his power. This can be done in various 
ways, though only by unexpected counter-at- 
tacks either against the flanks of the enemy or 
with a view to recapturing the position he has 
stormed. The garrison of the front line must 
therefore be weak as a rule, in order that as 
few troops as possible may be exposed to the 
enemy's artillery fire, but behind the front 
large reserves must be held ready to counter- 
attack and recover the lost sector. An excep- 
tion to this rule may be made only when the 
enemy is unable to concentrate a superior force 
of artillery with which to prepare the attack. 

If the attacker finds himself forced to the 
defensive by a counter-attack he must at once 
dig in, in order to hold up the enemy's advance 
in a favorable line. But he will not use his 
reserves for fixed or local defense, but must al- 
ways endeavor to group them if possible in 
such a way that he can employ them offensively, 
because that is the only way in which protec- 
tion can be obtained, at least to a certain extent, 
against the enemy's artillery fire. In this case 
the tactics of the infantry will, generally speak- 



74 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE 

ing, be the same in attack as before the war, 
with the difference that the machine-gun must 
be considered as the principal weapon of the 
infantry, both in attack and defense, rather 
than the rifle. 

Thus in open warfare the only change, even 
in defense, is that allowance has to be made for 
more powerful artillery fire, machine-guns and 
trench-mortars. It is otherwise in trench war- 
fare. 

If a definite line must be held at all costs it 
is an advantage to have a forward zone and to 
construct the defensive trench-system in such a 
way that the enemy is unable to discover in 
which line the main resistance will be offered. 
He will thus be unable to concentrate the 
fire of his artillery upon that line. Dummy 
trenches will be an advantage in deceiving the 
enemy. The ''forward" troops, on the other 
hand, must put up a vigorous resistance, hold 
up the enemy's approach from their fortified 
strong points, and try to draw his harassing 
and annihilating fire upon themselves. The ac- 
tion in the forward zone must also serve to 
deceive the enemy and to gain further time for 
the supports to be organized for battle and re- 
serves brought up. 

In the main line of resistance, which it is 



TACTICS 75 

intended to hold, the garrison must be under 
shell-proof cover as much as possible, so that 
their fighting powers will be comparatively un- 
impaired when the enemy arrives. If there is 
time, concrete dug-outs will be useful. At the 
same time reserves must be assembled, so that 
if the enemy gets through he may be immedi- 
ately driven back again by a counter-attack. 
If this local counter-attack fails, a general 
counter-attack, well prepared by artillery and 
carried out by strong reserves specially brought 
up, is necessary, while such of the original gar- 
rison as are still holding their part of the line 
must secure their flanks against the enemy, 
even if he has broken through, and oppose the 
most stubborn resistance to any attempt to roll 
up the whole line. 

If the proximity of the enemy or any other 
reason makes it impossible to hold a forward 
zone, every effort must be made to keep the 
garrison of the main line of resistance under 
shell-proof cover, strengthen the obstacles in 
front of the line as much as possible, and put 
down a dense barrage in front of the defensive 
system, so that in case of attack the garrison 
will have time to open fire on the attacker as 
soon as his artillery has lifted in order to open 
the way for his storm troops. 



76 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE 

But in any case the chances of victory for the 
attacker in these circumstances are very great, 
and so the main instrument of the defense will 
be the counter-attack, which must be planned 
and organized beforehand. The defender's 
artillery must be distributed in such a way that 
immediately after the successful attack it can 
subject what was previously the defender's 
front line to an annihilating fire and simultane- 
ously keep down the hostile artillery. Further, 
the artillery of the adjacent sectors must op- 
erate against the broken sector. Under the 
protection of this bombardment the lost posi- 
tion must be recovered by a counter-attack 
with reserves promptly brought up, while the 
artillery prepares to harass the enemy's in- 
fantry as it streams back and doubles its efforts 
to silence the hostile artillery. 

If the intention of the defense is not to hold 
a definite line or position at all costs, but to 
defend a certain zone, the conditions mil be 
similar to those obtaining in the defense of a 
position with a forward zone, and the only dif- 
ference is that in this case the main line of 
resistance does not now play so unportant a 
part as in the cases already discussed. It will 
be held with energy and resolution, but there 
will be no compulsion to recover it by a counter- 



TACTICS 77 

attack. Resistance will continue to be offered, 
with the same stubbornness as in a forward 
zone, in a fortified rear zone to which the de- 
fender's troops will retire. In certain condi- 
tions it will be possible for the defender to 
draw the attacker so far after him that if the 
attacker's artillery is to play any further part 
it will have to change its position and get the 
range again, while his own artillery, which will 
have prepared for this eventuality and retired 
to new battery positions where all the new 
ranges are known, will only now begin to pro- 
duce its full effect. 

During this, the enemy's weak moment, every 
effort must be made to launch a counter-attack 
under the cover of the most violent artillery 
fire and with strong reserves. This counter- 
attack will presumably find the enemy's in- 
fantry scattered to a certain extent, and its 
prospects of success are thus good. It will also 
have the advantage that the defender's artil- 
lery, which is now in turn compelled to change 
its position, can return to its former emplace- 
ments, and thus the change of position can be 
carried out with the greatest rapidity. 

In this kind of defense, from the tactical 
point of view, there will be assault, resistance, 
withdrawal and counter-attack of individual 



78 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE 

groups which must give each other mutual sup- 
port and cooperate intelligently though not in 
one continuous line. This form of action, how- 
ever — and there must be no sort of doubt about 
this — is possible only if one has at one's dis- 
posal an infantry which is a perfect instrument 
of war, well trained tactically, completely re- 
liable, and in the hands of officers and N.C.O. 's, 
do\\Ti to the smallest commands, who are ac- 
customed to act on their own initiative, hold 
their own even in the most difficult situa- 
tion and preserve touch between the different 
groups. It must be an infantry which never 
allows a retreat to turn into flight. If one's 
troops are not in that category it is better to 
fight in and for a definite line of defense. 

A self-possessed infantry with strong nerves 
is also an indispensable weapon for the defeat 
of tank attacks. 

It will never be possible, except within defi- 
nite limits, for the defender's infantry in the 
front line to attack or disable the tanks by 
themselves. They will have to try to protect 
themselves locally by tank traps and tank 
mines, so far as circumstances permit those 
measures. Otherwise the duty of the defend- 
er's infantry in the front line is to deal with 



TACTICS 79 

and hold up the attacking infantry which is fol- 
lowing or advancing in line with the tanks. 

With a view to doing so they must get out 
of the sway of the tanks, allowing them to pass 
them, and must, therefore, never themselves 
fight in one continuous line. They must be dis- 
tributed in groups to admit the passage of the 
enemy's attacks, and must be in a position to 
take cover outside or in the attacked trenches 
themselves. They must also quietly let the 
enemy's barrage sweep over their heads. The 
defending infantry must further be organized 
in depth so that hostile infantry and machine- 
gun parties which are deposited by the trans- 
port tanks behind the front lines can be at- 
tacked and if possible annihilated before they 
have time to cause trouble and confusion. The 
rear groups of the defending infantry are also 
intended to protect the emplaced or mobile anti- 
tank guns and light trench-mortars, so that 
these without anxiety for their own safety can 
destroy the tanks or compel them to return. 
Any cavalry which is following the tanks, as 
frequently happens, will then be easily dealt 
with. 

Here again we see the infantry fighting in 
groups and working in the closest cooperation 
with artillery and trench-mortars. Indeed, 



80 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE 

small independent groups, composed of these 
three arms, will be formed — the so-called tank 
forts — ^^'hich will be in a position to prove an 
insuperable obstacle to the advance of the 
tanks. Mobile anti-tank gims also ^^'ill often 
have to be concentrated. If the defender has 
further succeeded in holding up the hostile in- 
fantry follo^Ning up the tanks with the aid of 
the rifle and machine-gun parties left unsub- 
dued by the latter, a counter-attack, well pre- 
pared by artillery, will often find a situation 
which holds out the greatest promise of success. 
The vital element is that the infantry must not 
let its morale be shaken, the anti-tank guns must 
be correctly distributed and the whole area 
systematically prepared for defense against 
the tanks. 

Looking generally at the demands which will 
be made on the infantry, both in attack and de- 
fense — and in open as much as trench warfare 
— ^we shall soon realize that an immense change 
has taken place in the tactical uses of all arms, 
and that our organization and regulations must 
make full allowance for it. 

The company will certainly remain the small- 
est tactical unit, but its constitution must be 
revolutionized. The division into three pla- 
toons has proved its value, but the platoons 



TACTICS 81 

themselves must be organized in groups com- 
posed of machine-gunners and riflemen. Every 
company must have telephone detachments and 
runners. In case of necessity the company 
commander must have an assault detachment 
as a special reserve. It would be a last reserve 
which that officer can throw in at the decisive 
point. All the men must be trained with the 
rifle, the machine-gun and the hand grenade, 
*as I said above. The heavy machine-guns must 
be formed into separate companies so that their 
ifire may be as concentrated as possible when 
they are brought up to the decisive sector of 
the battlefield. It is only in the defense that 
the commander will be frequently compelled to 
use them by sections. The old war establish- 
ment of 250 men to the company has proved too 
high in the modem ''group" action. The es- 
tablishment must be 150, not counting the 
train ^ personnel and necessary details. 

The division of the regiment into three bat- 
talions has proved sound. It would be better, 
however, to keep the battalion of four com- 
panies so that the battalion commander vdW 
have a reserve at his disposal even when he is 
compelled to hold a comparatively broad front 
and tactically to distribute his men very widely 

' Corresponds with our Ai3.C. (Tr.) 



S2 THE WAK OF THE FUTURE 

or deeply. A heavy macliiiie-giiu company will 
also be attached to each battalion, and a labor 
company formed of less fit men, the latter for 
the purpose of supplying drivers for the trans- 
port, clerks, officers' servants and all the details 
which are continually being required behind the 
front, supply orderlies, work in the various 
supply, ammunition, pioneer and stores depots, 
and similar necessities. Further, a telephone 
detachment — not too small — must be attached 
to the battalion staff. At the present time all 
these detachments, most of which do not re- 
quire the full standard of medical fitness, 
make the most ruinous inroads on the fighting 
-Strength of the unit. 

Lastly, individual groups will have to be put 
under the direct orders of the regimental head- 
quarters staff. First among these we must 
place the telephone detachment with all its 
branches and then the labor companies. The 
trench-mortars, constituted in special tactical 
units, must be under the direct command of the 
regimental commander, while every regiment 
must have a batteiy of infantry gims — six guns 
to the battery, which may be distributed among 
the battalions if necessary — permanently at- 
tached to it. These batteries will be under the 
divisional artillery headquarters for technical 



TACTICS 83 

•and artillery purposes, but under the com- 
mander of the infantry regiment for tactical 
purposes. 

Whether it is necessary to give the three 
regiments which compose the division a brig- 
adier is a question which is much debated in 
the army. The brigade has often been nothing 
more than a channel of communication. Per- 
sonally, I regard it as absolutely necessary. 
The divisional commander is not so well able 
to have a continuous and thorough grip on the 
regiments and their tactical movements as the 
brigadier, whose principal function it is to ex- 
ercise such control and insure a uniform con- 
duct of the infantry action. Both in peace and 
in war a stage between divisional and regi- 
mental headquarters is extremely necessary, 
even from the practical point of view. 

The movements and action of the infantry 
must be restricted to the most simple principles 
(this was done to a large extent even during 
the war), and the essence of all training must 
be the physical and, above all, the moral train- 
ing of the men and their leaders. Fighting in 
separate isolated groups, which are none the 
less animated by one fundamental idea, de- 
mands a high degree of tactical knowledge and 
personal resolution from all the subordinate 



84 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE 

leaders, for it is quite impossible to direct such 
fighting by general orders. 

The object of the action and its final goal 
must be kuown to all the individual groups — 
indeed, to all the individual men. They must 
be familiar with the general principles of ac- 
tion, but definite instruction on the methods to 
be adopted c^ninot be given — as tliey used to 
be for infantry attacks in the old days — and it 
is cert^^in that orders will not always reach the 
individual groups in action. The letter of ac- 
tion is entirely secondary to the spirit, and the 
former will be subject to perpetual changes. 

With this method of training strict discipline 
and severe drill of tlie individual soldier must 
go hand in hand in order that a sense of duty 
may become second nature to him and accustom 
him to the resolute concentration of all his 
moral and physical powers. The regulations 
will take account of these desiderata, and the 
whole training will be aimed at their realiza- 
tion, for we shall be compelled to give far 
greater latitude to the independent decisions 
of the leaders — down to the most subordinate 
commands — than we have hitherto, and will 
have to confine ourselves to seeing that they 
are inspired by right principles. 

The independence of all leaders of troops, 



TACTICS 85 

especially those in direct command of men, has 
become very much more important. This fact 
determines the character of the whole training. 
At the same time vital importance must be at- 
tached to the training of individual character. 
The demands upon the endurance, courage and 
audacity of the individual have been very much 
increased by the immense power of modem 
weapons. In addition there is the fact that, as 
'the result of modern fighting methods, the men 
are left to their own devices much more than 
before. They are no longer carried along by 
the crowd; they are frequently deprived of the 
influence of their officers, and find themselves 
with nothing to depend upon but their own 
sense of duty and their own inherent worth. 
They can be equal to the requirements of the 
situation only if the bond of unity is strong, 
their moral sense high, and the idea of dis- 
cipline, that true soldierly virtue, has become 
part of their flesh and blood. 

All this, of course, makes the highest de- 
mands on those in positions of command who 
are destined to be trainers, instructors and 
leaders, demands far greater than have ever 
been made before. At the same time it gives 
the officer's profession an even higher status 
and consecration than it has ever known. 



86 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE 

n. — Artii.lery 

It is jnst as impossible to spoak of iiiiifonn 
artillory taotios as of uniform infantry tactics. 
The functions of avtilloiy have uniltipliod and 
become far more important. The number of 
types, calibers and natures of ammunition have 
increased, the enemy has now to be fought in 
the air also, and the dilTerent species of opera- 
tions make fundamentally ditYerent demands. 
Moreover, the character of the theater of war 
has a very material intlueuce on the mobility 
of this weapon, and therefore on the opportu- 
nities of employing" it. In roadless Russia the 
same giins cannot always be used nor artillery 
operations take the same forms as in France, 
which is well supplied with roads and railways, 
or in the mountainous regions of tlie Alps and 
Carpathians. 

We must first draw a distinction between the 
uses of artillery iu open warfare and in trench 
warfare, while pure mountain warfare requires 
separate consideration, even from the artiller)' 
point of view. 

In the tirst case. i. e., operations in which 
both sides maneuver and the attacker is not 
faced by continuous, uniform and more or less 
fortilied lines which he ))nL^t attack frontallv, if 



TACTICS 87 

at all, (tvan io-ihxy much the Hamo principlcH ap- 
ply a8 wf;re valiH before th(j World War. The 
field artillery, including the heavy field-how- 
itzerfl, are the deciding factor. Whether it ifi 
p^>HHible to (^ive the troopn heavy lonj<-rarj^e 
^nR and rnortarH depends upon the nature of 
the battlefield and the condition of the lines 
of communication. I have known cases in Rus- 
sia where 10 cm. guns had to be left behind 
because they crjuld not be got forward any 
farther. Anti-aircraft guns, on the other hand, 
must accompany the divisions everywhere. 

In open warfare, in any case, the artillery 
must be much stronger than hitherto in com- 
parison with the infantry, so that the enemy's 
fire, which will be more intense than heretofore, 
may be dominated and the way opened for the 
infantry attack. It will be extremely important 
to make the fullest possible use of the factor 
of surprise in concentrating the mass of one's 
artillery against that part of the enemy's front 
against which the main and decisive assault is 
to be delivered. To attain this object it will be 
absolutely necessary, as I insisted even before 
the war, to avoid assigning all the artillery to 
divisions, and to concentrate a large artillery 
reserve in the hands of the army or army- 
group commander (in certain circumstances 



8S THE WAR OP THE FUTURE 

even tlio corjis coinniaiider) , so that it can bo 
oinployed at the docisivc point. Tlio same rule 
applies to the ainmiinition supplies. 

In other respeets artillery operations will 
take mneh the same form as before. The artil- 
lery will practic^illy be restricted to shooting 
from obser\'ation, either ground observation or 
with the help of balloons and aircraft. The 
importance of tlash-spottino: and sound-ranging 
units, as well as squared maps, will become 
secondary, because one will hardly over have 
sutVicient time to make the necessaiy prepara- 
tions. These circumstances will also limit the 
use of the greatest ranges. Generally speak- 
ing, the artillery will be employed in large 
groups and without material distribution in 
depth, partly bec^uise of the limited opportu- 
nities for observation and partly for the sake 
of securing centralization of control and effect 
in the short period of preparation. 

In this connection it must be remembered 
that in the majority of cases the action \\nll 
develop out of strategic maneuver and that the 
time in whicli to prepare for the attack will 
be adequate only if one of the two sides decides 
to adopt the defensive in a fortified position. 
Even then it will be ad\'isable to make the at- 
tack as soon as possible to prevent the enemy's 



TACTICS 89 

having time to settle down in the position he 
has selected. 

In addition to the main artillery force, the 
task of which is to silence the hostile artillery 
and hold down the hostile infantry until the 
time for assault is ripe, certain units of field 
artillery must directly accompany the infantry 
attack, for even in open warfare it must be as- 
sumed that as the attack proceeds enemy strong 
points and machine-gun nests will be encoun- 
tered which have not been discovered or suffi- 
ciently silenced by the main artillery force and 
will now open a surprise fire at the decisive 
moment. They must be dealt with promptly 
and effectively if the attacking infantry is to 
be spared heavy losses. This task will be as- 
signed either to the infantry-gun batteries and 
light trench-mortars which are ijermanently 
attached to the infantry, or else to the escort 
batteries drawn from the main artillery force 
for this precise purpose. It must be possible 
not only to employ these batteries in complete 
formations but to distribute them in sections or 
even in single guns. This principle applies, 
of course, to the same batteries in trench war- 
fare, and means that the subordinate com- 
manders must have a particularly good tactical 
training. In other respects artillery opera- 



90 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE 

tions in trench warfare are absolutely different 
from those in open warfare. 

In this second case the artillery, which is 
strung out along a very extensive front, has 
the duty of being ready to meet a hostile attack 
at any moment and also to damage, and keep 
on damaging, the enemy by maintaining a 
steady fire on his artillery and infantry, har- 
assing his transport and shelters and destroy- 
ing his fortifications. Finally, it will have the 
duty of hindering hostile aerial observation as 
much as possible and protecting important 
points — stations, dumps, headquarters, billets 
— ^by anti-aircraft defenses. For this purpose 
the anti-aircraft guns must be distributed not 
only behind the whole front, but well over the 
back areas also, and at points which are favor- 
able for the purpose in view. They will be 
concentrated in considerable numbers some- 
times at one point, sometimes at another, ac- 
cording to the importance of the operations in 
view. 

Further, machine-guns will be assigned on 
the largest scale possible to all batteries; their 
function will be to protect the batteries against 
attack from the air and defend them against 
infantry attacks if the enemy breaks through. 

Yet the most vital function of the artillery 



TACTICS 91 

in offensive operations is to silence the hostile 
artillery so completely that it can no longer 
do any harm to the advancing infantry ; further, 
to prepare the enemy lines and fortifications 
for assault, while paralyzing the hostile in- 
fantry and shattering their nerve so effectually 
that they are no longer in a position to offer 
serious resistance. 

Generally speaking, the ordinary daily tasks 
of the artillery require its uniform distribution 
over the whole battle-front and a certain or- 
ganization in depth, both in order to make full 
use of the ranges and also to avoid present- 
ing, by too much concentration, that splendid 
target for the hostile artillery which batteries 
grouped together always represent. 

For purposes of defense, the artillery must 
be grouped in such a way that the hostile 
lines of approach can be harassed by heavy 
and the heaviest long-range fire, or at short 
range by field guns also, while the assembly 
trenches of the enemy's infantry can be brought 
under destructive fire and a barrage or cur- 
tain of destructive fire of the greatest pos- 
sible density laid over the area which the at- 
tacking infantry must cross to reach the de- 
fender's lines. As a rule high-angle fire will 
be employed against the enemy's assembly 



92 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE 

trenches, because the target is generally behind 
cover, and a further requisite is that the hostile 
ma<jhine-guns should be put out of action. 
Hence, heavy and light field howitzers and 
mortars will be employed. The same guns will 
serve the purpose of neutralizing the hostile 
artillery, but in this case long-range flat-tra- 
jectory guns will be useful at long distances. 

For the purpose of a barrage in front of 
one 's own line light field guns are the principal 
weapon. Where a reliable shrapnel is avail- 
;able (which is not always the case where mass 
production of ammunition is concerned), the 
employment of this nature of ammunition is 
particularly to be recommended when the bar- 
rage is to be laid from the flank, i. e., an enfi- 
lading position. However, the nature of am- 
munition and the setting of the fuse depends 
upon the country and the distance between the 
hostile lines as well as upon the particular kind 
of moral effect at which one is aiming. For gen- 
eral purposes the percussion-fuse shell is to be 
preferred. Heavy field howitzers can also be 
called in to intensify the destructive character 
of the barrage, while an enfilading effect can be 
obtained by the cooperation of medium 10 cm. 
flat-trajectory guns from adjacent sectors. 

The mortar barrage, on the other hand, will 



TACTICS 93 

not be laid immediately in front of one's own 
lines, because the range of the burst is great 
enough to endanger one's own troops. On the 
other hand, mortars are the most useful weapon 
for destroying hostile fortifications, as their 
effect is enormous. Heavy field howitzers will 
also be used for this purpose in order that the 
largest possible number of guns may be em- 
ployed on this work of destruction, while light 
field howitzers can be used against targets 
which are not shell-proof. 

These different purposes will determine the 
distribution of the artillery and its organiza- 
tion in depth, but another point of view must 
certainly be carefully borne in mind. It has 
frequently happened that when an attack has 
been successful, either as the result of surprise 
or for some other reason, a large portion of 
the defender's artillery has been lost, because 
it was too close up to the line and could not 
be withdrawn in time when the enemy's in- 
fantry came up. It will thus be necessary to 
keep the defender's artillery as far as possible 
behind the main infantry position, protect it 
by obstacles and special strong points, and have 
infantry reserves in the immediate vicinity, 
so that the guns cannot easily be overrun. 

The vital factor in determining the position 



94 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE 

of the artilloiy is the requirement that the 
bulk of the artillery must be able to direct its 
tire at the most etToctive ranges ag-ainst the 
assembly trenches and lines of approach of the 
hostile infantry; further, to beat otY a tank at- 
tack, no matter how, and reach the hostile ar- 
tillery at any rate with the guns of longer 
range. 

Thus, under all circumstances the annihilat- 
ing fire must reach the enemy front line in 
which preparations for attack may perhaps be 
in progress. The guns of longest range will 
be emplaced nearest to the artillery defense 
lines in order that they can reach the most 
distant targets. On the other hand, the bat- 
teries earmarked for annihilating fire anci the 
barrage must usually be emplaced farther back. 

If it is impossible to perform the current 
daily artilleiy tasks against more distant tar- 
gets from these emplacements, special guns or 
batteries must be brought up to perform these 
duties. For defense against a surprise tank 
attack the largest possible number of quick-fir- 
ing guns must be brought up pennanently to 
the main line of defense and emplaced in such 
a way that their fire commands the whole area 
which is suitable for the tank attack. Mobile 
anti-tank guns will also be held ready to be 



TACTICS 95 

employed against tanks at any point. Alterna- 
tive emplacements must be prepared for all 
fixed batteries, so that they can escape the 
enemy's fire the moment he begins to bombard 
them systematically. 

The divisional artillery will be entirely in 
the hands of the artillery general, and divided 
into two separate groups to each of which a 
special task is assigned. At the same time it 
will not be possible to constitute the individual 
groups out of guns of the same nature, as each 
of them will have to fire at the most varied 
targets. It will often happen that field guns 
will have to be used with li^^^ht field howitzers 
or 19 cm. guns in one group. Even heavy and 
light guns will often have to be incorporated in 
one group for action. Mortars 13 cm., and in 
some cases ]5 cm. guns, will be assigned to the 
groups as circumstances require. Each group 
will be given a definite sector of the enemy's 
front and have to deal with all the targets in 
that sector. It will often be necessary to dis- 
tinguish short- and long-range groups and or- 
ganize the battery emplacements from that 
point of view. As a rule, only the heaviest 
long-range guns, railway guns and similar na- 
tures will be employed by themselves, as these 
are usually assigned directly to the corps, 



96 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE 

armies, or aniiy groups, under a group com- 
mander. 

In these circumstances it seems necessary, 
for purposes of the order of battle, to assign 
permanently to divisions, which are the real 
tactical unit, the guns which they always re- 
quire, i. e., field guns and light howitzers, in- 
fantry guns, heavy field howitzers and 10 cm. 
guns. On the other hand, mortars, more field 
howitzers and heavy long-range batteries can 
only be lent to them from army or G.H.Q. re- 
serve when special circumstances require. On 
some occasions it will also be necessaiy to 
supply a reenforeement of field guns. 

Such special circumstances will arise when 
some particular task is set in ordinary trench 
warfare, and above all when the imminence of 
a great hostile attack has been recognized or 
such an operation is planned on one's own side. 
The first case will, usually speaking, apply to 
the whole front, as there are special tasks to 
be performed at all points, though at some less 
than others. Such tasks are as follows: De- 
stroying particularly formidable strong points, 
bombarding enemy billets at great distances, 
important industrial establishments behind the 
front, troublesome batteries a long way off, 
railway lines and similar targets. It will thus 



TACTICS 97 

be essential to give all divisions in line a 
icw mortars and heavy long-range batteries in 
addition to the normal divisional artillery. 

On the other hand, when a great hostile at- 
tack is imminent and it is necessary to take 
measures to meet it, a strong force of artillery, 
superior to that of the enemy if possible, must 
be concentrated. 

As the attack determines the form of the 
defense, it must receive our attention first. In 
the offensive, artillery can be put to the most 
varied uses. 

In the attack, as we already know, it is neces- 
sary to prepare the way for the infantry as- 
sault by destroying the hostile obstacles, strong 
points, trenches and other defense works, para- 
lyzing the hostile infantry so that it can make 
no adequate use of its weapons and silencing 
the hostile artillery before one's own infantry 
goes forward. Success in this last task is of 
vital importance as, if the defender's artillery 
is still effective, it can make the attack impos- 
sible. During the infantry attack itself it is 
necessary to prevent the defender's artillery 
from recovering itself and to protect the at- 
tacking infantry by a barrage which creeps 
before them and is timed to conform to their 
progress. Lastly, the duty of the artillery is 



98 TllK WAK' OF TllK Fl-TllvE 

to aocoinpany tho attacking- infantry anil cloar 
the \NiAy for thoni. ovon when thoir advance has 
o*'U*rio(i tluMU boyond the ranuc of tho barrajro. 

Thns wo liavo a sorios of tasks which arc not 
easy to porforni. Tho first great ditViculty is to 
keep the preparations for the attack and the 
concentration of the artiUery from the knowl- 
cdiTi^ of the enemy. The battery emplacements 
must be reconnoitered. snrveycd. and the sites 
markcii. The roads from the rear to the bat- 
tery lines nuist be improved and extended. 
Enormons qnantities of annnunition must bo 
brought up. Some o( it will come with the 
batteries, while the rest must be in dumps close 
at hand and protected against the weather. 
Lastly, the batteries themselves nmst be brought 
up. 

If circnmstances at all permit, the trench- 
mortars (heavy, medium and light) must 1x3 
emplaced immediately Ivhind tlie front infan- 
try lines and well supplied with anmmnition, 
so that tliey can prepare the way for the in- 
fantry assault by bombarding the enemy front 
lines and thus relieving the artillery. 

All this )neans a certain amount o( activity 
which it is very dithcnlt to keep from the knowl- 
edge o( the enemy. Kven though all work is 
done on principle only by night and the g:roa.t*- 



TACTICS <y.) 

ani procautioriH are taken a;^airjHt obnervation 
from tho air, it is ftxtrcrncly diflicult to hide 
these ^eat moveinentH. Enorny aircraft are 
certain t^j notice something, spies will reveal 
a good deal and prinoners from one's own 
troopH wiJl often betray what is going on. The 
operation planned must therefore be kept even 
from one'.H own troops, for surjirige Is a very 
material factor to success. If the enemy gets 
wind of the approaching attack he will be able 
to take effective counter-meanures. 

The Hecond great obstacle is the difficulty of 
finally and decisively neutralizing the hostile 
artillery, including its most distant batteries. 
The dispositions of the attacker's artillery must 
be designed to meet this difficulty, as I shall 
soon show. In many cases gas-shell will be 
the be.st weapon in dealing with artillery. A 
sur]r>rise gas bombardment will certainly cause 
losses, and in any case — as I have said before — 
it will compel the enemy to wear masks and 
thus make it extremely difficult for them to 
serve their guns or bring up ammunition. Be- 
sides, it is quite impossible to go on working 
in nriasks for any length of time. Thus, if the 
gas-shelling begins before the infantry attack 
and the gas-cloud is kept thick as long as pos- 



100 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE 

sible, the hostile artillery will frequently be 
silenced or compelled to ^^^thdraw. 

In certain circumstances high explosive can 
be used as well as gas-shell, in order to inflict 
bloody losses on the enemy, destroy his ammuni- 
tion and damage his material. Further, the 
attacter's artillery must be so strong that, in 
addition to gassing and neutralizing the hostile 
artillery, it c-an perform its ordinaiy tasks, 
and while doing so continue the gassing of the 
defender's artilleiy with an adequate number 
of batteries. 

These other tasks may be summarized as the 
duty of doing the greatest possible damage to 
the enemy's defense works so that the way 
will be cleared for the infantry attack, accom- 
panying that attack as long as possible mth a 
barrage, thus enabling progress to be made 
without heavy losses. 

The barrage will consist of high explosive or 
gas-shells from the largest possible number of 
field guns and heavy hoAvitzers. It will go 
forward at fixed intervals (which must be set- 
tled beforehand in accordance T\^th the infan- 
try's anticipated rate of progress) from sector 
to sector in order to keep the hostile infantry 
immediately in front of the storm troops under 



TACTICS 101 

cover, shake their nerve, and thus spare the at- 
tacking infantry heavy losses. 

The heavy mortars can also be used to co- 
operate by sectors in the barrage, but in that 
case they must fire ahead of it for fear of in- 
juring their own infantry. They will direct 
their attention to the most formidable of the 
enemy's strong points and defense works which 
will first be reached by the infantry behind 
the barrage. It would be very desirable if 
this systematic barrage, the time and direction 
of whose movements have to be fixed before- 
hand, could be made elastic so that it could 
directly conform to the advance of the infantry, 
whether fast or slow. Unfortunately there are 
practically insuperable difficulties in the way. 
This point will be discussed in a later chapter. 

If an adequate force of artillery is available 
the effect of the bombardment can be intensi- 
fied by giving it a certain depth. Our enemies, 
who had guns innumerable at their disposal, 
sometimes gave their barrage a depth of sev- 
eral kilometers. Thus the defenders have not 
merely to endure the fire of a narrow barrage 
for a relatively short time, but to hold out dur- 
ing the long period which a barrage of a depth 
of several kilometers takes to pass over their 
heads. In such conditions the attacker's pros- 



102 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE 

pects of putting the defending infantry out of 
action are naturally much greater than with 
an ordinary barrage, at any rate if the density 
of the deep-zone fire is anything like that of 
the narrow. 

As a rule it will be impossible to carry out 
these tasks completely from the artillery posi- 
tions in ordinary trench warfare — which are 
very far back — as full use cannot be made of 
the ranges in the manner required by the of- 
fensive. And so, at the risk of being suddenly 
attacked, the batteries which are to neutralize 
the most distant hostile batteries destroy the 
enemy's defense works in the back area and 
participate in the barrage must be brought as 
close up to the departure trenches as is pos- 
sible with due regard for secrecy. 

On the other hand, the batteries which are to 
engage the nearer targets must be placed 
farther back. The most forward batteries 
should, if possible, be brought into position 
only the night before the attack. As a rule 
registration will have to be dispensed with. 
Generally speaking, shooting will have to be 
by the map (very accurate maps, of course) 
or the Pulkowsky system, while the greatest 
possible use will be made of aeroplane observa- 
tion later on. 



TACTICS 103 

Further, it is very difficult to give the in- 
fantry the protection of artillery fire and sup- 
port them in their task when they have once 
passed the extreme limits of the ranges of the 
guns. Whether the surprise has succeeded or 
not, their task will become more difficult the 
farther they advance, for the hostile reserves 
concentrated in the back area or brought up 
from a distance, reserves which the attacker's 
artillery has not been able to reaeh, will now 
appear on the scene and face the attacker's 
infantry, which is perhaps already exhausted. 
Its need of artillery support will then be all 
the greater. The artillery must therefore stop 
at nothing to follow it up and continue firing 
from new positions, if possible without inter- 
rupting or diminishing the volume of fire. It 
is an extremely difficult matter to achieve this 
feat. The part played on such occasions by 
escort and infantry-gun batteries has already 
been discussed in the chapter on infantry tac- 
tics. They will be the first to follow the at- 
tacking infantry, either immediately or as close 
behind as they can get. 

The first serious obstacle in their path will 
be the very difficult ground which is the first 
fruits of trench warfare. Between two trench- 
systems which have been the scene of fighting 



104 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE 

for a considerable period there is usually a 
No Man's Land which has been plowed up all 
over by the artillery of both sides, a waste 
where all roads and tracks have been destroyed 
and the shell-holes are innumerable. 

If this area is to be made practicable for 
artillery, labor units, with the necessary ma- 
terial, must follow hard on the heels of the 
storm troops, in order to construct roads for 
the guns, Bridge trenches and shell-craters, 
and deal with impassable places. This is fre- 
quently a very difficult problem, which involves 
a great loss of time, particularly in areas with 
much ground water. Adequate preparation 
must be made, and the work carried through 
with the greatest energy. Good roads must be 
made, especially for the bulk of the artillery, 
heavy guns and ammunition columns. The 
quicker the artillery is sent ahead the better it 
will be. Of course the difficulties will be less 
where there has not been so much ordinary 
trench warfare before the battle and No Man 's 
Land is less plowed up. Yet it will always be 
a troublesome business to make the enemy's 
lines and trenches (which have been destroyed 
by the attacker's artillery) practicable for its 
advance. 

With a view to having artillery ready to go 



TACTICS 105 

forward without weakening the attacking ar- 
tillery still in action, it is advisable to have a 
second relay of guns behind the latter. These 
guns will have taken no part in the artillery 
action and can be brought up immediately the 
ground has been made sufficiently practicable. 

These batteries will be followed by the hind- 
most batteries of the attacking artillery the 
moment they have to stop firing owing to the 
range having become too great for them. On 
the other hand, precautions must be taken 
against sending forward too much artillery at 
once and thus placing too great a strain on the 
roads, as guns cannot be fought without the 
necessary ammunition. Batteries and ammuni- 
tion must be sent up in fixed proportions. The 
batteries must follow the infantry as far as 
possible and try to fire with the help of ground 
observation at first, aerial observation subse- 
quently. 

Their method of operation will then be de- 
termined by the requirements of open warfare. 
As there can be no centralized direction or 
control of the artillery in these circumstances, 
it would be a good plan to assign the artillery, 
both light and heavy batteries, which first ar- 
rives, to the infantry regiments, so that sepa- 
rate self-contained tactical groups are formed. 



106 THE WAK OF THE FFTURE 

Each infantry regiment will then indicate to its 
artillery the tasks the fulfillment of which is 
necessary to the further development of the 
action. As the batteries come up they will 
gradually be formed into groups, but it is only 
when the bulk of the artillery has followed 
the infantry- that the artillery conmiander ^vill 
be able to resume command of the batteries 
and groups, so far as their attachment to the 
infantry regiments is not found to be neces- 
sary for some further period. 

If there was originally a second artillery 
wave, another one will now be formed, com- 
posed, of course, of batteries other than those 
which had constituted the first, and thus the 
next stage of the advance will be prepared. 

If time and circumstances allow, it will natur- 
ally be desirable, if possible, to settle on the 
new battery positions on the first day of the 
attack and supply the necessary artillery maps 
so that the guns can shoot by the map even 
where ground and aeroplane obsen'ation are 
impossible. This method will suffice, however, 
only when a large number of theodolites are 
available — at least one to every two batteries 
— while the batteries press forward directly 
behind the reserves of the advancing infantry 
with the artillerv officers who are to reeon- 



TACTICS 107 

noiter and Hite the new emplacements. An 
abundant .supply of material for artillery maps 
muHt alHo be taken with them. As this is sel- 
dom possible, however, the fixing of aiming- 
points for the new emplacements will generally 
have to be dispensed with. In any case, it is 
more important to follow the infantry as 
rapidly as possible and give them good artil- 
lery Hupijort Sit the earliest possible moment 
after they have got beyond the range of the 
most advanced batteries of the attacker's artil- 
lery. For that purpose it will be important, 
apart from promptly making the ground prac- 
ticable for artillery, to send the sausage bal- 
loons forward as soon as possible, and get the 
artillery aeroplanes into action under the pro- 
tection of the pursuit flights. Wireless must 
be immediately carried forward with the artil- 
lery for the X)urpose of communication with 
the observation aeroplanes. The vital neces- 
sity is that the artillery attack should be kei>t 
going continuously, and that its fire should not 
be allowed to die down or diminish even for a 
moment. 

Although I have been discussing the employ- 
ment of artillery for a special kind of attack, 
it is essential to point out that methods of at- 
tack may be extremely varied. It has repeat- 



108 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE 

edly happened that the attack, when favored 
by the conformation of the ground or concealed 
from the eyes of the enemy by natural or arti- 
ficial fog, has dispensed with a preliminary 
bombardment altogether in order to have the 
advantage of complete surprise. In such cases 
it is accompanied by a deep and dense barrage 
only. Such a method is particularly advisable 
when the attacker has a sufiBcient number of 
tanks which precede the infantry, flatten out 
the enemy obstacles and chmb over his trenches 
and shelters. The moral effect of such an at- 
tack can be very great. 

In contrast to the surprise method, the at- 
tacker may choose to continue the prelimi- 
nary bombardment and the neutralization of the 
hostile artillery by the expenditure of a vast 
amount of ammunition in harassing and anni- 
hilating fire which goes on for days on end. 
The purpose of this method is to make it com- 
pletely impossible for the defender to remain 
in the area attacked, and destroy all his de- 
fense works one after the other by the use of the 
heaviest guns. This last system can even be 
combined with the tank attack, which should 
aim at the greatest possible effective surprise. 
Thus the tasks of the attacker's artillery will 
be extremely varied. But there will always 



TACTICS 109 

be the difificulty of the artillery concentration, 
and also the necessity of sending batteries 
forward after the storming infantry when the 
attack has succeeded. These difficulties will 
be particularly formidable after days of drum 
fire extending far into the enemy's back area. 

The method of the attack determines the 
form of the counter-measures to be adopted by 
the defending artillery. Of course, its pri- 
mary task is to annihilate the attacker's in- 
fantry in their assembly trenches, or, if this 
fails, to deal with them as they advance 
towards the defender's infantry lines. But it 
will only be able to fulfill this duty if it has not 
been previously silenced or neutralized by the 
attacker 's artillery. 

Thus, the first business of the defense is to 
maneuver with its artillery in such a way that 
the latter cannot be neutralized by the enemy's 
artillery. If the enemy's intention to attack 
has been discovered in time and the defender 
has a sufficient artillery reserve at his dis- 
posal, he will endeavor to strengthen the artil- 
lery on the threatened sector to such a degree 
that it will be equal, or if possible superior, to 
that of the attacker. Further, the defender 
will make full use of gas bombardment. As 
the area of the enemy's battery emplacements 



110 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE 

will not be entered by the defender's own 
troops, he can saturate it with gas and thus 
compel the attacker's artillery to evacuate it. 
Of course this will require an enormous ex- 
penditure of gas-shell. 

The defender will always be forced into this 
kind of life-and-death duel with the attacker's 
artillery when the lines of the opposing sides 
are very close and the defender's front line 
must be held for local or strategic reasons. In 
these conditions, if the attack comes by sur- 
prise so that an adequate reenforcement of 
the defending artillery is impossible, while 
the front line itself is not very strong or in a 
position to withstand the heaviest bombard- 
ment (perhaps open to a tank attack also), the 
attacker's prospects of success are very great. 

The defender's chances are a good deal more 
favorable when he has any kind of deep for- 
ward zone in front of his main line of resistance. 
This would mean that the enemy's artillery 
has to keep at a more respectful distance, while 
his infantry have to master the forward zone 
under the fire of the defender's artillery before 
they reach the main line of defense. 

The defending artillery must therefore be 
distributed in such a way that it can lay an 
annihilating barrage in front of the forward 



TACTICS 111 

zone, fight the hostile artillery, and yet pre- 
serve some of its batteries from the attentions 
of the enemy's fire. To a certain extent these 
are patently self-contradictory demands, which 
can be met only if the defender has an extraor- 
dinary force of artillery at his disposal. If 
• the hostile artillery is equally strong or 
stronger, the defender will be compelled to 
choose between the two sets of requirements, 
and by skillfully grouping the various natures 
of guns, try to attain his end at least to some 
extent. 

The most favorable situation of all for the de- 
fender, from the artillery point of view, is when 
circumstances enable him to give his opponent 
the impression that he intends to hold a certain 
position, while in reality he evades the blow 
and meets his adversary's thrust in a position 
lying considerably farther back. In such a 
case he can keep his whole artillery— with the 
exception of a few batteries sent forward to de- 
ceive the enemy — out of range of the latter 's 
fire. His artillery will be distributed behind 
his main line of defense in the rear; he wil] 
concentrate his whole fire in front of the latter, 
and thus make it quite impossible for the en- 
emy's infantry to storm it. 

In such a case the attacker will be able to ad- 



112 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE 

vance only by stoges, and when he has captured 
the dummy position he has to arrange a fresh 
artillery deployment before he can continue the 
attack. His chance of surprising the defender 
has definitely gone, and with it a very material 
and often decisive advantage for the attack. 

If the attacker's artillery is so strong that 
it can search the whole area of the defender's 
lines in days of drum fire, the defender will 
withdraw his own artillery — and even the bulk 
of his infantry, except such part of it as can 
be accommodated under shell-proof cover — out 
of range of the enemy's fire, and distribute it 
in such a way that it can take the advancing 
hostile infantry under the most effective de- 
struction fire. The defender will then endeavor 
to harass the enemy's artilleiy with long-range 
gunfire only until sufficient artillery reserves 
have been brought up to deal with them effec- 
tively. The maintenance of the position will 
then depend upon the success of the counter- 
attack. 

A tank attack makes special demands upon 
the artillery of the defense. If this attack is 
to be beaten off the first requirement is that 
the tanks should be exposed to an intense de- 
struction fire during their advance, which is 
generally shrouded in fog. In the second stage, 



TACTICS 113 

when they have come out of the fog, they must 
be fought and destroyed by a large number of 
anti-tank guns distributed over the area con- 
cerned for this very purpose. These anti-tank 
guns will work by direct observation. If the. 
destruction fire is to be really effective, it will 
be essential in this case also to distribute that 
part of the defender's artillery to which this 
task is assigned so far back that the hostile 
artillery will not be able to neutralize it in time. 
On the other hand, it is important that the anti- 
tank guns which are to destroy the tanks at 
short range, as well as the light trench-mortars 
on special mountings which are to be used for 
the same purpose, should be as close as possible 
up to the line in which the enemy's attack is 
to be held up, and which the tanks must there- 
fore break through. 

The difficulty in this case is for these guns 
and their detachments to remain an effective 
fighting force during the preliminary bombard- 
ment by the enemy's artillery and while his bar- 
rage is passing over them. In fact it will be 
possible only if their position is unknown to the 
enemy and the men at least are under shell- 
proof cover. 

In the case of the mobile anti-tank guns 
there will be the further difficulty that the teams 



114 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE 

also have to be preserved from destruction. 
Generally speaking, this will be possible only if 
the defender succeeds in neutralizing the at- 
tacker's artillery to a certain extent, so that 
the latter is compelled to employ part of his 
artillery permanently against the defending ar- 
tillery. This again will be made more difficult 
by the fact that no small part of the defender's 
force of field guns have to be employed as 
anti-tank guns from the outset, and therefore 
can take no part in dealing with the attacker's 
artillery. 

Here, again, the defender is faced with con- 
tradictory and apparently irreconcilable de- 
mands which can never be wholly satisfied. 
The upshot of the whole matter is the brute 
fact that in this case, as in every other, the 
defending artillery can never be too strong. If 
it is kno^vii that an attack is imminent all artil- 
lery reserves within call must be brought up. 
Emplacements for artillery reenforcements 
must be established in every part of the front to 
be defended. The ranges must be established 
and suitable artillery maps supplied. 

Turning to artillery methods in detail, it is 
of course necessary that, if it is at all pos- 
sible, shooting be from observation. This sys- 
tem alone is a guarantee of adequate results. 



TACTICS 115 

An endeavor should always be made to obtain 
ground observation or observation from bal- 
loons or aeroplanes. But this will not always 
be possible. Observation is out of the question 
at night or in dense fog, and yet even in these 
circumstances the infantry cannot be left with- 
out any artillery protection, nor can the enemy 
be allowed to advance unmolested. 

Targets of considerable size can be engaged 
without observation by shooting by the map, 
due consideration being paid to weather or 
other special influences. By this method the 
whole area occupied by the enemy can be 
harassed, roads and railways swept and bil- 
lets and stations shelled. Fire of this kind, 
even without observation, is particularly im- 
portant in a large-scale operation. 

It can always be employed where it is de- 
sired to sweep considerable areas or definite 
sectors, but not to engage small targets. Thus 
unobserved fire is inevitable in gassing hostile 
groups of batteries or considerable portions of 
the enemy's lines and assembly trenches for 
the simple reason that these operations are 
best carried out at night. In this case the 
intention is merely to spread thick gas-clouds 
over a considerable area. Again, observation 
is neither possible nor necessary for the creep- 



116 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE 

ing barrage, the forward movement of which 
has to be settled by the clock. All that is re- 
quired here is to pay the most careful atten- 
tion to the errors of the day and other special 
influences. 

The ordinary barrage, and frequently de- 
struction fire also, have to be carried on with- 
out observation. This barrage means that the 
defender spreads a curtain of fire of the great- 
est possible density in front of his own lines. 
The attacking infantry have to pass through 
this curtain. The method will be effective only 
if the defending artillery is so strong that the 
barrage is extraordinarily dense, and if pos- 
sible comes from the flanks. Otherwise — ^if 
there are gaps — it is only too easy for the 'at- 
tacker to slip through. As I have said before, 
shrapnel (if the shell is really reliable) is the 
proper nature for this operation, especially in 
the case of an enfilading barrage, though the 
time-fuse shell also is very useful in these cir- 
cumstances. The batteries concerned must have 
registered very accurately beforehand. It is 
impossible to correct the range once the barrage 
is begun, as it has to be laid down at its maxi- 
mum intensity the moment it is required. 

In cases where the necessary density cannot 
be obtained, destruction fire is a useful substi- 



TACTICS 117 

tute. The latter does not, indeed, cover the 
whole front, but its effects against the known or 
suspected assembly points of the hostile infan- 
try are even greater, and it can quickly be con- 
centrated against them. As a rule it will be 
observed fire against known targets. If it is 
to take the place of the barrage, without ob- 
servation being possible, it will be directed 
against the enemy's prospective assembly 
points on which the batteries concerned will 
have registered beforehand. In this case, how- 
ever, it must not be a fixed and rigid curtain 
like the barrage, but must be shifted to the 
flanks or rear as occasion requires. It will 
frequently be necessary to bring it back sharply 
to catch the hostile infantry as they leave their 
assembly trenches. The fire must be distributed 
in such a way that the enemy can never know 
for certain where it will fall and make his ar- 
rangements accordingly. 

Destruction fire against smaller targets — 
batteries, individual strong points, command 
and observation posts — will be useful only when 
it is accurately checked by observation. If the 
artillery is to be safe — as far as safety is ever 
possible — against the enemy's destruction fire, 
the batteries must shift their positions fre- 
quently as soon as they suspect that their em- 



118 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE 

placements have been discovered by the enemy. 

Among the weapons used in preparing an 
attack we must not forget the gas-shell mortar, 
which in a certain sense fonns a separate arm, 
but in \Hew of its functions is part of the artil- 
lery. This mortar is built into its emplace- 
ment and fires gas or high-explosive shells at 
ranges up to 3,000 meters. These mortars are 
fired by electricity, so that all of them can be 
fired simultimeously. Thus their moral and 
physical effects are very great when an ade- 
quate number has been concentrated. The area 
affected, though restricted of course, is envel- 
oped in an immense cloud of gas w'hich causes 
heavy losses if the defenders are surprised. 

The concentration of these weapons must 
therefore be kept a strict secret, and they must 
be cxirefully camouflaged. 

If high-explosive shell is used, it is desirable 
that the infantry attack should begin inune- 
diately after the explosion, so that its enormous 
moral effect may be exploited to the full. Of 
course these mortars can fire only once at the 
same spot, for the enemy wall immediately bom- 
bard their emplacements, and it takes a consid- 
erable time to prepare these mortar batteries 
for a second round. 

The direction and control of the artillerj-' in 



TACTICS 119 

all these circumstances is a very difficult mat- 
ter. On the one hand, especially in trench war- 
fare, it is essential that the artillery be in 
a position to develop and concentrate all its 
power without any observation, relying solely 
on careful calculations and accurate artillery 
maps and giving due consideration to all errors. 
In this case, a single direction by one central 
authority is essential and 'this authority must 
assign the targets, decide the distribution and 
scale of ammunition and settle all questions of 

time. 

On the other hand, it is often essential that 
all the subordinate commanders down to the gun 
captain should have a free hand to deal with 
targets which suddenly present themselves and 
act on their own responsibility, though in the 
sense and spirit of their general instruc- 
tions, without waiting for orders, which quite 
frequently will never reach the individual offi- 
cer. These demands represent extremes which 
may have to be observed in certain circum- 
stances. Between these limits, however, there 
lies a broad sphere of the most varied artil- 
lery tasks in which the problem is to reconcile 
the demands of a central control and direction— 
of the lower units, at any rate— with that in- 
dependence of the subordinate commanders 



120 THE WAK OF THE FUTURE 

which special circumstances frequently make 
inevitable. It means that these commanders, 
right down to the gun captains, must have a 
high standard of tactical knowledge. 

When we contemplate the whole range of 
artillery operations we shall very soon be con- 
vinced that the peace organization on which 
the training and tactical emplojTnent of the 
artillery was based before the war is quite un- 
suitable for modem conditions. The system of 
four guns to the batteiy has certainly proved 
sound. Six guns are required only in the case 
of the infantry-gun batteries, as these may have 
to be distributed in sections to the three battal- 
ions of the regiment. On the other hand, the 
separation into field and foot artillery has been 
seen to be a mistake. A number of natures 
which previously formed part of the foot artil- 
lery have become field artillery to-day, and are 
employed in exactly the same manner as the old 
field artillery. The artillery officers must be as 
familiar with the one as with the other. Both 
species must frequently be employed in one 
tactical unit under the same command. To the 
field artillery belong not only the field guns and 
light howitzers, but even the heavy field how- 
itzers, the long 10 cm. guns, and to a certain 
extent the 21 cm. mortars also. 



TACTICS 121 

Only the heavy flat-trajectory and high-angle 
guns, i. e., 13 cm., 15 cm., 21 cm., 30 cm. and 38 
cm. guns and the heavy mortars with a caliber 
of 28, 30 and 42 cm., are in a category by them- 
selves. These are employed on specialist tasks 
in particular circumstances, and generally 
speaking play no part in open warfare. It 
may be questionable whether the 21 cm. mortars 
also do not fall into this category, as in cer- 
.tain conditions — e. g., in the roadless regions 
of Russia — they cannot be employed in open 
warfare. On the other hand, in France they 
were in use during the whole war and fre- 
quently employed in conjunction with the field 
artillery. It will therefore be advisable to con- 
stitute special battalions of 21 cm. mortars, 
count them as part of the field artillery, and 
leave them behind only when the road system 
is particularly bad. 

In all other respects it would be advisable to 
let the field artillery regiments comprise field- 
gun and field-howitzer Abteilungen,^ and also 
assign an Ahteilung of heavy field howitzers 
and 10 cm. guns to each of them, so that all the 
officers and men can be trained indiscriminately 
on all these guns. The regiments thus formed 
will be part of the division. Other regiments, 

*An Ahteilung is a group of three batteries. (Tr.) 



122 THE WAR OF THE FUTUKE 

comprising long heavy guns and liea\^ field 
howitzers, would form corps artilleiy and be 
under the orders of the corps commander who 
would also direct and control the mortar bat- 
teries. 

It would be best for the anti-aircraft bat- 
teries to be assigned to the divisional and 
corps artillery. Further, all batteries will be 
et|uipped with machine-gims, either for defense 
against aircraft or for dealing with infantry at- 
tacks at shoi-t range. It must be anticipated 
that in trench warfare a very much larger artil- 
lery force will be required than for open war- 
fare. In open warfare it will be essential for 
the corps and the aniiies to have an artillery 
reseiTe at their disposal, and our peace organi- 
zation must boar this requirement in mind. In 
trench warfare, on the other hand, it is essential 
that the annies, army groups, and G.H.Q. itself 
should have a large artillery reserve, so that 
the artillery center of gi'avity may be shifted as 
circumstances require. These reserves must 
comprise field artillery regiments and anti- 
aircraft guns also. The necessary material 
must be brought up, and the required officers 
and men must be duly trained. It is therefore 
possible that the divisions will have more artil- 
leiy regiments than they cm\ use in ordinary 



TACTICS 123 

circumstances and open warfare, and this be- 
cause these units must j>rovide Uie necessary 
reserve in time of war. In any case, as com- 
pared with former times, the artillery of the 
field army will have to be increased much more 
than the infantry. 

As regards long-range guns and the heaviest 
howitzers, it would be best to form them into 
mixed battalions as a special and independent 
arm under an Inspector-General. They should 
be assigned to corps and divisions for special 
maneuvers only. 

No s]r>ecial tactics are required for this heavy 
artillery. It must know how to move about, 
get into position, shoot and cooperate with the 
other arms, particularly infantry. In this last 
department nothing like enough was done be- 
fore the war. Even for the field artillery tac- 
tical operations can be reduced to the sim^dest 
form. Of course it is necessary in open war- 
fare that batteries and groups should know 
how to move about safely and smartly, and 
how to get into position. For the rest, good 
shooting is all that is required. Shooting with 
direct observation at short ranges must be prac- 
ticed very frequently in the closest cooperation 
with the infantry. This applies not only to the 
infantry-gun batteries, which are permanently 



124 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE 

attached to infantry regiments, but to all field- 
gun batteries without distinction. Finally, far 
greater importance than hitherto must be at- 
tached to the independent action of the subor- 
dinate commanders. All section commanders 
and gun captains must know how to control 
and direct fire and must have reached such a 
standard of tactical training that they can take 
over the duties of the post above them at any 
moment and without hesitation. 

Artillery material must be simplified as much 
as possible. The demands of the war have led 
to the introduction of many new natures which 
did not correspond to the changing circum- 
stances. Great mobility (therefore the mini- 
mum of weight), long ranges and a rapid rate 
of fire, combined with very simple construction 
and ability to stand the hardest wear, are the 
absolutely essential properties which every gun 
must have. The ammunition wagons also must 
be constructed to stand hard wear. Motor 
transport must be used as largely as possible 
for this purpose, and produced on the scale re- 
quired. 

Fresh education is required in the matter of 
ammunition, which must be simplified as much 
as possible to meet all the eventualities of war 
with its changing requirements. In the course 



TACTICS 125 

of the giant conflict, as I have already said, 
shrapnel was driven out of use almost entirely 
by high explosive for the reason that in mass 
production it is not possible to manufacture 
really reliable time-fuses. Under normal cir- 
cumstances of production it will recover its 
old importance. On the other hand, special 
attention must be devoted to the production of 
a shell of a particularly high penetrating power 
for use against tanks. 

Ill- — Cavalby and Aiecraft 

If I deal with cavalry and the air force in one 
chapter my reason is that the functions of the 
former have to a certain extent been taken over 
by the air service. The mounted arm has 
changed its character very materially. In 
trench warfare it has practically ceased to ex- 
ist as cavalry. Mounted troops are helpless 
against the long fortified lines of the enemy. 
They can be used only as a police force behind 
the front. Apart from infantry patrols, the du- 
ties of reconnaissance have been almost entirely 
taken over by aircraft, though the activities of 
the latter are certainly supplemented by the 
work of spies and secret agents. Yet these 
activities are subject to the great disadvantage 
that aircraft can work only in more or less fa- 



126 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE 

vorable weather, aiid are as good as useless for 
this purpose at night or in dense fog. 

At night, movemonts by railway and, in some 
circumstances, the position of villages and 
c^mps are all that aeroplanes can usually dis- 
tinguish. It is only when flying \ery low and 
at short distances that it is possible for aero- 
planes to light up the area they wish to recon- 
noiter. On the other hand, in good weather 
aeroplane reconnaissance is often able to show 
better results than caA^alrj^ could ever have 
done. The whole area occupied by the enemy 
can be photographed from the air. This 
makes it possible to fix the position and organ- 
ization of the enemy's system of defenses in 
the greatest detail. Further, it is possible to 
observe and photograph from the air the move- 
ments of trains, the position of stations and 
rolling stock, aerodromes, the size and approx- 
imate capacity of camps, magazines and am- 
munition depots, the emplacements of hostile 
batteries and the presence of tanks (either 
directly or by distinguishing their tracks on 
the roads). 

Of course the enemy will do his level best to 
conceal all these establishments from aerial 
observation, but if the reconnaissance is really 
careful and systematic it will often be possible 



TACTICS 127 

to make out preparations for a hostile attack, 
the increase or decrease of the enemy's artil- 
lery, the arrival of reserves, and similar prepa- 
rations, and thus render the commanders the 
most valuable services. 

But just as the cavalry found the field for 
reconnaissance open only when they had driven 
off the hostile cavalry, the air force also will 
frequently be in a position to carry out this 
task effectively only when the supremacy of the 
air has been fought for and won. The enemy 
will not only attack our reconnoitering ma- 
chines whenever he has the chance, but he will 
also frequently patrol the area himself over his 
own lines to prevent our machines from break- 
ing through, and he is certain to take the of- 
fensive himself in adequate force to find out 
what he requires to know about his opponents. 

As I have said elsewhere, it is the function 
of the chaser squadron to fight the enemy's 
machines and to clear the way for the recon- 
naissance maichines. For this purpose they 
are constituted in tactical units, the strength 
of which is not, of course, fixed by rule. The 
largest unit is the squadron which may consist 
of four to six flights and is in charge of a com- 
mander. The flight, which normally consists of 
fourteen machines, is subdivided into chains of 



128 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE 

six to eight machines. The employment of a 
whole squadron always indicates the intention 
to destroy the largest possible number of hos- 
tile machines. 

The duty of the squadron-conunander is to 
lead the whole squadron, organized as a single 
formation, to fight the enemy. The commander 
himself, who always flies lowest in order to 
be seen by all the machines, arranges that he 
has, e. g., one flight each on his right and left; 
another follows behind, while the fourth is 
echeloned in height. Fixed tactical forms have 
not yet been developed and even the strengths 
of the individual tactical units will vary with 
the number of the machines and the personnel 
available. If the squadron meets a hostile force 
the action, which is always offensive, will break 
up into a number of separate duels. In these 
fights everything practically turns on getting 
above one's opponent, attacking him with the 
sun behind and shooting only at close quarters 
(there must be no hesitation about closing with 
the enemy) in order to be certain of hitting. 
After a successful action the squadron resumes 
its original formation round the squadron-com- 
mander who has been circling over the scene 
of battle. 

If the squadron meets a hostile squadron 



TACTICS 129 

which is flying higher, it must attempt to entice 
the enemy to come down and give battle, and 
then rob him of the advantage of height by skill- 
ful climbing. On the other hand, if the squad- 
ron meets individual hostile machines flying be- 
low it, only one machine should dive down upon 
the enemy, or in case of emergency it may be 
helped by one other at most. The squadron 
itself must remain at its original height and 
not be induced to come down, as otherwise it 
would find itself in a disadvantageous position 
with regard to any other hostile formation 
which came up later. 

In the individual duel everything turns on 
attacking the enemy from behind, and the enemy 
will do everything in his power to avoid being 
attacked from that quarter. With good climb- 
ers like our latest Fokker machines,^ the enemy 
can also be attacked advantageously from be- 
low and behind. Against hostile balloons the 
best effects can be obtained with organized units 
and in cooperation with heavy artillery. 
Whole groups of balloons are attacked simul- 
taneously, and their beds bombarded by heavy 
long-range guns to prevent the balloons from 
being promptly hauled down. Isolated ma- 
chines will often be able to surprise and destroy 

' I cannot say whether they still represent the latest type. 



130 THE WAR OF THE FUTUKE 

a balloon by making skillful use of the clouds. 

The same principles which apply to the squad- 
ron naturally hold good for smaller units which 
act independently. The offensive, first and all 
the time, must be the dominant note in air 
tactics whether a large formation or a single 
machine is concerned. Success depends upon 
it far more than in fighting on land. The war 
has proved it up to the hilt. It may often mean 
that a considerable number of flights — drawn 
from adjacent fronts also — have to be concen- 
trated in a certain area so that the supremacy 
of the air may be secured, come what may, at 
the decisive point. 

Some such systematic concentration must be 
carried out particularly for a defensive action 
and it is, of course, indispensable when an of- 
fensive operation is intended, for in this case 
the control of the air at all altitudes must be 
secured beyond dispute both before and more 
particularly after the infantry assault. It will 
thus be necessary to keep back reserves of 
chaser squadrons in order to deal with enemy 
counter-attacks. A single command of the air 
forces is necessary under all circumstances. 
Success in the air wdll make it possible to rec- 
onnoiter much more thoroughly and accurately, 
and fulfill in increasing measure the other duties 



TACTICS 131 

of the flying arm, for the air service has taken 
over the role of cavalry in another department 
and in trench warfare is alone in a position to 
perform it — I mean harassing the communica- 
tions of the enemy. 

In trench warfare the cavalry can never get 
behind the hostile front, while aeroplanes can 
fly over it and attack the enemy's lines of com- 
munication, troops marching behind the lines, 
camps and aerodromes, dumps, stations and 
railways, and this either with bombs or ma- 
chine-gun fire. These attacks can be far more 
successful and carried much farther behind the 
hostile front than in the days when this duty 
was assigned to the cavalry. As a rule these 
attacks will be carried out by bombing squad- 
rons which have a very great radius of action 
and usually work by night, though by day also 
against nearer targets, and then generally un- 
der the protection of chaser flights. 

Cavalry cannot intervene as such even in bat- 
tles in trench warfare so long as these have 
not led to a complete rupture. But the cavalry 
effect of surprise, if not its methods of oper- 
ation, can be obtained by the battle flights. 
These machines which, as we saw, are specially 
equipped for action against ground targets, 
can dive down (of course under the protection 



132 THE WAK OF THE FUTURE 

of cliaser squadrons) unexpectedly from high 
altitudes, sweep the enemy's trenches, troops in 
action, columns on the march and batteries in 
action with machine-gun fire at the shortest 
range. These attacks can be directed not only 
against the enemy's front line but also against 
defense works farther back and reserves as 
they arrive. In this way very material assist- 
ance can be rendered to the infantry in their 
hard struggle, and the situation will often be 
saved. The machines must come down very 
low, ignoring the enemy's fire altogether, if 
they are to make good use of their weapons and 
spread terror and confusion in the enemy's 
ranks. 

Armor protection for the most important 
parts will materially facilitate this task. Thus 
the machine can be employed for attack as a 
kind of cuirassier of the air. On such occasions 
it will be a great advantage to organize the air 
forces into battle squadrons, each with a special 
task. As tactical units they will be sent into 
action where the decision is being sought either 
in attack or defense. 

In trench warfare the cavalry can partici- 
pate only when it is dismounted. They will be 
employed exactly in the same manner as infan- 
try, and must be equipped and organized 



TACTICS 133 

accordingly. The horses will be left in safe 
places while the men will be organized in regi- 
ments within which the squadron forms the tac- 
tical unit. The peace training of this arm must 
provide for their employment dismounted, for 
even in open warfare their dismounted role will 
play a vital part. In other respects open war- 
fare, which will mark the beginning of a cam- 
paign or succeed a victorious rupture of the 
enemy's front, will make quite different de- 
mands on this arm from those of trench war- 
fare. Its peculiar characteristics will then 
again play their full part. Of course mounted 
fighting — ^by which I mean shock tactics — will 
be limited to a few exceptional occasions, as I 
pointed out even before the war, of course with- 
out being believed. It is only the patrols on 
both sides which will continually get to close 
quarters. 

On the other hand, the strategic functions of 
this arm will become of vital importance. The 
speed of the horse will be used no longer for 
attack but for rapid strategic maneuvers. In 
this department an independent force of 
cavalry, properly handled, will obtain great 
successes of much strategic importance. Its 
main function will be to attack the flanks and 
rear of the enemy during a battle, cut his com- 



VM TilK WAlx OK THK Fl'TllxK 

munioations as tho oporation proooods ami 
cause ooufiision bohiiul tho hostile front, hi 
action itself cavalry wiU usually tight dis- 
mounted and with the assistauee ot' the aux- 
iliary anus assiii'ued to it. Mounted lighting 
will take place only when it meets the enen\y's 
niountcii cavalry, or when it falls by surprise 
on hostile tivops in tlight, or tiuds a transport 
column on the march without escort. These 
will certainly be exceptional occurrences and 
dismounted tighting will be the rule both in 
attack and in defense proper. 

These considerations must determine the tac- 
ticfU uses and tlierefore the organization of 
this arm upon which they are based. The form 
of action requires that a tactical disuioimted 
unit uuist bo tlie foundation of the whole or- 
ganization. Every two squadrons, which num- 
ber alnnit 150 men when dismounted i^apart 
from patrols and oiiierlies, etc.), must there- 
fore form the tactical unit under the senior 
captain or a statf othcer. The cavalry regiment 
must consist of at least ten squadrons in" addi- 
tion to the reserve squadron in order to form 
a dismounted battalion with a total establish- 
ment of about 750 men. The larger formations 
also must have a pn^portional establishment. 
The brigade Tuust consist of two or three regi- 



TACTICS V/> 

nuiniHf »o that it can cjtnHtiiuUi two or three 
(ViHmounU'A ImiUiUoiin, while the division nnujt 
have thr<'^; hn'j^a^JeH, ho tftat it can represent 
a nanouH i\iihi\u'/_ forcji even aft/^r (hdadaing 
one hriga/Je. i'oth briga/JeK and (Vivmona mtut 
hf; f'uJJy ('j\m\)[t(ii\ with tli/j auxiliary weapon* 
and indeed on kucJj a »cale tfiat each brij^ade 
forrnx an independent tactical hK>dy. The iiu>Ht 
vital r<'/\u\r('j(ii'Jii in thai monuUA tr^xjps hhould 
have miif'Aiinc^i^n Hrjua/JronH, if pOBHibhj one to 
ea/jh rejrinjent. Thi» in particularly imjrxjrtant, 
an the li^ht rnachinr^^n, b^iing difficult t^i carry 
on hornebaek, cAmuot be UH^i^L The machine- 
g^un Kquadron rnuKt be able t^j develop a really 
Heriouw fin^power. The cavalry formation* 
rniJHt alHo receive a Btrong forwi of artillery, if 
poHHJble light field howitzers of special con- 
Htnjction Ix^jaune the useH of the latter are far 
more varl'id than thoHo of gunH. Ad(if{UiiUi am- 
munition muHt be taken by a large number of 
ammunition cjlumnn. Under all circumiitances 
it will be TKiCMHH'dry for cvary brigade to have 
a battery which in permanently atta/;hed to it, 
and the divisional commander mu8t liave a 
group of three l)atterieH at his immediate diu- 
pOHal. 

Provision must also be made for the rc-quire- 
mentn of tronch warfare by f^quipping the 



1S6 TllK WAU^ OK THK KT riKV: 

ORVsUrv with lijilit m.iohitio ii'uns. A Inviiv nuui- 
Wr of mon ntus^t U\orv>fori^ bo tniiuod ii\ tho use 
of tiiis \v^\»VHni ovo!\ tho\iii'h it ^vvniiot bo oarriini 
aKnit ponnHMontly in ovhm\ warfarw Tho foivo 
niuiit hrtvx^ a larjiv uun\bor of oiUutwii;^ for 
briii^iiV^ up tho novv^sary fvnidor and ii sor\ os 
of matorial, aiid it will Iv advisablo to form 
s|Hvial osvvrt {^quadrvMis to protivt tho ivhmiws 
on tho niarv^h and, at tho san\o tinu\ porforni 
tho dutios of olo$o nxvnnaisv^anoo. Thus and 
thus ah\no will a sutlio.iont fi\HHion\ of niovon\ont 
bo gioourwi to tho wholo forvv. Anothor funo 
tion of thoso osoort squadrons will bo to n\)ui- 
iiition t\Hxi supplios and foddor fixnn tho coun- 
try itself. As it will usually bo in\possiblo to 
n^lN- on gv^ttiiVi? supplios frvmi tho ronr. it will 
W partioularlN' important to tuako tho fnllost 
uso of Kval rosourvH^s. Tho osv.vrt squadrons 
must thoivforo not bo too woak. auvi may bo 
traimxi as mountiHl infantry, as monntixl t\jj:ht- 
ing is most unlikol>\ If all thoso dutios. and 
parlioularly n\\nisitioninii' and protootinji: tho 
transports, had to bo porformod by tho tl^htin^ 
tixH^ps thomsolvos thoir tijihtinsj: stivngth would 
soon bo vory soriously rvninood. 

Tho samo considerations apply to distant 
roivnnaissiUico, which oxv>orionoo has shown 
absorbs a vory largo forco and puts a strain 



TACTICH L37 

on iha hhrni'M wh'wh in <mi fff profK^rtion t/> th<i 

fff thix \mr<U',fi tf lih at alJ iMfanWAh. lit-ra tii^ttin 
ihi', air fort'/-, f,r(fV(:H a wjilabl^ MxhuXiUiU.. VffT 
\)uri>oht',H of n/'XtmiHiaHiiiK'/i flying rjrjit« rrjuxt 
^*#* hiUuJfU'A U) th<; cavaJry ari/J fonfif'A and or- 
gan/V^J in Huch a way that th/; n^^y^'KHary air- 
craft can h<; ami'tHK-A avdu to (itiiiuthtA bn;^a/J/^, 
thoMjfh thrjy rnuHt all Jkj nnd<jr thii (\Wm<m t<fT 
c/frnmon op^iratk/iw. In viffw of th/; Kp«>*^J of 
th/; ii>'',r()]>\itu(', that will nlmoHi always Ik; jiOft- 
HJbh;, jrjKt an it will b/; fhUHihhi to (iHinhViSih 
Mtijtablo tifirfAroman under tho protraction of the 
rmmnUA irodpn. Thana a^oplan<;H rnunt n;coii- 
no'iUtr the country ahead and on b/Ah Hide» of 
the cavalry ho thoroughly that the latter will 
alwayn be gafe aj^ainnt Hurj-jrige or attack by a 
superior for/;/; when on the march or oth/;rwi»^. 
If Huch an a/;roplane deta/:Jinrj/nit i» to UAlow 
iha r;avalry permanently it muHt be particularly 
mobile, for it alH/> has to phrfonn the duty of 
Kpotting for the attach^;/! artillery. This aim 
can be ax'M'itiViA hy the pr//vi«ion of iulofiusiUi 
motor transport. The c/^mrnander of the flying 
Hqua/lron or an Air Fore/; YitiiHon officer must 
always j<o with the c//rnman/ler of the r;avalry 
forr;/;. I'he cavalry formati/m must also be fol- 
lowr;/] dinxjtly by a c/^lumn of m/^tor transport 



r«tU8 and u'lianiv^ t\>r tho noivplanos, as \Yi>ll as 
motor ivu\^ aiul motor oyolistj*. Thoso vohiv^los 
iwust iviuaiu whoro tho oavalry tonwaliouvS 
(ivrps» divisions, or brigados) t\x tUoir hoad- 
quartors. 

In choosii\^4i' tlioso points ^^and tho roqniro 
monts of tlio atlaoiu\i th ing nnits nuist bo l)ori\o 
in mind for this pnrposo'l tho ooimtry will havo 
to Iv iwoiuioitorod boforoliand. and tho sitos 
soKHxlod indioatod by oortain si>5:nals a^irotnl 
upon by tiio indiviilual oavalry nnits. Tlioro 
n\nst ivrtainly bo a landing- liTound oK>so to 
tho otluvr in oonnnand of tho oavalry, and 
it wonlii bo tlosirablo that aiivraft shonUi bo 
ablo to land i\oar to divisional and bri^i-ado 
lioadqnartors as woll For tho rost. tM'viors 
anvi n\ossa>ivs wonld havo to bo oonvoyovi by 
wiivloss or mossaiiv baii's drc^ppod from aoro- 
planos. Tho movomonts of tho tlyin^i* dotaoh- 
mont imist bo by stajivs on ordors fnnn tho oon\- 
mandor, anii nnist bo dotorniinod by tho prog-- 
ivss or tho intondiHl stratojjio on\ploymont of 
tho acHnnnpiinyini^ cvwalry t*orn\ation. This 
nwnnaissanoo from tho air oortaiidy vioos not 
ivliovo tho oavalry of tho dnty i>f oU>so rooon- 
naissanoo or lookin^j;: aft or its own safoty. bnt 



TAOTICH l^ 

it Uiki'H ovar iha (vtvalry ftmfdUm of dininni, 
r('j'/>nfniin¥,}i.fi('/- - - - * on iU<fn*', (Uiyn on y/hU'h 
no f\y'ntf('in i>f/r injr t/> th^r w';alh';r Kvtin 

that in a v^ry vulimhUt a/Wnnimeo.. 

/y;i«fjy, a eydint ymiiaVum or a force of fn- 
ffiniry in hocHc/i or rntdor ]ornfin ifiay bf? 
itXUu'hi'A to ihi', f',ii.wH\ry. On th/; otii/;r band, it 
JH not hjdvinhhht that it nhouUl \xi 'dC/'jompanuA 
by infantry or .I'lffcr (nt for^t, an that woaW 
rnat^jrially r<;«trict itH mobility. For althongh 
th^; '' march Inpr rJay" hUouU] not F><; too Ionj< for 
Hcvcsftl Htu^if'j'M/tvo, (layn, if cavalry in t/> Ui fit 
lo fnnnanvnr at a critirjal mornont, it in abb? to 
r^iv<fr v^jry lon^ ^Vinianmn very rapidly. It 
may, ji}<'.rhfij[fH, )><; mwl that to (riv^; \nth',\>*:nt\f',ni 
c/fivtilry (iiviHionH Uia HircnitSh I bav^; auay^'/iiU-A 
involvcH an unnoc/'Mnary [furdcji tm 'lU HtraU;^'c 
mobility, yiccjinnc o\fv\onAy it in nfit an ea«y 
uiidU'T to prov'ultt MO large a forc/5 with <5very- 
thinpr it r<'/\\i'\r('.n, 1 do not Hhan; that vif;w. In 
th<;Hf', dayn of m/iHH arrni^iH, wh^;n;v<;r jf''^;at re- 
HultH arr; fi'irncA at a {rr^^at forc^j niu«t alwayg 
b<; fiinjAoycA. A vjc/aV. forty; fa/]o« away Ytfifora 
\h(', powarn of rcHiKbtncA now (ViH^AaycA by even 
quito Hmall (h.Ui/'Mmcjiin, txnd in cnt/frpriue* 
Hijch aH v/<; hav^; bf;f',n diHcuHHin^ 'tn Htnm^h in 
Hoon (-.xhiiiiHioj]. ()n the other hand, the authori- 
tieB ('/>ncA:ni(-A with the 8tix>ply of food and 



140 THE WAK OF THE FUTURE 

forage to the troops may always rely on finding 
large snpply depots in the rear of the hostile 
armies, as no modern army can move withont 
them. Living on the country was a feature of 
past wars, and ^vill be possible only in quite 
exceptional circumstances in future. 

There are certainly a good many critics who 
are so impressed by trench warfare that they 
consider large-scale cavalry operations impos- 
sible under modern conditions. I need only 
refer these doubters to our campaigns in Russia 
and Rumania and the operations of our army 
cavalry during the campaign of 1914, in which 
the independent cavaliy force performed re- 
markable feats, and could have done even 
greater things if it had been strong enough. As 
an example I need only mention our break- 
through at Slocow, in the summer of 1917, when 
it would imqnestionably have been possible 
practically to destroy the armies opposed to us 
if — as had actually been planned — a strong 
cavaln^ corps had been sent out in the enemy's 
rear. It would be easy to multiply similar in- 
stances. 

Unfortunately, we were compelled by cir- 
cumstances to transform our cavalry very 
largely into dismounted troops, and thus to 
weaken even the divisional cavalry very seri- 



TACTICS 141 

ously. At the last there was only one weak 
squadron to each division. That is far too 
weak, oven for trench warfare, in which it has 
the duties of police work behind the front and 
supplying mounted orderlies. One squadron is 
hopelessly inadequate for open warfare, in 
which it has to perform the tasks of close 
reconnaissance, orderly duties, requisitioning 
and so on, in addition to providing flank protec- 
tion and intervening in the action where cir- 
cumstances require. 

It would certainly be a mistake to replace 
cavalry by mounted infantry — apart from the 
escort squadron, to which we have already re- 
ferred. For distant marches and successful 
and effective raiding, efficient and skillful 
cavalry are an absolute necessity. Further, 
only cavalrymen can really keep their horses 
fit in the long run. Forming mounted infantry 
units is nearly always a half measure and has 
had little success, even in the Boer "War, where 
the English used them on a large scale. The 
methods of dismounted fighting must be exactly 
the same as with the infantry. Here again the 
enemy's fire will compel the attack to be or- 
ganized in groups, while everything will 
depend on refraining from attacking formidable 
strong points frontally and leaving them on on© 



142 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE 

side, so that they can be captured by envelop- 
ment. In this case the attacker will strive to 
break through at the point of least resistance, 
and leave the capture of strong points to the 
infantry waves coming up behind. Batteries 
will have to accompany the attacking troops 
directly, with a view to breaking down obstinate 
local resistance by artillery fire. Distribution 
in depth is just as important as in the case of 
the infantiy. 

In trench warfare particularly, the methods 
of dismounted cavalry will be determined by 
the same considerations, as in the case of the 
infantry, but it will be otherwise in open war- 
fare, because, in this case, cavalry will seldom 
be employed in a purely frontal attack shoulder 
to shoulder with the sister arm. The com- 
mander will endeavor to make the fullest pos- 
sible use of the mobility of this force. He will 
send out his cavalry from the wings against 
the flanks and rear of the enemy, and thus 
strive to strike him in the most sensitive spot. 

In the action itself the commander will en- 
deavor to make his frontal and flank attacks 
react upon one another and thus, by envelop- 
ment, reach that goal which can be attained 
only in a purely frontal action by distribu- 
tion in depth. In this case the distribution need 



TACTICS 143 

not be so deep as in the purely frontal attack. 
At the same time the flanks and rear of the 
attacking cavalry must be protected against 
surprise from approaching hostile reserves by 
reconnoitering squadrons thrown out far 
ahead. Indeed, generally speaking, it will be 
possible to contemplate employing such a mass 
of cavalry only after previous reconnaissance 
has established that there are no hostile re- 
serves in the vicinity. If their approach has 
been discovered it is the business of the cavalry 
to place itself across their path or keep them 
from getting nearer to the battlefield by at- 
tacking them in flank. 

In affairs of this kind the cavalry will have 
to cooperate with the flying arm not only for 
reconnaissance purposes but in the action itself. 
Battle flights can not only introduce their 
attack on the marching columns of the enemy, 
but support it very effectively. Bombing 
squadrons can deal with hostile batteries em- 
placed behind the battle-front or advancing in 
the open, or they may be used against ammu- 
nition depots or columns on the march. In 
every kind of operation in open warfare the 
systematic cooperation of cavalry and aircraft 
will be very useful. 
If we ever see cavalry battles in the grand 



144 THE WAK OF THE FUTURE 

stylo ag'ain in some future war (which is not 
altogvthor impossiMo), it is certain that there 
^^•ill be no question of the so-eaUed "throc-liue" 
tactics with its supports. Even before the war 
it could be seen that these tightiuii; methods and 
maneuvers were entirely out of date. Unfor- 
tunately, it has had an unhappy intlnence upon 
the development of the cavalry arm, and led it 
into false paths in spite of all warning-s. 

Under the conditions of to-day there can be 
no question of putting in the division as a tac- 
tic*nl unit, even in a cavalry action, in view of 
the etfects of artillery and machine-guns. It 
\n\\ first be necessary' to try and neutralize 
the hostile batteries and maoliine-gims witli 
one's own artillery, and then send out one's 
brigades and regiments with individual com- 
missions in such a way that they can execute 
a tlank movement as much as possible out of 
range of the enemy's fire before they actually 
open their att-ack. In maneuvering they must 
advance in separate colunms and concentrate 
for united action only when they reach the 
battlefield. The object will again be to envelop 
the enemy, and can alone bring \ictor\'', as a 
frontal attack in close order will only lend 
straight into the enemy's fire and present it 
with the most splendid target. The cooperation 



TACTICS 145 

of the various columns can bo socurod by com- 
munication through aircraft as well as by fixing 
tlie rate of thf3 advance beforehand. 

In the atta<^;k itHelf, which, as a rule, will bo 
only against hostile cavalry, as far as circum- 
stances permit the cavalry will be divided into 
two lines, the first being considerably the 
stronger of the two. The enemy must never be 
allowed to outflank them. If circumstanrji^s 
make it at all possible, the cavalry commander 
will have a reserve at his disposal, and in any 
case he will provide him.self with artillery sup- 
port and operate in such a way that without 
exposing himself to the enemy's fire he will get 
the latter under his own guns before he gets 
to close quarters with cold steel. 

This is a lesson which I did my best to bring 
home, both in theory and practice, even before 
the World War. Unfortunately for the cavalry 
arm, I preached to deaf ears. At the beginning 
of the war particularly, our attacking and mass 
tactics cost our cavalry very Kerious and utterly 
useless losses in both men and material. The 
war has justified me at every point, and to-day 
there is reason for fearing that we are going 
1^> far in the opposite direction by completely 
underestimating the value of cavalry as such, 
and expecting nothing more from its strategic 



146 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE 

activities simply becauso it was so often used 
wrongly in the war. It would be a great dis- 
aster if this view gained ground. 

IV. — Fortifications, Enqineees and Railway 
Troops 

The art of fortification is so essential a factor 
in the conduct of modern operations that it 
must be regarded as an element in the tactics 
of all arms. Indeed, it is impossible to imagine 
an action ^\ithout the use of the entrenching 
tool or the otlier technical engineering re- 
sources. In trench warfare all arms must be 
familiar with methods of fortification. The 
batteries must know how to provide themselves 
with \s'ire and defenses in order to be able to 
deal with hostile infantry or tanks which have 
broken through. In trench warfare the cavalrj'- 
fights exactly like infantry and therefore re- 
quires the same technical training. The infan- 
try itself must be in a position to construct its 
defenses Avithout assistance, and call in the 
engineers only as supervisors in the heavier 
technical work, such as concrete construction, 
tunneling, etc. In case of emergency, moreover, 
the infantry must know how to do everything 
necessary unaided, ordinaiy trench-digging and 
wirine:, for instance. 



TACTICS 147 

Nov(3rthclcHS, unuHually difTicult tochnical 
workH, for which a wpecialist training in re- 
quired, muKt remain the province of the en- 
g-ineer.s. They alone can do the heavier Hpecies 
of bridging, whether with proper engineering 
apparatus or only with improvised material. 
They or the railway troops must blow bridges 
up when required, as is so often the case in war. 
Mining is itself a special service within the com- 
pass of engineering. So is pontoon work, while 
all pioneers must be trained in temporary 
bridging as must the auxiliary pioneers in the 
infantry, i. e., infantrymen who have had a 
special training in the necessary pioneer work. 

But even if the art of fortification has thus 
become the common property of the troops to a 
certain extent, the fact remains that the tech- 
nical engineering problems of field warfare 
have increased so immensely in number and sig- 
nificance that the engineering arm has become 
very much more important and must be 
strengthened in comparison with the other arms 
so that it can relieve the infantry of many tech- 
nical engineering functions and thus release it 
for its proper work of fighting. 

On the other hand, it must be realized that in 
future there will be no fortifications in the 
true sense of the word. 



148 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE 

Even the greatest fortified cities can be bom- 
barded by the long-range artillery of present 
times without the attacker's being compollcd to 
sit down to a proper siege. The fire of long- 
range flat-trajectoiy gams can be reenforced by 
the bombs of bombing squadrons which can 
attack the fortress from great altitudes, while 
the defense measures, such as anti-aircraft 
artillery and aircraft itself, can be no certain 
protection against such attacks. Even a ring 
of forts at a considerable distance from the 
to^vn cannot save it from bombardment by 
long-range guns. Indeed, these forts offer the 
most favorable target to the attacking artillery, 
for even the strongest reenforced concrete and 
armored turrets at the disposal of the defend- 
ing artillery cannot withstand the effects of 
heavy high-angle fire. They will be destroyed 
in a very short time, and cannot prevent the 
attacker from gaining access to the town itself. 

Antwerp, the strongest fortress in Europe 
before the war, was able to hold out only twelve 
days. 

Thus the fortress ceases to perform its true 
function of being a safe depot and center for 
war material and the civil authorities, as well 
as a defense for important strategic points, 
such as river-crossings, railway junctions and 



TACTICS 149 

so on, for a considerable time, even though the 
field army is temporarily compelled to leave it 
to its fate. Neither Paris nor Metz would have 
been able to hold out as long as they actually 
did in 1870-71 if they had been attacked by 
modem artillery, even if they had had the 
same resources for defense as Antwerp had in 
the last war. To-day the only value of Paris as 
a fortress is that it would compel its assailant 
to concentrate and deploy a large force of artil- 
lery. After that concentration was complete it 
is absolutely out of the question that it could 
hold out for any length of time when once it 
had lost touch with the field army. 

It may perhaps be suggested that the case of 
Verdun is a proof to the contrary, for Verdun 
certainly succeeded in defying capture. That 
case, however, has no weight. In the first place 
Verdun was never out of touch with the army. 
It always formed a sector of the French line. 
Moreover, it was not the fortifications which 
saved the fortress from capture. It was the 
extraordinarily favorable configuration of the 
ground, which was particularly suitable for 
defense and offered the defenders shell-proof 
cover in subterranean tunnels which, combined 
with the general military situation, made it pos- 
sible for the town to hold out. Notwithstand- 



150 THE WAK OF THE FUTURE 

ing all tliis, it never performed its function of 
a safe supply center. 

Nor did it protect an army or even its own 
garrison, tliough that is what was expected of 
a fortress in former times. On the other hand, 
it was itself protected and saved by the field 
army. These are great differences, and prac- 
tically reduce its value as a fortress to nothing. 
The real forts and armored works were soon 
destroyed by the attacker's artillery and played 
a relatively subordinate part during the whole 
siege. 

There can be no possible doubt that fortresses 
have lost their value in face of modern methods 
of attack. Even before the war I prophesied 
that that would be the case. 

Under modern conditions it is quite impos- 
sible to protect railway junctions, river cross- 
ings, and similar important strategic points 
locally, either against artillery as soon as the 
latter has got them within range, or against air- 
craft, for anti-aircraft guns are a very limited 
protection. 

In actual practice such points can be pro- 
tected only by the offensive both on land and in 
the air, an offensive which keeps the hostile 
columns at such a distance that they cannot 
reach the object to be destroyed "svith their ai-til- 



TACTICS 151 

lery, while the bombing squadrons are attacked 
with the greatest vigor before they appear over 
their target on their nocturnal visit. Important 
dumps can bo protected in this way only, and 
further, by being established at places which 
the enemy does not suspect and which are as 
safe as care can make them against discovery 
from the air. 

In future, whenever one side is compelled or 
elects to stand on the defensive, fortresses will 
be replaced by field fortifications in selected 
areas. The defenses will be planned on the 
same lines as defenses in trench warfare, but in 
certain circumstances will be permanent con- 
structions, as will be the case in trench warfare 
also where time and other conditions permit. 

Whether it will be necessary even in peace 
time to construct pennanent defenses on part 
of the frontier on the principles of field fortifi- 
cation, and then make them as safe as possible 
even against heavy artillery, must depend upon 
political, military and local conditions. Such 
defense works would undoubtedly impose upon 
the prospective enemy a concentration of artil- 
lery which would mean a loss of valuable time. 

As regards field fortifications themselves, the 
most varied and fundamental changes have 
taken place during the war. While certain 



lo2 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE 

arrangoments which had proved their value in 
some circumstances were generalized, it often 
happened that instructions were issued which 
had no place in other circumstances. In actual 
fact it is quite impossible to draw up a manual 
of universal application ; all orders must he de- 
termined by the special circumstances of each 
particular c^ise. Thus only quite general prin- 
ciples can be elucidated, for their execution in 
practice depends upon the nature of the ground 
in which the work is to bo done, the amount of 
ground-water, the question whether the area 
before and behind the selected position is over- 
looked, the material and labor resources avail- 
able, the prospective natures and strength of 
the enemy *s artilleiy and other oflfensive arms, 
and finally the purpose which the trench system 
is intended to ser^-e, i. e.. whether it is to be de- 
fended merely for a short time or held for a 
considerable period. 

Tlie plan of construction must be determined 
by all these considerations. If there is time 
geologists will be chilled in to help, so that the 
nature of the soil and the question of water can 
bo considered from the outset. It is of the very 
greatest importance to dry the trenches by a 
suitable system of drainage. I proved the truth 
of that mvself both in Russia and France. In 



TACTICS 153 

countricB where there is much ^ound-water it 
will be impoHHible to dig very deep and it will 
often be necenKary to keep renewing the para- 
pets. Where the trenches are on a declivity 
the water will frequently pour into them from 
above. In such a case appropriate stejjs must 
be taken to drain it off. If possible, hydraulic 
engineers must be called in to advise. The 
trenches must always be sited in such a way 
that they do not easily collapse under artillery 
fire. The profile must be determined accord- 
ingly, and a method of revetment adopted 
which avoids the scattering of splinters when 
a direct hit is scored, as is the ease with revet- 
ments of planks for instance. 

In view of the effects of modem artillery, 
covered-in trenches with loopholes from which 
to fire — the system so freely used by the Rus- 
sians — must be emphatically condemned. It is 
also important to make the trenches as invisi?jle 
to the enemy as is possible and particularly to 
protect them from observation from the air. 
The field of fire must be adequate. It must 
be possible to fire over the wire in front, as 
otherwise the bullets will cut through it. 
Lastly, the trenches must give the men, if at all 
possible, weather and shell-proof cover from 
which they can quickly get to the fire-step. By 



154 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE 

' * sliell-proof , " however, I mean only cover 
against 15 cm. shell at the outside, as protection 
against heavier calibers is only possible under 
particularly favorable circumstances. Further, 
there must be safe communication with the rear 
if in any way possible. The more formidable 
the hostile artillery fire to be anticipated, and 
the more the whole trench system is exposed to 
the enemy's view, the more essential does it be- 
come to provide cover in the shape of shell- 
proof dug-outs. 

In some circumstances it may also be neces- 
sary to construct the defensive system not as 
a continuous line of trenches but as a series of 
strong points. In that case it will be essential 
to provide safe means of communication be- 
tween the individual strong points (though 
frequently such communication trenches can 
be concealed from view only by camouflage), 
and further, it will be necessary to establish 
second-line strong points, chessboard-wise, be- 
hind the gaps in the front series, so that when 
the enemy has broken through he will find him- 
self faced with fresh centers of resistance. 

If time and the available labor permit, rear 
lines or a series of strong points will be estab- 
lished even behind the continuous front-line 
system. In these resistance will be offered to 



TACTICS 155 

the enemy after he has broken into the front 
line, the impetus of his attack will be shattered, 
and he will be held up long enough for the 
counter-attack of the defender's reserves to 
make itself felt. These trenches or strong 
points will also serve the purpose of providing 
cover for local reserves. 

The same principles apply in the case of the 
fortification of a deep defensive zone from 
which it is intended in certain circumstances to 
retire slowly, but fighting all the time, on a line 
farther back. 

In many cases it is advisable to select a posi- 
tion on the reverse side of a slope which cannot 
be directly seen or observed by the enemy. But, 
to my eyes, this slight advantage is nothing 
compared with the great disadvantages of such 
a position. In the first place it is clear that the 
defender himself cannot see the enemy, and 
therefore is very liable to be surprised. For 
that reason posts have to be established on the 
crest of the hill in all circumstances, and their 
position is very unfavorable. Moreover, the 
advantage of not being seen directly is very 
small, at any rate in my opinion, for even a 
trench system on the (to the attacker) far side 
of the slope can be observed from aircraft and 



156 THE AYAK OF THE FUTURE 

often ovoii from balloons at i^roat heights, and 
thus brought under artillen- lire. 

In considering the proper method of oon- 
strnotiniT a system of defenses it will always be 
of iniportano^^ to site the trench lines or strong 
points in snch a way that they win give each 
other mutual flank protection, mainly by 
raachine-gim fire. Continuous lines must be 
adapted to the ground and broken up in such 
a way that each part naturally secures the 
flanks of the others. Strong points must be 
established and adapted to folds in the ground 
in such a way that the area on front of each of 
them is covered by the fire of the adjacent 
works. The strong points behind must not only, 
command the inters'als between those in front, 
but also the area in front of the works in the 
advanced line. 

As a rule the so-Ciilleii tank forts \nU. be at 
dominating points if possible, and so close be- 
hind the main line of defense that they can 
deal with tanks as they approach the latter or 
after they have successfully broken through it. 
The whole area which is likely to witness a tank 
att^nck must be commanded by them. In an 
emergency mobile anti-tank guns must be close 
at hand ready to render assistance. The posi- 
tion of the obstacles is of particular importance. 



TACTICS 157 

For th(tH(i, barbed wiro ontanglernentH will 
almoHt always bo uhcA. Tho forward zone in 
front of tho syntorn of dofonncs will bo pro- 
tected by the doopost poHHiblo bolt of wire, 80 
that attacking,' infantry will bo hold up by it and 
exposed U) the fire of the defender for as long 
as possible. Wirin^^ rnay take very different 
forms. There may bo wide belt.s of flat wiro 
formed of closely intorwined strands of wire 
which are carried diagonally across an immense 
number of stakes. Or there may be the so- 
oaJlod "P'landors' chevaux-de-fri^je/' which 
consists of a largo number of high but only 
lightly strung wire fences, fairly far apart, and 
in this case also the iron or wooden stakes will 
be braced laterally h>y wire. 

The flat entanglements represent a consid- 
erably greater obstacle to advancing infantry, 
but are easily distinguished by aircraft and 
thus betray the position of the whole trench 
system. They are also an excellent target for 
artillery and trench-mortars. The chevaux-de- 
frise, on the other hand, cannot be seen so 
easily and are more difficult to destroy by artil- 
lery fire, though they do not present anything 
like so great an obstacle as the flat entangle- 
ments. The method to be chosen will thus de- 
pend upon the special circumstances. Where 



15S THK WAlx OK VllK FlTrUK 

ouomy\< viow -4>von f«\>u\ (ho wu^ tho tlat wiro 
svi^toiw will always bo olu^sou. l.{\stl>\ Ivtwoon 
tho ditYoivut Ivltji or rouos of wuv it will aljio 
Iv jH>85tihlo to put trip wiro, wiiv nottiiv^c. or 
tn^ps which i\hh bo soattonnl fivo^v ovor tho 
jj:nninvl, ami arx^ intouiKHi to oatoh tho avlvamMUg 
infantry who oanuot soo thoiw. 

Tho moihiHl of oiwtiui? iho ontaii^«:lon\ontvS is 
also iiujH^rtaut. It has alroailx' boon said t]\at 
tho ilofondor n\ust bo ablo to titv ovor tho 
oiitaivv:lomoi\ts, t>i\rticularly thoso cv^nsistiu^i* of 
vory donso wiiw It is al^o important that thoy 
should bo sitod at\d distributod in suoh a way 
that thoy CiU\ bo ontiladod by inaohino-jiun t\ro 
alou^jT thoir wholo lon^th; thoy must also loavo 
brvv\d iT^H^^ through whioh tho outposts can 
w-ithdraw if a rotiron\out is decided upon or 
from which one's own infantry can omorgo for 
an attack. 

Thoso gaps must bo oasi^v rooi^gnixablo by 
ono*ii own tivops. On tho other hand, it must 
Iv made very ditlicult for the enemy to dis- 
tiiViTuish them and it must bo possible to close 
thom at a n\on\ent's notice with appropriato 
material O'^^^^^o-rests" and portable ontanglo- 
ments^, which arc always kept close at hand. 
Further, thoy must bo open to avvurato tiro 



from iiui'tr (nwri rnachlri'j-^jrjji nvtfri at ii'if^hL 

firoof r'/>v<rr in all paH.M of th<; dcffjinivti Hy«U'Tri, 
but for firifii^ purpoH^rH thny rnoHt f>f; brooj^lit 
out into th'! op<;fi ho that tfuiy hav^; a fn;<; fj<;l/i 
of fin; in <;v*jry rlirfectjori. 

It m particularly difficuJt to pla/;*^ ohnitu^fm 
&f(n'triHi tank hiUutkn f^ifon? th<; Iin^;H, an tankn 
nirnply cruHh rJown wiro (-jdfiUi^UimhniH and 
dirnb parap<;t« arid tn^nchen without any diffi- 
rjfjity. Th^. main tfumriH of (h-AhxiUfi aj^ain^t 
tankH an; iUarcforc, ikm f^rd of anti-tank j^inH 
and th^; fact that they rjan ^k; attacked by in- 
fantry with Hp^^cial anti-tank riflen and c^^n- 
c^jntratcd char^e«, and by rnachin^^-gtinH with 
Hpocial ammunition. If a lar^e number of them 
are employee] clone together it in not difficult 
to put them out of action. P'urther, local 
obHta/jJeH may alH^> be used a^ain«t them. Deep 
and wide HheIl-hole« in which ^ound-watcr of 
at le?i«t one meter in depth ban CfAlhaicA cannot 
UHually be f^roHHt-A by them, nor can very 
rnarHhy ^^round and trenche.'i of more than four 
iru-Mrn in width and proportionately deep. 
KoadH can be cloHcd by strong concrete barri- 
c^kIch if the tankn cannot jret around them. 
TT-jey may have j<apB to let ordinary trannport 
and artillery through. LaHtly, large areas may 



1(>0 TUF. W Alx OV rilK Kl'TUKK 

bo svnvti with tank niinos, whioli I'mu'tion in 
8Uo.h a way that llioy aiv hanuloss to orvliiiary 
tratVio but oxpU^lo whou tho hoavy tanks cn>ss 
tluMu. This kinii vM' work is bost oarrioil out 
by tho ouiiiuoors, or thoy shouKl at loast diroot 
and oimtrol it. 

Thus tho pionoors havo a oonipU^x i>t' dutios. 
and ovou though iu u\y viow thoro is uv> riH>u\ 
for thorn in roal fortross operations, thoir 
aotivitios havo assun\od a nnioh largor so;Uo 
and ro^\niro far more uion than hithorto. 
Wlioroas iu fonnor wars thoy woro onuagvd on 
spooial taf^ks. thoy havo to oooporato pornia- 
nontly with all tho tight ing anus to-iiay, pri- 
marily in trouoh warfaro, but also in opou 
warfaro and particularly in tho otTonsivo. 

As I havo already said, tho rosult is that it is 
nooossary io strongthou tho pionoor arm in rela- 
tion to the other arms and also to train all 
pioneers iu the solution of <j// the problouis 
(^ovon the most eomplieated ones') whieh will 
faee every single formation iu every part o\' 
the givat theater of war. That tloes not mean, 
however, that every man in the pioneers must 
or need be trained equally t'or every speeialist 
servieo. For example, mining and tlame pro- 
jectors are a branch of the service in which 
single groups only of every company of 



TACTICS IGl 

HpoAifiliHU wM hf. ir'Ainfidi, whiUj pontoon- 
brirj^^jnpf, <!n;ctln^ (IcfcnHCH and ohnUiddn of all 
kIndH, h)owinj< up \>ru\ijr<:H, c/fncj-c.Ui worU, 'Jrairi- 
inj< ircncUcH arwJ Hirnilar dutir'H muHt U; r/jan- 
f,<;n;ri f>y (;vr;ry fu(:u\\)cs of ih<; \)\()UCMr arrn. 

'rh(5 c/funisiicXion of rofi^ln ov<;r ha^i j^rounrl ih 
ariofiior d<;partrriorit of f^d/l op<jrationH with 
whir-ii ihr; \/i<>u(;(-TH rniJHt hf; familiar. It iH v^;ry 
rifi<',ri ri(;r'/;HHary to brirjj< up hridj(';H and other 
rjrrir;r^r;rK;y material in ord<;r t^^ rriakr* Horne 
wiIdf;rn<;HH of HhrjIl-hoh'H pa«Hablo, frv^ifj for 
h(;avy artillery and ammunition wagonH, in the 
F-hortent pOHHihIe time. Of courHe thin work will 
generally h't r;/irried out by the ordinary labor 
troopH, but the pioneerH rnuHt direct them and 
parform cmxV.uu Hpecial technical duticH. 

Hannuif, aU theHe thinp^H in mind, it in abso- 
Intely vital that a Htron^ pioneer battalion of 
three or four ('/>in\niu\<'/ri be attached to every 
diviHion and h<; fjermanently at its diflpoHal. 
G.FI.Q., moreover, will require further Hpecial 
pioneer troopH which it can diHtribute to the 
individual army groupH and annicH, thouj^h 
they need not be UHed equally at all pointH, for 
the C5^>nHtruction of rallying powitionH in the 
rear, brld^^ing j.;reat rivern, the rapid eHtablinh- 
ment of lifieH and blocking trenchcH which the 
divinional pioneerH could not manage by them- 



162 THE WAlx OF THK KITIKK 

sol\*\^s. Tho bridiriuij of tho ^'istula at Ivan 
iivrod and '"' -.stniotion of tho Siocfrioil 

l.iuo aro ox. \ of thoso s^Hvial taskv^^ wliioli 
tho divisional onginoors oo\iki not, or woiv too 
busy to porfonn. This foivo of army pionoors 
must, of oourso. bo ostnMishod in poaoo tiu\o. 
At thoboirinniuji'of tho \\-:u- tlio fortross-piouoor 
battalions ^oriiiiually intondod for ompU\vmout 
in attacks on fortivssos") woro assij^nod thoso 
duties. As this will bo uuuooossary in futuro 
it will bo advisable to form oorps piouoor bat- 
tiilious in addition to tho divisional piouoors, 
and those corps battalions will bo available for 
spivial employment in time of war. 

Tho railway troops, tho importanoe of wliieh 
hais inoreasod very eonsidorably, nuist bo un- 
der the sole orders of the Supreme Command, 
tho Chief of tho OonenU StatY or a Special In- 
speotor both in peace and in war. Tho restora- 
tion of railways which have boon destroyed, the 
construction of now broad-irauiiv linos, and the 
establishment of field railways have assumed a 
scale in comparison with previous wars which 
no one ever suspected. In trench wart'nro par- 
ticularly all troops must bo connected with 
the great railway arteries by a complex of tield 
railways if thoy aro to bo kept pormanontly 
supplied. This roipuros a L'U\iio force (much 



TACTICH U'//, 

larK'-r ihan Uiyhhrijt) of raUwuy and raiJway- 
c/)nyXru('X'\(m troopH, th^; miiiuU'M'dncji of wh'icM 
will not bo (;x('/'.pi]()UfiUy oxp<;nHive, aw the rnf^n 
will bo cjfi\t\<)y('A on railwayn and rallway- 
c<)jiHinicX'i()ii in pf;a<'^; tirn<!, work which will bent 
fit thcrn for th<;ir duticH in war. 

For the purpOHr; of forrnln;^ railway TjnitH, 
and pion<;r;r unitH aH w<dl, in Holcctin^ the rnrm 
in f)f',?j/;f; \>r(.U:ri'.u('At, will bo j<'ivon to thoHO from 
callJn^H which arc a Hpocial training for thoir 
dijti<;H in war. Of c/mr^Jt pioneer and railway 
U()<)\>H nniJHt be trained in the »imple«t form 
of infantry fiprhiinfr. They will remain HoldierB 
under all eireumHtanrii;H, and thiH work munt 
never be fiWHig-ned to civilian labor. 

There in one jioint, however, on which we 
must be quite clear. The hbch to which pioneers 
and the troopH aHHociated with them can be put 
have become very much more important. Their 
numherH have K^^'own very cj^>n.«iderably, but, 
whatever happenH, thiH anri can no longer per- 
form one tank which waH formerly their prin- 
cipal function — prof,eclinj< the frontiern against 
the enemy by fortJ/icationn. Of Cyourna the 
pioneerH, in conjunction with the other arrriH, 
can delay an invasion for a time, hut they can- 
not save the area which they are to protect 
against shelling by the enemy. Long-range 



164 THE WAR OF THE FUTUEE 

guns — the ranges exceed 120 kilometers even 
to-day — mil ravage the area far and ^ade, and 
carry ruin and destruction deep into the 
enemy's country. There is therefore no option 
to take the offensive or stand on the defensive. 
We must take the offensive if we are to protect 
our own country against hostile shelling. 

Of course the defender also can bring up 
long-range guns and thus, to a certain extent, 
revive the conditions of bygone days. But the 
situation will be quite different. In the first 
place, the side which determines to conduct 
operations on its own frontiers will concentrate 
its guns in peace time or, at any rate, prepare 
their emplacements. The enemy can do the 
same for the matter of that, but it will never 
be possible to discover the emplacements so 
completely that the guns will be unable to in- 
flict the most serious injury on the enemy's 
country before their positions are ascertained 
and they can be dealt with in such a way that 
they can fire no more. This will be particularly 
true when they fire from alternative emplace- 
ments which will be difficult to find even with 
the help of aircraft. 

Thus he who intends to fight within his own 
frontiers is bound to expose a large area of his 
own country to devastation by the enemy's 



TACTICS 165 

long-range artillery, while he who wishes to 
avoid such a fate must carry the war into the 
enemy *s country. In other words, all future 
wars will start with offensive operations, and 
the side which attacks too late or first suc- 
cumbs in the attack will abandon his country 
to his enemy who cannot help gradually turning 
it into a desert, for that is the inevitable conse- 
quence of trench warfare which seems unavoid- 
able to-day. Woe to him who attempts to fight 
within his own frontiers at the outset ! By his 
own action he will lose his chance of keeping 
war and its horrors from his own country, and 
will only bring down ruin upon a large part of 
it. 

Thus, even though the pioneer arm has be- 
come much more important, and exercises a 
great influence on the fighting methods of the 
other arms, it is none the less dominated by 
the artillery and gives the offensive greater 
latitude than had ever been thought. Its tacti- 
cal value has increased, but its strategic value 
can be felt only indirectly. To think of and 
arrange for the offensive is thus essential under 
all circumstances. 

Even from the political point of view the 
pioneer arm makes itself felt with great force. 
The days of the small state which protected it- 



166 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE 

self with fortifications are over. From the 
military point of view it can exist only if asso- 
ciated with some great state, and political cir- 
cumstances alone can protect its neutrality. A 
Belgium is possible only if bound by the closest 
ties to one of its great neighbors, and Holland, 
Switzerland and Poland mil not survive after 
their larger and more powerful neighbors have 
ceased to have an interest in their continued 
existence. 



CHAPTER III 

ATTACK, DEFENSE AND THE INITIATIVE 

In his immortal book on war, Clausewitz has 
said that the defensive is the stronger form of 
action. In saying that, he did not, of course, 
mean to deny the immense material and moral 
advantages which the initiative and the offen- 
sive mean in military operations, but simply 
that in the then conditions of armament- 
assuming equal numbers on both sides — the 
defender had the advantage, which was un- 
doubtedly true. It is equally true to-day. But 
a very different answer must be given to this 
question when we look at it from the point of 
view of generalship. For even in Clausewitz 's 
time the decision was determined by issues 
quite other than the theoretical superiority of 
the defense. 

Had not Frederick the Great, in his heroic 
struggle, which even to-day remains unique, 
shown how the weaker side could cope victo- 
riously even with enormously superior foes, 
by renewing its attacks again and again and 

167 



168 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE 

firmly maintaining the initiative which forces 
the enemy to follow one's lead and calls in- 
c^ilculable factors into existence! In this sense 
the offensive — to-day perhaps more than ever 
before — is certainly the superior form of gen- 
eralship, though not the superior form of action, 
and indeed for the reason that a rigid defensive 
without offensive reaction is possible only in 
quite exceptional cases. The methods and re- 
sources available to the defense have increased 
enormously, but certainly not on the same scale 
as those of the offensive. 

Modem artillen- can destroy any defenses 
that have yet been constructed; where it is in 
a position to subject a defensive system to a 
continuous and concentrated destruction-fire, no 
infantry in the world is in a position to maintain 
itself. It will simply be destroyed. The men 
can do nothing but tiy to keep alive in shell- 
proof dug-outs — until the latter get hit — and 
can use their weapons only when the enemy's 
fire is ''lifted" farther on in order to make 
way for the infantry attack and prevent the 
approach of reserves. 

It may now be objected that the defender 
c^n have an equally powerful artillery, and 
therefore is in a better position to annihilate 
the enemy's infantrv when he attacks than the 



ATTACK, DEFENSE, INITIATIVE 169 

attacker to deal with the defender's, who are 
under cover in fortified lines. That is true 
enough. The advantage of the attacker is the 
fact that by keeping the initiative he gets a 
great start over his opponent, and can there- 
fore concentrate unexpectedly a superior force 
of artillery against the sector to be attacked, so 
that he will be in a position to neutralize the 
artillery of the defense before it can be re>- 
enforced and also subject the enemy's defenses 
to so annihilating a fire that no resistance can 
be offered. It is the chance of concentrating a 
superior force of ai-tillery and infantry, as well 
as tanks for the offensive, and then attacking 
by surprise which is the main reason of the 
superiority of the offensive. 

In addition there is the prospect of over- 
coming the hostile obstacles with tanks, con- 
cealing the attacking infantry from the enemy's 
view by artificial fog, and on top of this there 
is the great moral effect which offensive oper- 
ations always have. Nothing is worse for a 
soldier than to have to sit down idle under an 
annihilating fire and simply contemplate death 
without being able to take any sort of action. 
All weaknesses of character then make them- 
selves felt, and fear steals upon even the stout- 
est heart. If the soldier can only do something 



170 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE 

himself, fight, shoot or niako an advanoo, the 
mental strain becomes more toUn*able, and this 
often foUow^ the moral exhaustion of even the 
greatest heroism. It is the attacker who pri- 
marily enjoys this advantage of action, but it 
is so important that the defender also must at- 
tempt to secure it for himself, at least partially. 
As a pure defensive appears to be more or less 
hopeless against an opponent who is strong in 
artillery, unless the defender has the protection 
of shell-proof cover, the latter must keep strong 
reserves behind his front line in order to coun- 
ter-attack and throw back any of the enemy's 
troops who have broken through. 

Of course these reserves will have to go 
through the enemy's destruction-fire or bar- 
rage, and are thus bomui to suffer heavy losses, 
bnt they need not be exposed permanently to 
the enemy's fire, and will naturally have every 
inducement to go forward as quickly as possible 
in order to get out of it. Here is the opportun- 
ity for the defender's tanks to make their pres- 
ence felt. At the moment of his successful 
break-through, the attacker can have only a few 
guns in a position to be dangerous to the de- 
fender's tanks, and these should thus be able 
to help their infantry in the counter-attaclv. 
Of course this will not be easy, even then, be- 



ATTACK, DEFENSE, INITIATIVE 171 

cause the defender has to deal with a superior 
artillery which can fire at the tanks from a dis- 
tance. 

But if the attacker in trench warfare gets 
his superiority only through surprise and his 
tanks, this advantage will probably be increased 
in open warfare, for in this case it is not merely 
a question of an unexpected concentration of 
superior forces behind the front, but of pre- 
paring and carrying through unexpected en- 
veloping and similar movements. The ox>por- 
tunities for surprise are greatly increased. Of 
course in open warfare the opportunities for 
reconnaissance are much greater than in trench 
warfare, for where the two opponents are fight- 
ing in detached army groups, the latter expose 
their flanks to reconnaissance, and reconnoiter- 
ing by aircraft can be supplemented by similar 
activity on the part of the cavalry, while in 
trench warfare there is absolutely no room for 
cavalry as such, and all that can be ascertained 
is what is going on behind the hostile lines. 
Yet even here the advantage is with the at- 
tacker. 

In open warfare the possible strategic ma- 
neuvers are very numerous and varied and fre- 
quently difficult to discover. Further, the stra- 
tegic movements which are the preliminaries to 



172 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE 

the battle are executed relatively rapidly, and 
therefore deprive the defender of the possibility 
of taking prompt counter-measures, even when 
he has discovered the enemy's movements. 
Lastly, in open warfare the army is tied to the 
lines of communication available, and unex- 
pected troop movements are usually more dif- 
ficult to carry out — especially from the point of 
view of the necessary supplies of ammunition 
and food — than in trench warfare in which an 
extensive and specially constructed network of 
roads and railways, field railways, depots for 
annnunition, food and engineering materials 
are provided to meet any circumstances, so 
that all troop movements are facilitated to an 
amazing degree. 

When we turn to consider the general stra- 
tegic situation, the superiority of the side on 
the offensive appears to be even greater than 
on the battlefield itself. 

Over immense areas, such as those between 
the Swiss frontier and the Channel, or between 
the Baltic and the Black Sea, the attacker can 
choose the precise spot at which to attack. He 
can demonstrate at any point, and thus try to 
deceive his opponent as to the real sector in 
w^hich the attack is coming. The defender must 
be ready for the attack ever>"where. The only 



ATTACK, DEFENSE, INITIATIVE 173 

data available to him in divining the enemy's 
intentions are the directions in which the en- 
emy's attack would probably produce important 
resultH, and secondly, the form of the enemy's 
railway communications. For the rest, he is 
left to the reports of spies, the statements of 
prisoners and deserters, the results of tapping 
telephones and telegraphs, and reconnaissance 
from the air. The reconnoitering machines, 
however, have an extremely difficult task, as all 
artillery movements are carried out by night, 
and all battery positions and defenses are con- 
cealed as far as possible from aerial observa- 
tion. 

Further, it is almost impossible to distinguish 
between dummy and real defensive systems. 
The defender will often come to the conclusion 
that an attack is imminent because he notices 
increased railway movements behind the hostile 
front, but here again he may be deceived by 
what are really demonstrations. Thus, in actual 
fact, both we and our enemies repeatedly suc- 
ceeded in concealing preparations for intended 
attacks, while on other occasions the intention 
to attack was discovered in time, because suf- 
ficient care had not been taken to. conceal it 
and the attack failed as a result of prompt 
counter-measures. 



174 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE 

Thus, while the attacker knows pretty accu- 
rately beforehand at what points he must con- 
centrate his forces and make his preparations, 
the defender is compelled to assemble his re- 
serves of men, ammunition, and even food in 
some circumstances, at certain central points. 
Further, he must always have his rolling stock 
and motor transport ready for moving these re- 
serves the moment the enemy's intentions have 
been definitely ascertained. Any error in mov- 
ing reserves may have fatal consequences. In 
such a case, to meet the emergency he may be 
compelled to adopt such measures as unpre- 
pared troop movements, breaking up larger 
units, and similar improvisations which are 
often disastrous. Such measures only too easily 
throw the systematic and regular troop and sup- 
ply movements into confusion — those move- 
ments without which a modern mass army can- 
not be handled at all. They may also have a 
serious effect on the morale of the troops which, 
as we shall see, is to-day a more vital factor 
than ever before. 

Lastly, the superiority of the offensive lies 
in the fact that it alone can bring the decision. 
"Wars cannot be won by pure defense. Even a 
successful defense can mean superiority only 
when it gives the defender a chance to pass from 



ATTACK, DEFENSE, INITIATIVE 175 

it and seek a decision by the offensive. A de- 
fensive victory is never anything but a half 
victory, and the hope that the enemy can be 
forced to make peace by attrition, i. e., the ex- 
haustion of his forces, is in its nature a snare 
and a delusion. For no one can by a pure de- 
fensive compel the enemy to consume his troops 
if he does not, for his own part, attempt to 
force a decision by the attack, and thus prove 
once more that only the offensive can bring 
victory. 

If one side believes that the enemy's forces 
can be worn down to such an extent that the 
foe will be compelled to make peace from sheer 
exhaustion, he must keep on attacking him time 
after time, in order to compel him to use his 
troops. As long as it is left to the option of the 
enemy, whether and how far he will sacrifice 
his men, it is obvious that no end of the war 
can be in sight, and it is for the enemy to say 
what form that end shall take. 

Professor Hans Delbriick — a well-known arm- 
chair strategist — ^has invented the term ''attri- 
tion strategy" for this negative species of oper- 
ations, and seems to think that he has said 
something very clever. In actual fact, of course, 
there is no such thing as a strategy which 
avoids the offensive in order to obtain a vie- 



17G THE WAR OF THE FUTURE 

torv by wearing: down the enemy. Defensive 
strategy means rather that one side wishes to 
delaj' the decision because it no longer feels 
capable of forcing that decision itself; but in 
doing so it renonnees the prospect of military 
victory, and leaves the enemy to decide how long 
he will continue his efforts. The issue of the 
war will then be the result of factors wliich are 
not the outcome of its own operations. 

The wars of Frederick the Great are only 
a superticial proof of the justice of Delbriick's 
view. The enemies of Prussia certainly shied 
at a decision by force of arms, and tried to win 
the war by exliausting their foe. In the end, 
however, they lost it. They were exhausted 
themselves sooner than the King. The latter 
turned their hesitation to fight to good account, 
and therefore gave battle only when he found 
himself compelled to do so. The war would 
have ended victoriously for the Austrians and 
their allies long before had they made up their 
minds to try to obtain a victory in the field. 

Thus, in all circumstances, the offensive is 
the inevitable preliminary to a victorious de- 
cision in war, so far as this is dependent en- 
tirely upon the course of military operations 
and is not affected by changes in the political 
and economic conditions which prevail at the 



ATTACK, DEFENSE, INITIATIVE 177 

beg-inriing of the war. Even in the strategic 
defensive it is always the vital factor. It is 
the soul of generalship in all times and places, 
and in the last resort the whole art of war con- 
sists of initiating a decisive offensive under 
favorable conditions. This fundamental law 
of war is, of course, unaffected by the fact that 
one has frequently to adopt an attitude of pure 
defense, at any rate in a strategic sense. In 
those cases, "delaying" action is adopted be- 
cause one wishes to create favorable conditions 
for the offensive at some other point or in 
some other way. 

In this connection I need only to refer to **the 
Law of Numbers," which I discussed very fully 
elsewhere.^ It is not numbers in themselves 
which bring victory in war; the vital factor is 
the possibility of concentrating numerical, 
mental, and moral superiority on the decisive 
battlefield or theater of war. Where that ap- 
pears feasible, war is justified — ^from the purely 
military point of view. Where it does not, a 
favorable decision can be expected only as the 
result of circumstances which do not depend 
upon military successes. 

Thus, if one desires to be justified from the 
military point of view at the beginning of the 

' Vom hcutigen Kriege, Vol. I, II, 2, p. 97. 



178 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE 

war, it must be probable that so decisive a 
victory can be won over the enemy that the 
latter loses his power to bring about a decision 
which has any prospects of success for him. 
Such a victory can, as a rule, be secured only 
by the offensive and will, in any case, have to 
be exploited offensively if it is to lead to the 
goal of the operations. 

This law, as it has developed in the course of 
time, naturally holds good even under the con- 
ditions of the World War, and determines the 
relations between defense and offense. Defense 
is justified exactly to the degree that it enables 
the defender ultimately to pass to that offen- 
sive which is necessary under all circumstances. 
This truth must be borne in mind in military 
operations of every kind, and to-day more than 
ever before, as the offensive, both from the 
strategic and tactical point of view, has un- 
doubtedly proved the stronger form of strategy 
and action. 

But if the offensive is the soul of operations, 
even when it cannot be pursued directly in all 
circumstances, and if it remains an arriere 
pensee, even in the defense, the logical result 
is that in war it is always essential to try to 
keep the initiative in one's own hands. This 
is a principle of the art of war which is gen- 



ATTACK, DEFENSE, INITIATIVE 179 

crally recognized, and I ahi saying nothing new 
in repeating it. The initiative brings the ad- 
vantage — an advantage which cannot be over- 
estimated — that the enemy is compelled to con- 
form to one's own actions, and one is not bound 
to conform to his. As long as one avoids an 
attitude of passive expectation and is always 
engaged in some enterprise or other, or in cre- 
ating a new situation, the enemy is compelled to 
conform to one's actions and keep changing his 
own plans, which are based on a given situa- 
tion, simply because this situation has been 
modified by initiative action. Thus one keeps 
the upper hand in all operations, and gets the 
start of the enemy both as regards place and 
time. 

Of course it is very important to distinguish 
between the initiative and the offensive. Be- 
cause one side seizes or maintains the initiative, 
it need not always be contemplating the of- 
fensive. Even in the defensive the initiative 
can be kept, or an attempt made to recover it 
when it has been lost. I have already said that 
a pure defensive can never lead to positive 
victories, and frequently will not result even in 
a purely defensive victory. Thus every defense 
requires a corresponding offensive, either to 
retain or recover the sectors attacked by the 



180 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE 

onomy. or to bo initiator at somo otlior point 
\Yhoro tho oiioiuy has povhaps woakonod him- 
solf, or tho dot'oiiso docidos to sook tho decision. 
This is Olio of tho Nvays in which a lost initiativo 
CiUi bo rocovorod, and tho onomy to rood to oon 
fonn to onr own actions. 

On tho other hand, tho defender is certainly 
not bonnd in overj* case to boar the shock of 
tho enemy's attack at the point which the latter 
has selected. ^Vhere a loss of i^ronnd is not 
particnlarly vital, the defender may withdraw, 
if he w-ishes. to another position which is tacti- 
cally bettor and has perhaps boon established 
and fortitied beforehand. Tho defender will 
thns briniT his foe into a position which is nn- 
favorable to him from tho tactical point of 
view. Sncli a retirement may also be combined 
with a decisive otYonsive. In this case tho de- 
fender \vill prepare the connter-attack behind 
the lines on which he is withdrawinir. nnd then 
lanncli it by snrprise airainst his nnsnspoctinii; 
enemy. Tlie object will always be to keep 
tho nppor hand, and by nnoxpoctcd action coni- 
pol tho onomy to conform to one's own move- 
ments, and to impose npon him that conrse of 
action which we desire. In the lonir rnn. a de- 
cisive battle, that is. an otTonsivo or a dofon- 



ATTACK, DEFEXSIO, INITfATIVK 18) 

Bivft f(>\\<)v/(t(\ hy a ('/mnUtr-fdi'ddkj j'h alwayn tho 
n;Hulf, f^r in Hi alive action. 

A purely local dcforiHC iH pr^nniHHiblc only 
wh<;rc Ujo cJefondor Ih fi^^hlinj^ for time a^ainnt 
a Hijperior enemy in a region which iH particu- 
larly favorable to dofenHe, and hiH flankn aJHO 
are Hccurr;. Such ca«cs are conceivable, e. ^,, 
where the defender in hopinj< for the Hubnequent 
intervention of an ally or the releawe of troopH 
for the offenHive from some other theater. 
They will, no doubt, be frequent. On the other 
hand, in theaterH in which the decision is being 
Houi^ht they are inconceivable, or, at any rate, 
penniHHibir; on the HmallcHt Hcale only, and 
Boloiy in local actions. 



CHAPTER IV 

THE PEINCIPLES OF THE OFFENSIVE 

Our old Prussian "Training Manual" states 
that the best form of tactical offensive is the 
simultaneous attack on the front and flanks of 
the enemy. This statement is true only of small 
affairs in which fire from front and flanks can 
be concentrated locally against an opponent con- 
sisting of a single body. Otherwise it is funda- 
mentally false. 

In attempting to enunciate a principle we 
must assume that both sides are equal numer- 
ically and the conditions are the same for both. 
If that is so the defender — thanks to his frontal 
superiority — can successfully hold the front at- 
tack with forces weaker than those the attacker 
can employ, and at the same time concentrate 
superior forces to protect his flanks. He will 
thus be superior in the flank action, which is 
decisive by virtue of its direction, and is bound 
— ceteris paribus — to win. This is a matter of 
mathematics. The advantage which the offen- 
sive has in modem war is not great enough to 

182 



PRINCIPLES OF THE OFFENSIVE 183 

outweigh this advantage enjoyed by the de- 
fense. The defective teaching of our ' ' Training 
Manual" erroneously assumes the superiority 
of the attack either in numbers or in fighting 
value. 

Thus the only formal rule we possess in the 
sphere of taxjtics is wrong, and in the sphere of 
strategy there are no rules at all. This is in- 
deed quite natural, for the circumstances under 
which a strategic attack can or must take place 
are so varied that apparently no rules of uni- 
versal application can be deduced from them. 
From the tactical point of view also, it is to- 
day apparently impossible to give definite rules 
after the war has assumed forms so different 
as open warfare on one side, and trench war- 
fare on the other. On the other hand, there are 
certainly a few principles which apply both 
tactically and strategically, and from these the 
form of attack in every single case can be de- 
duced by paying due regard to all special cir- 
cumstances. 

One of them may be put in the words of Fred- 
erick the Great, and runs: ''He who tries to 
protect everything will protect nothing." The 
other was put by Field Marshal Eindenburg, in 
the words : ''A General must never fight with- 
out a center of gravity." The expressions sup- 



1S4 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE 

ploiuoiit oaeli otlior. and aro the product of the 
same spirit. 

At first sight the words of Fredorielv the 
Great seem to refer to pure defense. When 
we look into them moiv closely, however, we 
soon realize that their eliaraoter is olTensive 
and nothing else. It is only by reading an of- 
fensive meaning into "prv^teetion" that the 
sentence has any strategic sense at all. If 
we try to protect a long front by a pure defen- 
sive, but leave some sector unprotected, the 
enemy will, of course, break through at this 
point, come in on the tlanks and rear of the 
front which is held, and thus reap vital ad- 
vantages. If King Frederick, who had to pro- 
tect both East Prussia and Silesia, for ex- 
ample, had decided to let East Prussia go in 
order to stand on the defensive with his whole 
anny in Silesia, he would undoubtedly have 
lost the war in a very short time. But if, with- 
out dividing his forces between tlie two prov- 
inces to be protected, he decided to beat his 
enemies in Silesia by a resolute olYensive, in 
order that he c<nild then launch another of- 
fensive in East Prussia and win further bat- 
tles there before his opponent in Silesia had re- 
covered, he could certainly protect both prov- 
inces, althoui^h he abandoned one of them tern- 



PlilNCHMvKS OF Tin: OFFENSIVE 185 

porarily. If j'h oxproHwion, * ' JIo who tries to pro- 
tect evorythin^r will protect nothing," is thua 
fully juHtificfl. 

If he had diHtributed his army over both 
provJrjcf;H at the outset, in all probability he 
would not have won a Hingle battle, as ho would 
have been too weak at every point. Thus we 
realize that the meaning of the great King's 
words is approxiniixtely the same as that of 
' the Field Marshal's. In modern language we 
should say; '*! first make Silesia the center of 
gravity of my offensive and at first give up any 
idea of protecting East Prussia with adequate 
forces in order that I may transfer my center 
of gravity back to East Prussia when I have ob- 
tained my victory in Silesia." Thus, at the be- 
ginning of the World War itself, we saw Silesia 
and Posen practically drained of fighting troops 
and defended by a weak frontier force only, 
while the real fighting force was concentrated 
in East Prussia, in order to take the offensive 
exactly in the sense of King Frederick's words 
and Hindenburg's remark about the center of 
gravity. 

It was in this spirit that the German Army 
was grouped at the beginning of the war. Weak 
forces only were held back for offensive pur- 
poses in the East; the main mass of the army 



186 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE 

was concentrated against France, in order to 
deal the tirst decisive blow against that coun- 
try. There is certainly reason to ask whether 
tlio process of transferring troops on the West 
to East Fiiissia was not begun too soon, and, 
indeed, before the decision in France had been 
obtained. We certainly achieved our purpose 
of driving the enemy from East Prussia and 
the other provinces in the East. On the other 
hand, we paid for it by being too weak to make 
strategic use of the tactical victoiy we had al- 
ready gained in the decisive Battle of 
the Marne, and, as we c^in see to-day, this fail- 
ure was partially responsible for the issue of 
the whole war. 

It is impossible to say, once and for all, how 
long one theater of war may be left uncovered 
or protected with weak defense troops only in 
order that victor}' may be secured in some other 
theater. It depends upon all manner of cir- 
cumstances — the enemy's intentions and 
strength, the importance of the areas to be 
evacuated to the operations in general, and the 
chances of transferring troops to the threat- 
ened regions in time. As a general principle, 
it may be said that an area may be surrendered 
for any time, as long as the enemy is not in a 
position to extract such great advantages from 



PRINCIPLP]S OF THE OFFENSIVE 187 

his occupation that no victory at another point, 
however decisive, can ever be sufficient compen- 
sation. 

We may take an example from the opening 
phase of the World War. If we had not re- 
enforced our army in East Prussia from the 
West, we could certainly never have won the 
Battle of the Masurian Lakes, and should 
gradually have been forced behind the Vistula. 
But we could have held up the Russians for a 
long time before they seriously threatened Ber- 
lin, which had, of course, to be held at all 
costs, being the kernel of our whole resistance. 
As a result of that course, in all probability 
we should have won the Battle of the Marne 
in brilliant fashion, overthrown France once 
and for all before England could raise her 
army of millions, and almost certainly have im- 
posed a speedy peace on that side. From the 
purely military point of view, even after the 
Battle of the Marne, we should have been in a 
position to save Berlin, drive the Russians 
from our country, and bring the war in the 
East to a victorious conclusion. Of course, this 
cannot be proved mathematically, nor is it in- 
tended to be any criticism of our strategy, which 
can be judged only in the light of a thorough 
knowledge of all the circumstances. It may. 



188 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE 

however, serve as an example to illustrate a mil- 
itary principle. It is the law of interior lines, 
which decides such a case, and only forms a spe- 
cial case of our teaching on the subject of the 
center of gravity.* 

This teaching is important, both from the 
strategic and tactical point of view. It is, or 
ought to be, the fimdamental principle of every^, 
attack. Like Epaminondas at Leuctra and 
Mantinea, Frederick the Great availed himself 
of it down to its last corollary in the oblique 
order of battle which he used at Leuthen and 
Rossbach. On these occasions he made the at- 
tacking wing his sole center of gravity and even 
went so far as completely to ''refuse" the other, 
i. e., he did not get to close quarters with the 
enemy's front, but compelled it by his flank at- 
tack to change front and deploy afresh. Then, 
when the wing he had attacked was thrown back, 
he attacked and defeated the front in the very 
middle of its maneuver. 

Of course this method cannot be used on all 
occasions, and Frederick the Great himself 
did not attempt to do so. But there must al- 
ways be a center of gravity whatever form the 
attack may take. In open warfare the matter is 
comparatively simple, though the possibility of 

* Vom heuUgen Kriege, Vol. II, III, p. 89. 



PRINCIPLES OF THE OFFENSIVE 189 

the enemy's retreating must be borne in mind. 
For the rest, the main blow of the attack will 
always fall at the point where success would do 
the enemy the greatest damage. 

For instance, if circumstances compel us to 
make a frontal attack in all cases when we 
are dealing with long fronts, we shall strive to 
obtain victory by breaking through, and either 
make our main thrust where a rapid success is 
most probable, or direct it against a part of the 
hostile front from which the rest can most 
easily be rolled up or the enemy's line of re- 
treat threatened. 

If we are in a position to envelop one of the 
enemy's wings, we must try to select, and in- 
itiate our operations against, that wing from 
which the enemy can most easily be forced off 
his line of retreat. We shall then bring up 
our main force to that point. The same rule 
applies in the case of double envelopment, the 
maneuver which was carried out in the Battle 
of Tannenberg, for example. Here, again, the 
vital thing is to be particularly strong at the 
point where the enemy's communications lie, 
and to throw in one's main force where the en- 
emy is mainly concerned with endeavoring to 
escape envelopment. At Tannenberg this was 
the Russian right wing. 



IPO THE WAR OF THE FUTURE 

Of course such dispositions will not always 
give ideal results. Even Frederick the Great 
was able to tight only one TAnithen and one 
Rossbach under particularly favorable cireum- 
stances, for in open warfare the battle develops 
out of maneuver, and in the course of ma- 
neuvering- one Cxinnot always foresee what the 
situation will be when the two annies eome into 
tactical contact. "With modern mass armies it 
is even more difficult than before, when troop 
movements could be improvised on the battle- 
tield itself. This is no longer the c^ise. It is 
even more necessarj-, therefore, for tlie modern 
commander to trj- to realize from the general 
situation how matters will develop, and then 
distribute his troops, select his line of attack, 
and arrange his communic^itions in such a way 
that he can place the center of gravity of his 
attack at the decisive point when the critical 
stage of the struggle is reached. 

In trench warfare it is ditTerent. Here the 
first business is a purely frontal attack, even 
in cases where it is intended to try to envelop 
some salient in the hostile line. In this case 
the center of gravity is obvious. The main 
thrust will be delivered not against the front 
of the salient, but against its points of junc- 
tion with the rest of the line, so that if the at- 



PRINCIPLES OF THE OFFENSIVE 191 

tack succeeds the hostile troops within the 
salient can be taken in flank and rear, and in 
certain circumstances be completely cut off. 
For the rest, the center of gravity of the attack 
will ho determined by the confi^ration of the 
ground and with reference to the enemy's field 
of fire and the direction indicated by the gen- 
eral situation. But we must always concen- 
trate our main slrikin;^ force at one special 
point, and avoid distributing it equally over the 
whole front. 

The detailed dispositions to be taken on these 
occasions must be discussed later when we come 
to the special subject of the break-through 
battle. 



CHAPTER V 

THE SOURCES OF POWER 

Numbers play an extremely important role 
in war, and are the element which determines 
the issue of battles and wars where other fac- 
tors are eqnal on both sides and equally skill- 
fully used. As a matter of fact, these suppo- 
sitions, on which the overwhelmina: importance 
of numbers is based, are never true in practice. 

The factors, apart from that of numbers, 
which determine the issue of w^ar are very 
varied from the point of view of their impor- 
tance. The tactical value of the troops, 
differences in armament, the skill of the high 
command, the driving force behind the war, the 
influences of the terram, the national character 
of the people at war — all these are elements 
which increase or diminish the value of num- 
bers, and in some cases even make numerical 
superiority a positive danger. Their influence, 
however, varies greatly at different times, and 
it therefore seems important to inquire where 
the true sources of power are to be found under 

192 



THE SOURCES 01^^ POWER 193 

modern conditions. A war lasting years has 
taught us to distinguish between appearance 
and reality, and to recognize what is really vital 
in the changing flood of superficialities. 

Is there any one whom history has not taught 
that the great hiader can often inspire his 
troops to perform the most extraordinary 
feats? Is there any Prussian officer who does 
not know that the spirit and the moral force of 
the troops are far more valuable than mere 
masses? Is there any one who has not learned 
from our Wars of Liberation and the National 
uprising of 1914 what mighty forces can be re- 
leased by an idea, and what heights of heroism 
can be reached by an enthusiasm such as that 
which carried our young men to battle, death 
and victory, singing patriotic songs. Yet, here 
again, values which are apparently purely 
mental and moral, are dependent to an extraor- 
dinary degree upon external circumstances. 
As a rule it is a question of mass suggestion, 
for independent moral forces, springing from 
inmost feelings, are peculiar to very few men. 
The mass is swayed by, and entirely dependent 
upon, external circumstances. Of course the 
heart of the masses must certainly be capable 
of enthusiasm. The last war has brought that 
home to us in full force. 



194 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE 
Think of Goethe's words: 

Begeisterung ist keine Haringsware, 
Die sieh aufheben lasst fiir viele Jahre. 

It can flame up for a moment, fire the imag- 
ination of the masses and sweep them away 
with it, but it seldom survives the strain of a 
difficult and serious situation, unless it is kept 
alive by success and nourished by great dom- 
inating personalities. Only a few heaven- 
inspired individuals are capable of a lasting 
enthusiasm which can survive even disaster. 

For instance, who would have thought it pos- 
sible that the same nation which was swept 
away by enthusiasm and flocked to the colors in 
1914 apparently prepared for any sacrifice, 
would allow itself, after but a few years of war, 
to be governed solely by its own personal appe- 
tites and interests, although the enemy had 
never appeared within our frontiers, except in 
East Prussia? Who could have dreamed that 
it would lose all its patriotic pride; in short, 
that it would descend to those depths of degra- 
dation to which it sank in 1918! War profiteers 
and workmen, paid much more than their de- 
serts, wallowed in material luxury, and cared 
naught for the honor of the State or the future 
of our Fatherland. But the hydra of party poli- 



THE SOURCES OF POWER 195 

tics raised its hideous head and cooked its 
miserable supper at the fire of public calamity. 
Indeed, it could never have been clearer that 
patriotic enthusiasm is no firm or healthy soil 
for a proud plant like military power. No idea 
which contains the secret of our destinies, how- 
ever great, is likely to raise the masses— the 
German masses, at any rate— to permanent 
heights of military achievement. Of course 
there are still thousands of proud hearts which 
will not bow before the general degradation, 
but they lack the courage to act, and their de- 
sires remain a force from which the life has de- 
parted, the last twitches of a dying man. 

Yet, at the present time, the moral resolution 
of the whole nation has far greater influence 
on the moral strength of the troops than it had 
in days of old. In the days of Frederick the 
Great the army was to a certain extent a for- 
eign body of State, and, even in its outward 
forms, war seemed to be no business of the 
whole nation. The citizen was never touched 
by the fortunes of war, except where the enemy 
invaded the country. The state of public opin- 
ion at home, and the nation's tendency to de- 
spondency, could not, however, affect the army 
directly, as there was only a loose connection be- 
tween it and the mass of the nation, and there 



196 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE 

were practically no letters to and from the sol- 
diers in the field. It is quite otherwise to-day. 
The spirit and feelings of the public at home 
reach the souls of the troops in millions of let- 
ters, and strengthen or shake their will to vic- 
tory and their soldierly confidence. 

Thus the nation at home is largely responsible 
for the spirit of the men in the field, and there- 
fore for the military efficiency of the army. The 
morale of the nation, however, is a fluctuating 
element, which may have an inspiring and en- 
couraging influence on the army at one time, and 
a harmful and depressing effect at another. 
Thus it is essential to do all that is possible to 
neutralize this element of uncertainty. The 
greatest efforts must be devoted to preserving 
the spirit of the army against such ruinous in- 
fluences without depriving it of the impetus 
which a wave of heroic resolution at home is 
able to communicate to it. Unfortunately, the 
latter depends to a high degree upon military 
success and the amount of suffering and priva- 
tion which war imposes upon the civil popula- 
tion. 

The noblest and truest ideas lose their hold 
on the masses the moment they cease to be as- 
sociated with victorious progress and begin to 
be accompanied by a certain measure of per- 



THE SOURCES OF POWER 197 

sonal sacrifice. It is then that the bad elements 
in the nation — the political agitators who de- 
sire to exploit public needs for personal pur- 
■ poses, and the weaklings who try to communi- 
cate their cowardice to the masses in order to 
relieve their own nerves — obtain a paramount 
influence only too easily, and their teaching 
stifles the call of duty and honor. How this 
process developed in Germany at the end of the 
war is known only too well. 

The soldier, in the noblest sense of the word, 
must also avoid being dependent upon victory. 
He must not allow his sense of duty and will 
to victory to be shaken by even the greatest 
disaster. Indeed, he must thrive on misfor- 
tunes, like Prussia after Grossgorchen and 
Bautzen. The harder his task, the greater the 
danger and perhaps the crisis, the stronger must 
his will be, the greater his exertions, the more 
faithful his service. Nor must the soldier allow 
himself to be influenced by bodily sufferings and 
privations. He must not let himself hesitate 
over the performance of his moral and military 
duty, even though it seems to exceed the limit 
of what is humanly possible. The determina- 
tion to conquer must survive everything ! That 
in itself is an inexhaustible source of strength 



198 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE 

which leads to final victory in spite of every 
possible disaster. 

Of course it will not be possible — as every- 
tliing human is imperfect — always to attain 
sucli a standard of soldierly independence, par- 
ticularly under the conditions of a national 
war, in which every man fit to bear amis is 
called up, and it is difficult to develop that firm, 
internal cohesion which marks a real unit among 
newly-foinned regiments which are recruited 
from the most varied elements. But there is 
always some method of influencing the spirit 
of the men in the desired direction if these 
regiments are used with some reference to the 
situation and the circumstances. 

The first, and by far the most important of 
these methods, is discipline — i. e., training the 
men in those habits of discipline, order, subordi- 
nation and obedience which must become 
second nature to them. It must work like 
hypnotic suggestion. The soldier must regard 
it as an almighty power which governs him like 
an iron law. It will be infinitely more efifective 
when in the mind of the subordinate the cus- 
tomary obedience is associated with trust in 
the officer, a conviction that the latter is his 
best friend who is always looking after his wel- 
fare, setting him a good example, and in diffi- 



THE SOURCES OF POWER 199 

cult and dangerous situations knows best what 
should be done. 

These two elements, automatic obedience and 
unshakable confidence in the superior, form the 
basis of discipline. They must be the cement 
which holds the unit together, even in the worst 
crisis. In the last resort the efficiency of troops 
depends upon the brotherly loyalty of the men 
to each other and their trustful devotion to their 
leader, especially where they have received a 
proper military training. For if the soldier 
is to defy every danger and be able to meet 
all demands made upon him, he must, in addi- 
tion to giving his officer obedience and confi- 
dence, show that he has completely mastered 
his profession. He must also have a certain 
degree (relative to the possible scope of his 
duties) of tactical judgment, which enables him 
to act on his own responsibility when his lead- 
ers have fallen, and he is left to his own re- 
sources. Otherwise he will not be equal to 
the tasks which the moment may require. 
Knowledge and judgment will then engender 
that soldierly confidence which will and is 
bound to be an enormous aid to efficiency. 

Where the largest possible number of self- 
confident and yet well-disciplined and loyal men 
are to be found in a unit, the foundations for 



200 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE 

the highest standard of efficiency have been 
laid. Unfortunately, these qualities by them- 
selves are not enough to protect the troops 
against injurious influences from home. Of 
course the influence of officers who enjoy the 
confidence of their men will be able to do a 
great deal in this respect, but it is necessary 
that the troops shall be kept apart from the 
home country in a certain sense, and feel that 
their interests are not the same although they 
are a genuine national army. 

They must develop a proud feeling of pro- 
fessional detachment towards the civil popula- 
tion. Such a feeling is absolutely justified. 
While the civil population at home, who are 
not directly touched by the war, have to bear a 
few, though serious, privations, the soldier is 
offering his life and facing countless dangers, 
often when suffering the greatest physical tor- 
ments and trials. In many cases he has left 
his family behind in want and anxiety. There 
he is in the field, living in wet trenches or ex- 
posed shell-holes, far from friends and rela- 
tions who might be giving him moral support, 
though often enough they only worry and tor- 
ment him with their faint-heartedness and 
tendency to exaggerate their trouble. Undoubt- 
edly he has the right to regard himself as a 



THE SOURCES OF POWER 201 

being apart, the sole real representative of the 
nation and the Fatherland, and to look down 
with pride on those at home, who live in safety 
under his protection, and yet all too often 
grumble and groan and pay him back with 
words only, not with deeds. 

The officers must devote themselves to culti- 
vating this sentiment of soldierly self-con- 
science and keeping the troops alive to their 
own high calling. This is relatively easy in the 
case of old and famous regiments who have a 
great tradition, for in that case there is his- 
toric fame on which to build. It is far harder, 
however, in a war which, like the last war, sum- 
mons the whole nation to arms, compels the 
formation of many new regiments, scatters the 
old solid officers' corps and fills their places 
with young and inexperienced officers of the 
reserve ; a war which everywhere disturbs the 
old order, keeps all units in a state of flux 
and never permits the maintenance of higher 
units of fixed constitution. All this means 
that the higher officers, who have all had 
a long period of regular service and thus ac- 
quired a wealth of experience, must devote 
themselves unceasingly to teaching and helping 
their subordinates to influence the men in the 
right direction. 



202 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE 

It is of quite special importaiieo to train the 
X.C.O.'s also to be the staiuiard-bearers of 
soldierly pride. Yet the corner stone from 
every point of view is the regimental CO. 
^Miat the CO. is, that will the regiment be. 
This was proved over and over again in the 
last war, where battalion and company com- 
manders were frequently inexperienced yonng 
officers. Even the youngest officers must be re- 
quired to look after the material welfare of their 
men. That Anil contribute not a little to win 
the officers the confidence of their subordinates. 
It is perfectly astounding how much influence 
a matter like food, for instance, cnu have on 
the spirit of the troops. The prolonged short- 
age of potatoes frequently had an injurious 
effect on the spirit of even good divisions. 

It is also important to give the troops now 
and then a real rest out of the danger zone and 
not get the last ounce out of them. If the offi- 
cers go too far in that direction they may ren- 
der the whole unit ineffective, while a rest, even 
if short, at the right moment will often do won- 
ders and restore full efficiency in a surpris- 
ingly short time. It is particularly advisable 
for the higher authorities, who are only too fond 
of moving divisions hither and thither like 
chessmen, to devote the most careful attention 



THE SOURCES OF POWER 203 

to this psychological factor. Tho moral atti- 
tude of men is frequently influenced by their 
physical feelings. Hunger, overstrain, or being 
kept continuously in the danger zone under the 
effects of the nerve-shattering thunder of the 
guns and the shells falling and bursting about 
them, have an influence which cannot be pre- 
vented and in the long run paralyze their moral 
powers. 

Lastly, we must consider the influence which 
the commander in chief may have on the whole 
army. Just as the spirit of a regiment de- 
pends on the influence of the regimental CO., 
the spirit of an army depends on the personal- 
ity of its leader, which does not always make 
itself felt in victory only. There are subtle 
threads woven between the commander in chief 
and his subordinates. They cannot be seen, but 
they work with wonderful power. It is the un- 
conscious force of suggestion of a great man 
which asserts itself here. This subtle influence 
is originally the effect of victory, but when once 
it has been firmly established it. will survive 
even the heaviest disasters. After Kolin and 
Kunersdorf Frederick the Great's men wor- 
shiped him just as much as after his first bril- 
liant victories, and the halo which Napoleon 
won on the battlefields of 1796 existed in the 



204 THE WAK OF THE FUTURE 

eyes of liis anny oven after the Mtnstrophe of 
1S12 and the disaster of Leipzig. 

Es'eu imder modern conditions this vital pow- 
er of a great personality makes its presence 
felt, though it is not so easy to presen'e it, 
beo^nuse too many injurious intluenees from 
home assail the hearts of the soldiers with other 
and contrary emotions. The Battle of Tannen- 
berg made Hindenburg the hero of the army in 
spite of all the victories which were gained by 
other generals, for the soldier has an extraor- 
dinary, even though only half-conscious, feel- 
ing for the power and influence of personality. 
Unfortunately the universal self-seeking and 
jealousy at home have raised their voices even 
against him, fried to undermine his influence 
with the army and thus shatter one of the pil- 
lars of our military power. 

It is very necessary that a spirit of esprit de 
corps should be cultivated in the army, so that 
it will regard attacks upon its commander as 
an attack upon itself and refuse to yield to 
such influences. 

It is not diflicult to cultivate such a spirit in 
the units in the line. These evil influences 
usually developed first in the lines-of-commimi- 
c^tion areas. The troops employed in these 
areas are nsuallv older men who have not been 



THE SOURCES OF POWER 205 

BubJGctod to military disciplino for a consider- 
able time, and they are commanded by officers 
who are sent to these formations because they 
are not quite fit for duty at the front. These 
office rs are not always equal to their task. 

In this department there are but few regular 
officers who always form the flower of the offi- 
cers' corps, as the few officers trained for these 
duties in peace time are nothing like enough to 
staff the many new formations which have to be 
established for the transport of the army in 
case of mobilization. Thus, in this branch of 
the service many of the officers are not ac- 
customed to handling troops and do not realize 
the needs of their men. 

The result is that these lines-of-communica- 
tion formations are often the breeding-ground 
of insubordination and of all the other bad 
qualities of an army. 

We must devote the greatest attention to 
this mai;ter in peace time. A good deal more 
will have to be done than has been done hitherto 
to train all these officers to be really effective 
leaders of men, in order that they may not have 
to learn this branch of their duties during the 
campaign itself. For we must be perfectly 
clear on one point : just as the efficiency of the 
troops depends primarily on discipline, disci- 



'20G THE WAR OF THE FUTURE 

plino itself is based on the capacity and eflS- 
ciency of those in a position of command, pri- 
marily the officers, bnt in hardly less degree the 
N.C.O.'s, who are the natural connecting link 
between the men and the corps of officers. 

The responsible task of all these leaders is to 
establish the foundation upon which the power 
of an army rests — absolute and automatic disci- 
pline; good training, which develops coopera- 
tive effort out of the conscious independent 
action of the indi\'idual; genuine soldierly 
pride, whicli springs from the consciousness 
of personal achievement and duty fulfilled and 
protects the unit against all injurious influ- 
ences which assail it from outside; the devotion 
of all those in positions of command to the wel- 
fare of their subordinates, and the absolute 
confidence of the latter in those whose orders 
they obey; lastly, true patriotism, whicli enables 
the troops to fight for a great common idea and 
gladly to sacrifice their all for King and 
Fatherland. 

In this respect we made a great mistake, 
owing to the relative shortness of all previous 
wars. We started the war with too many reg- 
ular officers in the active units. They all rushed 
to the units at the front because they thought 
that this war would last only a short time like 



THE SOURCES OF POWER 207 

other wars, and in any case they preferred to 
be there. Unhaf)pily, large numbers of them 
were killed, and we missed them sorely in the 
later years of the war. 

In future wars we must act with greater pru- 
dence in this resi)ect and at the very outset 
adopt a measure which, unfortunately, we took 
too late — the formation of an officer reserve. 
We shall thus save ourselves a great unneces- 
sary sacrifice of life, and we shall not get less 
out of the fresh troops than we did before. For 
the later phases we shall thus have a far bet- 
ter and more effective corjjs of officers. It will 
then be far easier to maintain the spirit of the 
troops, even on the lines of communication — 
that element which holds all the others together 
and can alone bring lasting victory. It is the 
element of absolute determination to conquer, 
firmly implanted in every heart. 



CHAPTER VI 

THE INFLUENCE OF POLITICS AND ECONOMICS 

"Waes like those waged in modern times are 
not fought with weapons alone, for politics, and 
particularly economics, play a far greater part 
than in the wars of bygone days. Of course the 
influence of politics made itself felt even in 
earlier times, and economics also have had an 
indirect effect. To-day, however, these two 
factors are consciously employed as direct 
weapons. This was certainly the case with our 
enemies ; not with us, unhappily. The enemy not 
only tried to starve us out, but left no stone 
unturned to bring new enemies into the field 
against us. 

To all appearances, we let this go on for 
years "svithout making the slightest effort to 
meet it. If we knew what was coming our 
policy must be judged even more harshly. In 
any case, we allowed ourselves to be completely 
hoodwinked. We looked on quietly while Italy 
was being enticed away from us. We did not 
take it amiss that England, France, and Russia 

208 



POLITICS AND ECONOMICS 209 

entered into an alliance against us and drew 
North America on to the side of our enemies. 
We completely overestimated the stability of 
the Triple Alliance, the internal cohesion of 
Austria and the capacity for resistance of Tur- 
key and Bulgaria. We did nothing before the 
war to strengthen these last two states. With- 
out bothering ourselves with what was going 
on among other nations, or even noticing their 
feverish activity, we quietly pursued our peace 
policy, in the firm belief — for which there was 
no justification — that we should succeed in com- 
ing to a friendly arrangement with England 
and thus secure the peace of Europe. 

We never thought of America at all at first. 
By conceding point after point we allowed our 
enemies to believe in our weakness, and thus 
simply provoked war instead of averting it. 
When we had a chance of making peace with 
Russia before the Russian revolution broke out, 
we declined to do so, completely miscalculating 
our chances of victory. Thus, in the judgment 
of history, we shall have the glory of having 
pursued an absolutely honorable policy and car- 
ried out the ethical teaching of Christianity. 
In the political sphere, however, we have been 
outrageously deceived. 

Even in matters of domestic politics we hope- 



210 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE 

lessly miscalculated. We despised the inevit- 
able progress and credited the German nation 
with a capacity for resistance which, in fact, 
it never possessed. Right up to the last we un- 
derestimated the revolutionary elements whicli 
were at work among the people. Thus wo 
stumbled into the war without any political 
preparation at all. Bismarck would have 
turned in his grave if he could have seen such 
a lack of proper precautions. Our political 
action was distinguished by an unprecedented 
poverty of ideas. 

From the economic point of view also we 
acted eqUillly thoughtlessly. AVe made no sort 
of preparation for the commg war. We never 
gave our ships in foreign seas timely warning 
that war was imminent, and of course we did 
nothing so obvious as to hoard supplies and 
enable our agriculture to make the necessary 
arrangements! From this point of view we 
were hopelessly sui*prised. 

In view of the proved inadequacy of our di- 
plomacy it is thus urgently necessary to ex- 
amine the laws which must govern both this art 
and that of war, if a state is to maintain its 
position in the world. It is equally important 
to examine the economic situation to see how 
far it can be influenced by war. 



POLITICS AND ECONOMICS 211 

The man who is responsible for directing the 
affairs of a great state must first know quite 
definitely what he himself wants and what the 
other states want. lie must look at the matter 
from a purely professional point of view, and 
not in accordance with preconceived desires 
and ideas. He must accurately estimate the re- 
sources at his disposal and those available to 
the other states. In the first line, of course, he 
must consider military resources, as the politi- 
cal importance of any state depends upon its 
military capacity. 

It is a common, indeed too common, error to 
assume that policy can do things of its own 
impetus and that it is an independent power. 
In actual fact it can attain its ends only ufhen 
it has the hacking of a force of which the enemy 
state is afraid. The circumstance that policy 
frequently achieves successes to which the real 
power behind it does not correspond is to be 
ascribed only to the fact that the opponent is 
deceived on this point, or that he regards the 
matter in question as not worth fighting about. 

The main function of diplomacy is to produce 
or maintain that deception while securing one's 
own interests. From this point of view it is 
indifferent whether one's own power is con- 
cerned or that of another state whose interven- 



212 THE AVAK OF THE FIGURE 

tion is feared or throat eiuxi. Ileneo the dis- 
ilhisioiimeiit of diplomacy, which rogjirds what 
is really due to mistakes or reluctance on the 
part of the opponents as a success of its own. 
Henct>, too, its etforts to spread such illusions. 

But if this v>oint of view be departed from, 
and one side fails to deceive its opponent as to 
its real power, it will often suddenly tind itself 
faced with a war, as Germany was when the 
World War began. Before we start a political 
game, we should fairly ask ourselves whether 
in case of need we are ready and williuir to take 
up arms to attain our end. If that is not the 
case, or if the position chauires in our adver- 
sary's favor as time goes on, we must change 
our course and save anything that c^m bo saved. 

That is the general principle and only supor- 
ticially immoral. Of course it aims primarily 
either at hoodwinking the adversary or a pre- 
ventive war, but both are justilied. The first 
duty of every man is to his fellow countrymen. 
That must always be kept in miud. The neces- 
sary deception can be secured without a single 
untrue statement's Innng made. That is just 
where the art of diplomacy comes in. Prince 
Bismarck was an adept in tliis art. He is even 
now without a peer in the realm of great diplo- 
mats, and no one could possibly call his actions 



POLITICS AND ECONOMICS 213 

immoral. The prcvontive war, also, is justified, 
bccaufio the Bacrifices which are exacted by a 
war which was inevitable because the adversary 
intended it are nothing- compared with those 
wliJch will have to bo made if such a war is lost. 
The World War has certainly brought that 
home to us forcibly enough. 

It is true that in his Gedanken tmd Erirmer- 
tmrjen Prince Bismarck declared himself 
against preventive wars. On the other hand, 
he wrote this book in his old age, and his own 
actions were inconsistent with that expression 
of opinion. Indeed, his real greatness lies in 
the contrast. We must, therefore, not be afraid 
of distinguishing between the aging Bismarck 
and the man of action. It is the deeds of the 
latter only which are beacons for the great 
man's successors. 

To continue, a good many successes can be 
obtained by diplomatic methods because the 
military power of each side is actually equal. 
In such cases success falls to the side which 
knows how to make the best use of that power, 
but behind everything the real power is there 
and is not forgotten. ** Negotiations without 
arms are like notes without instruments, '^ 
said Frederick the Great, and he was undoubt- 
edly right. Thus the diplomatic game always 



214 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE 

turns on real power or the appearance of power, 
and he who thinks that success can be secured 
by civic ideals will be bitterly deceived sooner 
or later. It is the nature of the averagv nuin 
to look after his o^^^l interests; he does not 
think of giving up something merely because 
it is right to do so or might be to the advan- 
tage of another. 

AVar is nothing but the continuation of di- 
plomacy by other methods. It is always purely 
a question of weighing the real or apparent 
resources (both our own and those of the ad- 
versary), trj'ing to deceive our opponent, or 
spoiling his game and winning our owni by 
threatening war or unexpectedly beginning it. 
In this game there is no room for generosity, 
and such an emotion would, indeed, be a crime 
against the nation. AMiere the threat of real 
power does not acliieve its purpose, or the at- 
tempt to deceive is unsuccessful, war is in- 
evitable if we intend to attain our ends, nnd 
then arises the qiiestion as to what is the rela- 
tion between diplomacy and war when we have 
decided to appeal to the latter, the ultinw ratio. 

It is obvious that in every political affair we 
must be quite clear as to whether a war is 
possible if we do not succeed in settling the mat- 
ter at issue in a manner corresponding to our 



POLITICS AND ECONOMICS 215 

interests by the methods of peace. We must 
know whether we are willing to take up arms on 
behalf of those interests, whether we attach suf- 
ficient importance to the whole matter to make 
this extreme step necessary, and whether we 
have come to the conclusion that the enemy has 
decided to act in the same manner. In such 
a case we must make political preparations for 
war, and, if possible, in such a way that the 
enemy will notice nothing. 

Of course it will be quite impossible to con- 
ceal the military measures which we consider it 
necessary to take, and which must be in keep- 
ing with the magnitude of the political aim in 
view. But it is otherwise with the political 
measures. In the case of the former it is al- 
ways essential to avoid half-measures and leave 
the opponent in no doubt that we have decided 
to take the most extreme steps in case of neces- 
sity. The last two army bills which were 
passed in Germany before the war were half- 
measures, which could give the enemy no kind 
of misgiving and could be recognized as half- 
measures. They are fittingly described by the 
proverb, "Wash my fur, but don't wet me.*' 
The Government at that time was told as much 
in unmistakable terms, but the only result was 
that we were forbidden to repeat our objections. 



216 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE 

But while the military preparations must be 
made publicly and with the greatest energy, and 
while half-measures in this sphere mil have 
the effect only of encouraging tlie enemy, the 
political preparations must be carried on in 
complete secrecy. This is what our enemies at- 
tempted to do, though they did not hoodwink 
those who were not willfully blind. Of course 
we could not tell exactly what was going on, 
but wc could certainly realize that serious pians 
were being made for a general attack on Ger- 
many. In these circumstances it was essential 
that we should consider war as at any rate pos- 
sible, and act accordingly. We had to prepare 
for the war by making alliances. 

Further, it is essential to prevent states from 
participating in the coming war by making con- 
cessions which must be kept secret. Thus, in 
the case in point, we ought to have concluded 
treaties with Turkey and Bulgaria, and no one 
need have known. We should also have tried 
to come to some arrangement with North Amer- 
ica, which certainly would not have been impos- 
sible. The same course should have been taken 
mth Italy and Rumania. 

There were other political measures which 
could certainly have been taken, but about 
which it is impossible to form an opinion, as 



POLITICS AND ECONOMICS 217 

all the facts are not known. In case of emer- 
gency, we ought to have decided on a preventive 
war if the whole existence of the State seemed 
in danger by our refusal to do so. 

Thus, when it is possible that there will be 
war, everything must be done to prepare for it 
under the most favorable conditions, or the 
statesman must realize that ho must give way 
altogether if he does not succeed in deceiving 
his enemy as to the true position. 

But the task of diplomacy is quite different 
when war has actually broken out. It still has 
the duty of keeping other states from partici- 
pating in the war. Indeed, it will make con- 
cessions to them corresponding to the advan- 
tages the enemy would derive from the entry 
of the state in question into the struggle. But 
this step must be taken only in agreement with 
the Supreme Command. In all other respects 
the only duty of diplomacy is to support the 
military with all its might. It must conform 
to their wishes entirely, and give up any idea of 
taking any step without consulting them. That 
is equally necessary, of course, in the case of 
affairs which may possibly lead to war — for 
there must always be a proper relation between 
the statesman and the general. But a breach 
of this rule never produces its effects more di- 



L'lS THE WxVR OF THE FUTUKE 

rectly and ininiediately than in war itsolf. The 
military penalty follows the political mistake 
at once. Diplomacy must therefore oonrtne it- 
self to preparing" the way for military victories 
and exploiting them, but only in accordance 
with instructions to he given hif the military 
authorities. Where this rule is not observed, 
militaiy and political measures might pursue 
the same aim and yet in a totally dilTerent 
spirit, and that might easily give wholly contra- 
dictory results. 

The upshot is that, where possible, military 
and political direction should be in one hand, 
and for that purpose military and political 
functions should be combined in one person. 
That was the c^ise with Frederick the Great. 
He knew how to reconcile the political and mili- 
tary influences in the conduct of war in the 
most wonderful way. This appears clearly 
from a study of his wars, although not a word 
is said about it in the official history of those 
wars published by the General Staff, a history 
which completely ignores the political aspect of 
Frederick's generalship and reads as if every 
action of the King were to be attributed to 
purely military issues and considerations. 

No one else has ever enjoyed quite the same 
position as the Great King, and where that is 



POLITICS AND ECONOMICS 219 

HO th<^ political authority — in old PrusBia, 
therefore, the King himself — must know how 
to keep in ilia backj-^round and leave the mili- 
tary authority to (U^c'ida what is to be done. 
The politician must unconditionally submit to 
the will of the soldier, for the combination of 
political and military action is the main object, 
and military re^juirements determine the politi- 
cal. The military leader must be selected 
acc(irdingly, and where that cannot be done it 
is much better that some one less expert in 
politics should settle the broad lines of diplo- 
macy than that the soldier and the statenman 
should work against each other. 

As long as the war is in progress and there 
is no immediate prospect of a suitable peace, 
military victory alone must be pursued and 
everything else must be directed to furthering 
those efforts. If peace is in sight, on the other 
hand, it is again for the soldier to judge 
whether it is nec^issary to secure it by intensi- 
fying the military effort or whether it is better 
to adopt the diplomatic method, i. e., by making 
concessions. Only the soldier is in a position 
to judge. Not the least of the causes of Ger- 
many's downfall is the fact that this simple 
rule was not obser-ved. 

Thus it is simply foolish to require that 



220 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE 

diplomacy must always be carried on with all 
the cards on the table. One might just as well 
ask that the strategist should always tell the 
enemy beforehand what are his intentions in 
his operations. It is perfectly obvious that 
diplomacy must always be secret simply be- 
cause — ^apart from technical reasons for that 
course — if we did the opposite, i. e., made all 
our diplomatic arrangements openly, we could 
never be quite certain that our opponent or 
opponents would act as honorably as ourselves. 
We ought to have learned that at least from 
our downfall. Our enemies did not show their 
hands until the last moment, while we Germans 
made a point of concealing nothing from them. 
We must abandon that principle if we are ever 
to be anything in the world in future. It is 
not too much to ask that a reasonable govern- 
ment should enjoy so much confidence that the 
nation will draw the obvious inferences and as- 
sume responsibility for the results of its secret 
diplomacy. 

It is hoped that by forbidding secret diplo- 
macy the so-called ''people" will be secured 
against the outbreak of war which, as a whole, 
they have not foreseen; but the fact that this 
is simply cutting off one's nose to spite one's 
face is wholly ignored. There is obviously no 



POLITICS AND ECONOMICS 221 

security against anything while the opponent 
is given an absolutely free hand. 

Nor must there be any indulgence in delu- 
sions with regard to domestic policy. We must 
know for certain what can be expected from 
our own people and what is beyond their 
powers. We must be quite certain that the 
great mass can never realize logically what the 
common welfare means; that it is certainly 
Capable of a momentary enthusiasm for some 
ideal, but is never able to pursue that ideal with 
resolution and energy; that it is quite ready to 
make certain sacrifices, but, generally speaking, 
has its eye on material well-being only. The 
statesman who is working for the welfare of 
the whole body politic is not understood by 
the masses, and in some circumstances is there- 
fore bound to use force to cany through his 
plans. This course requires a high degree of 
sense of duty and energy, and success alone 
can justify action which is superficially irre- 
sponsible and high-handed. For example, the 
French authorities took drastic measures when 
about seventy-five regiments mutinied, and yet 
in the long run their action proved necessary 
for the common good. Of course I know as well 
as any one else that the whole of French policy 
was based on the interests of the great financial 



222 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE 

magnates, but in this case — when once the war 
had begun — their interests coincided with those 
of the whok> nation. 

The politiciil head must therefore have the 
courage to take the sharpest measures against 
his own peopk> if occasion requires. But be- 
fore he c^in do so he must be well informed of 
what is going on among the people, so that he 
can intervene in time and prevent the ring- 
leaders (for there always are ringleaders) from 
doing anj' harm. He must therefore bo as wtII 
informed about the domestic situation as about 
the secret intentions and resources of the neigh- 
boring states. Indeed, it is the courage he dis- 
plays in dealing with his own people which is 
the real hall mark of the great statesman. 

It is just the same with the economic situa- 
tion. Here, again, it will be necessary to use 
force when occasion requires. Of course it is 
impossible to be permanently prepared for all 
conceivable wars. But probabilities can and 
must always be borne in mind without trusting 
entirely to the enemy's sense of honor. The 
errors of this last course we can appreciate 
from the attitude of our present enemies, who 
have not the slightest idea of adhering to their 
own statements. We can also realize the fool- 
ishness of relying on the honor and enthusiasm 



POLITICS AND ECONOMICS 223 

of mankind by considering what is happening 
with us at homo now. There have never been so 
much stealing and dancing as at the present 
moment, in spite of the great national disaster. 
Of course, in considering the measures to be 
taken, it is very material whether a country 
is wholly or partially cut off from the outer 
world, or not. To all appearances Germany cer- 
tainly was. When Italy, France and Russia 
close their frontiers, the Northern neutrals are 
under the power of England, and in the East 
the poor communications of Turkey and the all- 
pervading influence of England cut off all sup- 
plies, Germany is left to her own resources, for 
it is obvious that she can make no use of her 
merchant fleet. 

The situation is quite different for England. 
Supplies from outside can reach her as well as 
France. In return she supplies half the world 
with coal, while France has to rely mainly on 
imports. Submarine operations affect both 
states, and can certainly hinder the import and 
export of coal to a very material degree. This 
applies to Italy also, which is dependent upon 
imports for its food and coal, and cannot even 
exist without them. Such are the considera- 
tions which these states have to bear in mind 
when war becomes probable. Russia, on the 



224 THK WAK OF THK FUTURE 

otlior hand, can novor bo out off fnnii Asia, 
though lior world-trade oiiu bo interrupt od, as 
it is carried on u\ainly throuirh the Baltic, 
l^istly, Turkey and tinnve are as irv^od as de- 
pendent upon V^.ngland, whieh will before long 
dominate the routes throiiirh the Mediterranean 
and into the interior of Asia. 

Thus the states which more or less depend 
upon imports will do everything in their power 
to make these safe against submarines, (lor- 
many, on the other hand, just because slie can 
be cut off frv^m ever>* form of maritime com- 
nmnioation, must import a large number of 
things as soon as war is in sight, i. e.» commodi- 
ties which cannot Ix^ produced in the countrj- 
itself. She must also adapt her agriculture 
acooniingly. There is no need to say here what 
must be cultivateii and what not. It is the busi- 
ness of the Government to discuss all this with 
the farmers, and tlie World "War itself has 
given us the necessary tinger-posts. All I will 
say is that provision must be made for the 
necessary food supplies and the indispensable 
raw materials. 

For the rest, diplomacy must endeavor to 
keep the trade routes open, which is conceiv- 
able only if there is a complete revolution in 
our present system of alliances. Time will 



POLITICS AND ECONOMICS 225 

Hhow UH what can ho (Jonc in this roHpoct. 
LaHtJy, tho fj-hoat weapon must bo devoloporj 
to the highoHt pitch of capacity, notwithntand- 
in^' the prcHcnt peace cr^nditionB. That both 
this and the reorganization of the army are 
poHKible is proved by the years after 1806, in 
which 200,000 men were trained under the eyes 
of the French garrisons instead of the 42,000, 
ihii number permitted. This example is a fur- 
ther proof that diplomacy which sets out to do 
anything must be, so to speak, always on the 
offensive. Of course that does not mean it 
must be always aiming at war. On the con- 
trary, it must never forget that its business is 
to preserve the peace, but it must always be 
active and always desiring and striving for 
something if it is not to be dictated to. 

Thus diplomacy is subject to exactly the same 
laws as war. We must never lose the initiative 
and never give the other parties in the game a 
completely free hand to pursue their designs. 
Our own schemes must always interr>ose and 
cross the intentions of our adversary; thus 
keeping the initiative is the golden njle of 
diplomacy, and it applies equally to national 
economy. We must always be prepared for all 
eventualities and never let ourselves be sur- 



226 THE WAK OF THE FUTURE 

prised. " Toujinus <;» vedette" must bo our 
motto. 

Of course it would be a great mistake to be 
coutinually uusettliug trade by appreheusions 
of war, as, for iustauoe, by recalling all our 
mercluiut ships wheuever there was the slight- 
est prospect of war. That would moan saori- 
tieiiig the present for the sake of a conjoeture; 
but we must always know exactly what we 
want, as I jxnntod out at the beginning of this 
discussion. AVe must be clear at the outset 
whether wo are prepared to lot matters go to 
the lengtli of war, and whether what is at stake 
for the enemy is gn^it enough for him to risk 
a war also. When wo have come to the conclu- 
sion that war is probable we nmst have the 
courage to take appropriate measures both in 
the ^x^litie^U and economic sphere. In the for- 
mer it means that tiual preparations for war 
must be made, and if necessary a preventive 
war embarked upon. The same course must be 
tiiken in the economic sphere. Action must be 
prompt and of such a nature that, if possible, 
the prospective enemy notices nothing. 

Home supplies must bo supplemented and 
secured for a long time to come. Our ships in 
foreign waters must be n^called and the neces- 
sarv instructions issued to the agricultural 



POLITICS AND ECONOMICS 227 

intcrostH. It will thuH be soon that the prelim- 
inary work muHt be^nri early if the preparations 
for war are not to be noticed by the enemy, and 
that it iH impoK.sihle to do what is necessary 
publicly. If we took that course we should 
always be too late. Thus we must not be afraid 
of making secret preparations for war or of 
hcj^inmnfr it ourselves. The real responsibility 
will be exclusively at the door of those who 
have made the preservation of peace impos- 
sible. We must not let ourselves be drawn into 
wrong paths by superficial ideals which will 
receive the applause of the masses. It is the 
greatest cruelty towards one's own people to 
lack the courage to begin a necessary war, to 
abandon vital interests in order to keep the 
peace, and to sacrifice the wfjlfare of the whole 
state to attain an ideal which is unattainable. 
He who directs national policy (policy in its 
widest signification), and is thus responsible 
for the welfare and prosperity of the whole 
state in its ever changing relations with the 
other great powers, must know how to keep the 
initiative in every sense in his own strong 
hand. That is the first and vital law in both 
the political and economic spheres. But there 
is another factor which must receive his atten- 
tion, the factor of military power. If policy 



228 THK. WAK^ OK TUK. FlITrKTI 

depoixds wholly on this last factor, \t will bo 
essential to dovoU^p it to tho hii::host possible 
standaixi auii thus extend the prospeets open 
to statesmanship. If the statesman is always 
to keep the initiative he n\nst vealixe that his 
dianoos are proportionate to the n\ilitary 
power behind him. Thus the principal task of 
statesmanship is to further the development of 
the national forces. Our enemies fully realize 
this. 



CllAi'TKU. VJI 
THK oksfmaIj ijiH'iiiiHf:'ii(j:i or -jhk rjiOOJ'H 

In diHciJHHJrjj^ tho luiUvMcji of politico an^J 
'-.(•/tri'iTiucM in t-hf; origin and cauHt; of warH wf; 
<U)iit\)l(A(i iha whole HoricH of factorH which may 
infhjorjc^i military oporationH and the tactical 
f^roblcmH confronting the troopH. Wc have now 
l.o inquire and ry^nHidcr how the annicH are to 
he diHlrihuted over the theater or theatern of 
war in order that the bent poHHihle uHe may be 
made of l.hern. 

In the firHt plac^;, the general pLin of cam- 
rjai;<'n in the determining^ factor. The troops 
muHt be HO distributed that there is a c^^nter of 
gravity at some point. It is the business of 
i\i(i c^jmmander in chie'f to select this point. It 
mijKt be chosen in such a way that, if the cal- 
culations of time and Hpiicj; ant acjfjurate, sue- 
cessful ofie-rationH are bound to develop. Thus, 
jit the fHj^irjnin^ of the World War the Germans 
cleverly left only four army corps on the Rus- 
sian fronti(!r, apart from local troops, because 
we relied on the slowness of the Russian 

229 



IW rUK W AU^ OF THK Fl'TrKK 

mobiliiwitiou. It wa^ Ovmuuiu diplomaov aloui^ 
(which oiuv mon^ luisUxi tho Suv>ron\o i\>ui 
iwaiui) whioli mndo this iwloulation orrouious. 
Wo thoit failed to tuui tho vvnraiiv to aot ot\ 
purx^ly n\ilitary ointsidorations and abauilon 
Kast IVusjiia to tho ouoniy for a tiino. li\stoad. 
wo traujifomHi a iwnwbor of anny corps fvvMU 
the woiitorn to tho oajiicrn theater, and thus 
lost our ciiauce of a ilecision in order ti> save 
a province. 

I have r\>f erred to tl\is e.-ise before, if I am 
not mistakeii, and laid stress on the fact that I 
>\*j\s in no way criticiy.iu^ii" the Supreme Com- 
nuand. Invause I an\ not sutVieieutlN' a^Hiuainttxi 
with all the cireumstanivs. Yet this case is svij- 
niticant Invause it teaches us hvnv ditVieult it is 
to pursue one idea to its losjical ciu\cJusiou, to 
avoid beinsr distracted from it by a temporary 
setback and yet to abandon it at the riiiht mo- 
ment. It is particularly dithcult for a kinji: to 
diXMdc to alviuvlon a fertile province to the 
enen\;k\ That aspect of the matter must, of 
course, Iv considered, but what is rcvpiired of 
a real ivmmander is a certain courage to take 
resv>onsibility and a ivfusal to allow himself 
to Ik» intluenciHl by such sentimental objections, 
Tu Germany at that time there was no such 
tisiure at the head of our militarv machine, and 



DISTiniMJTIOM OF TIMO TKOOPH 231 

ha who wuH n;Hf)oriHib)o for our ntratc^ wan a 
Hick man. 

Ah war can fx; c/mducicd only r>ff<;nHivcly, 
and ifi(5 offVjnHJvc thuH dfdorrnincH all Htratf;jcy» 
1,h(; biU.cr muHi b(; ^ivftn Hpocial w<;iKht in con- 
nidoring' llic diHtrif>ulIon of the troopH. Jiut 
tho rcquircmcntH of lh(! dcfcnHivc hIho mnHt be 
borne In mind, ;ind, if poiJ„',il)h;, in Huch a way 
ihai the nienHureH thf^y involve are the Hame an 
thoHe which can Herve for the offenHivf; if ro- 
quin!d. Vet, wlntre there Ih any conflict be- 
tween th(!ni, offenHive dinponitionH muHt be 
preferred. Thin Htatenn^nt in a funfJamental 
rule nf>f)lyirif^ to both trench and opfji wjirfare, 

Thit diviHiori, an the unit whieh Hhould ne,ver 
be broken uf> if it e;in be helper], haH proved 
itHclf the real baHic unit in war. In open war- 
fan; it lookH aH if that unit wen; the eorpH. Its 
C}r>rnpoHition UHually n;niainH unchanged while 
an action in in proj^rr-HH. The divinion only in 
rnov<'.d from one f)art of a theater of war to 
anoth(!r, or from one theater to another, while 
the army corps remainn in one place. ThuH the 
corfjH in perpetually clmui^'inf^ itH divinionH. 
Th(5 n;Hult Ih that th(; influence of the (^>rp8 
commander on the men Ih purely iliuHory, while 
the diviHional c/>mmander in the rf;ally rcHpon- 
Hible figure. ThiH has proved quite a practical 



232 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE 

system. It is particularly conspicuous in 
trench warfare, less so in open warfare, as I 
have said before. Thus, in trench warfare we 
see the divisions perpetually in movement, 
while in the second case the situation is more 
permanent. This is due to special circum- 
stances. In trench warfare the really effective 
divisions have continually to be sent to that 
part of the battle-line which is most seriously 
threatened by the enemy, while troops which 
have done their share are sent to the quietest 
sectors or brought back into rest billets. In 
open warfare the distribution is generally per- 
manent until it develops into trench warfare 
again for one reason or another. 

The next higher unit is the army, which 
usually consists of three to six corps. Several 
armies form the army group. 

As regards open warfare itself, from a stra- 
tegic point of view at any rate, much the same 
laws apply as in the case of earlier wars, for 
a rigid defense, such as that of Frederick the 
Great at Bunzelwitz (which 'was extremely 
similar to modern trench warfare), is all the 
more unlikely because such operations were 
inspired by the peculiarities of the enemy and 
the characteristics of war at that time. It will 
be far more a matter of advancing or retreat- 



DISTRIBUTION OF THE TROOPS 233 

ing until the successful blow has been delivered 
at a decisive point, when the other army groups 
will have to advance or retire in conformity. 
As a rule, it will only be when the theaters of 
war are at a great distance from each other that 
one of them will have no influence on the other. 
But where a decision is reached either in the 
sole theater or (where there are two or more) 
in an adjacent theater, it will usually have its 
effect on the other fronts. 

The distribution of the troops will be deter- 
mined on these principles. We shall always 
direct the bulk of our divisions to the point at 
which we think a victory would strike the 
enemy's vitals, and these divisions will be sent 
to the selected points during the approach in 
order that the object of the whole operation 
may not be betrayed by their lateral move- 
ments by railway or road. It will also be essen- 
tial to effect the approach as rapidly as possible 
in order that the time available to the enemy to 
take his counter-measures may be very short. 
The cavalry will be disposed on the wings to 
hinder hostile reconnaissance or assist our own. 
Marching will be only by night, to prevent ob- 
servation by enemy aircraft, and this will also 
be dealt with in the air itself. 

Here, again, the functions of the artillery 



will nssmuo i::roator imporiaiioo than ovor be- 
fore. Wo shall oiuloavor to appoar ou tho 
battletioKl with tho laruvst jH^Svsiblo force of 
ariillory from iho poim of viow i>f both num- 
Ivi-^ {Uid caliber. This artillery will be taken 
from the army reserve of the army in qnostion, 
ai\il it is [>laiu that every army must have such 
a reserve, whieh will consist primarily of heavy 
guns. The infantry action will be essentially 
a machint^gnn action, and tho cavalry w ill play 
a relatively unimportant itMe. After tlie ac- 
tion, on the other hand, its functions will be 
muoli more important, as it will have to per- 
form the duty of pursuing the enemy laterall\' 
or defendinsi: us a^iinst such a VHivsuit. liMhc 
ensuinir operations everythiiiJi' will depend 
upon the speed of the horse. These considera- 
tions will be Ix^rne in mind in distributiuii" the 
tivopji, and tho independent c^'walry force will 
Iv sent to the point where maneuver warfare 
is in prv\siTess or to be anticipated. In action 
itself it will have to rely entirely ou its lii*o- 
arms. 

As roiTJvnls tivnch warfare, we shall first dis- 
tribute as many divisions on the line appointed 
for defense as we consider absolutely necessary 
to beat otY the tirst hostile attacks. AVhat other 
svHHnal arrangements are made will depend 



DTSTRTBTJTION OF TTTE 'rKr)Oi»H %\U 

\\\)u\\ a ^r(;ai variftfy of cin;urriHtanco8. Th<; 
f;on/i^uniiIori of llu; j^roufKl, Uk; inf.ftrilioriH of 
ihr; (jnorriy arifJ JjIh <JiHl,ancf; from uh will \m'. rnoHt 
rriatorifil. If ifio j^rounrl in parlirMiIarly Huil- 
;jliJ(! for rJr^foriHfj and th(j oriorny far away, w(; 
Hhall, of fX)iirHo, ri(!(!d f(!W('r IroopH thjiri oihcr- 
"wiHO. On lh(; oWwv fiarifl, rnoro rnr;n will bo 
required when iho enemy in ynvy near or there 
iH a poHHibiliiy that Ik; will attack. Thr; amount 
of artillery at liin dinpoHal will alno b(; impor- 
tant in thi.H connection. 

A variety of m(;tbodH may be employed for 
the defenHO ItBelf. The front line may be 
selected an Ihfr nuiin line of defenwe and small 
listeninj^-pOHtH (-Htablinhed only a nhort dis- 
tance in front of the win; rintan^htmentH, which 
will be pretty done to our own lincH. Thi.s waH 
a very common phenomenon in liussia during 
the World War. On lh<; oUj<;r hand, we may 
hold the main line of defenne only lightly, send 
out outpoHtH p(!rh;jpH a kilometer abroad and dis- 
pOHe our main force in Heveral wavcH in such a 
way that they can rewjver the main line of de- 
fen.sc by a counter-attack. In this case, the 
attack by the rcHerveH Ih the main feature. Of 
course there are variationH innumerable, which 
need not all be diacuaBod here between these 
two extremes. 



236 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE 

In the reserve line, and as far away from the 
enemy as possible, will be the casualty clearing 
stations, the function of which is to receive 
cases of slight wounds and such men as require 
immediate operation. Like all other hospitals, 
they work under the protection of the Geneva 
Cross. This matter requires special considera- 
tion. The divisions have to be moved about from 
time to time to give the men the necessary rest. 
The question arises whether these casualty 
clearing stations should be taken with the 
divisions, or should remain permanently in one 
place. In the first case, they are on the move 
a large part of the time, and thus the medical 
work is hindered. In the second, medical ac- 
tivitj is not interrupted, and they always get 
the same cases — which has its advantages — ^but, 
on the other hand, they do not serve the 
divisions, and these are always getting fresh 
doctors, which does not promote confidential re- 
lations between the senior medical officer and 
the divisional commander. The best system 
will be to give part of the clearing station a 
definite station, and move the other part with 
the division. 

These arrangements do not complete the 
whole distribution of the troops in trench war- 
fare. Other divisions vdW be assembled be- 



DISTRIBUTION OF THE TROOPS 237 

hind the troops which are required for direct 
defense, and these divisions must be prepared 
to deal with any enemy attacks on a consider- 
able scale, or carry through our own. Here, 
again, much will depend upon the configuration 
of the ground and the behavior of the enemy, 
and in addition our own measures for the de- 
fense will be determined by our decision to hold 
^the main lino of defense throughout, or only 
to recover it by a counter-attack. It will fre- 
quently happen, especially if the enemy hold 
his line in considerable strength, that we shall 
have to crowd our divisions more closely than 
under ordinary circumstances and concentrate 
considerable reserves in support. The latter 
will be brought up so close to the enemy that 
they can intervene promptly, and thus take him 
by surprise. The best course is to assemble 
them at a railway junction, from which they 
can be rapidly transferred to the point where 
we intend to use them. 

As a general rule, cavalry will not be em- 
ployed for this purpose. Their ordinary and, 
indeed, sole function in trench warfare is police 
duty. We shall bring them into action — and 
then as infantry, of course — only in exceptional 
cases where no other troops are available. It 
will be primarily artillery and infantry which 



2SS THE WAK OF THE FrTURE 

we shall coiuviitrato at such point s. Those 
ivsorvos will usually otmsist of tn^ops which 
arc bohiixd the liuo in rest billots, or havo boon 
brvniirht up sptvially for this purpose. The 
movemouts of artillery and auiuiunitiou col- 
umns must be plamuxl with the greatest care, 
as these betray our intentions to the enemy 
moro easily than anything else. Si^al troops 
and aircraft will also bo in the rear at our dis- 
posal, Khvxuso we shall want to eev^nomisie them 
as long as possible, and aircraft, at any rate, 
can operate from a lonir way back. Another 
reason is that we sliall \\*^int to use thorn at once 
when the enemy Wsrins to sliow signs that the 
moment has come. Of course some of our air- 
craft must always W in contact with the enemy 
in order that we may K^ informovi of the lat- 
ter *s intentions as soon as possible. 

The upshot of all this is that in trench war- 
fare it is necessary to have railway lines be- 
hind and parallel with our front, as well as 
branch lines connecting the latter with the for- 
mer. In ojvn warfare, on the other hand, we 
must have linos leading as directly as possible 
from the home country to the front, and lateral 
railway communications will be required only 
to a limited extent. Of course suitable railway 
communications are not alwavs available, and 



DIHTRTPJJTION' OF TUK TROOPH 2'.*/.) 

in ihiH c/,iH(', w<', Hijail hav^- to axiarni mch an 
thrjro aro, and rnako f.h/; ruoni of thr^rn. W^^ 
HhaJl corjHlnjct th<; rnont cHH^'Mia] Wwm iirni, • 
I. a.f ilrut hiUtral in ircncM wHri'unt and th'j rnain 
•yHtr^rn in open warfare. Thf^y munt thfm be 
(hiVclofxA ;i/'/j/jnJini< t^i requirc-rrjontH. Apart 
from tho offnhootH to thr; front, th^j lat^^ral line«, 
which unt paH.icijlarJy nacAtH-nnry in iro.rich war- 
fare, will Hond orjt main linen to the home c^>un- 
try. There miwt be at lea«t one Hucb main 
line for (-.very army, and ^iom'iUy two. It will 
all depend on the nize of the army, which In m 
turn (hij[Kin<h'M upon the nature of the f^juniry 
and our ov/n offennive InUiniiom. The ofT- 
HhootH to the front will generally be fimall fieW 
rallwayfi, on which we can u«e «p<jcial locomo- 
tives or horne traction in an emergency. All 
kinds of Hioran and material which an arrrjy 
needs for the maintenancf^ of its striking power 
—veterinary hoHpitals, remount depots, repair 
workshopH, food depots in BericH one behind (he 
other, field drenning ntations, casualty clearing 
stations and clearing hospitals, recruit der>ots, 
arsenals, medirjal stores, and so on— will be dis- 
tributed on these lines and thi- main railways, 
as well as in adjac^.-nt villages. The longer an 
army remains in one place the more establinh- 
ments of this kind will it accumulate, and these 



240 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE 

can become a positive danger when it advances, 
and particularly if it retreats. We shall thus 
do our best to avoid keeping supplies close to 
the line, and we must arrange things in such 
a way that only what is essential is brought up 
as it is required. The main depots will be es- 
tablished very far back, if possible in the home 
country. Of course, the greatest attention 
must be devoted to the railway arrangements, 
for if there is any failure in this department 
universal confusion is produced, and the troops 
are the first to suffer. It is extremely impor- 
tant to come to a right decision as to what can 
be stored permanently in depots and what must 
be sent out to the troops. The longer we think 
we can hold a certain position the more we can 
venture to establish depots close up to the line. 
In this matter the whole railway system at our 
disposal is the determining factor. The larger 
the number of railways leading straight to the 
front line the larger the quantity of supplies 
we can accumulate behind it, but we must be 
careful to secure that, in case of emergency — 
e. g., where a sudden retreat becomes necessary 
— we have the requisite rolling stock to get 
them away. In deciding this question of de- 
pots, there will often be a conflict between our 
desire to give the army what it wants and the 



DISTRIBUTION OF THE TROOPS 241 

necessity of keeping it as mobile as possible. 
Another important aspect of this matter will 
be our anxiety for our rolling stock. In view 
of the enormous number of troops which have 
to be moved hither and thither, the colossal 
demand of the home country, and the output of 
industrial establishments (which is increased 
by the manufacture of war material), it is prac- 
tically impossible to keep the permanent way 
and rolling stock in a proper condition. It 
naturally deteriorates in time, and in many 
cases it will be impossible to effect the neces- 
sary repairs, especially when the war has 
lasted a considerable time. This question of 
material is of great importance, and involves 
that perfect system of supervision which is 
possible only with a really first-rate railway 
staff. Unfortunately, in a modern war in 
which every man fit to fight is called to the 
colors, such a staff is not always available. 

Thus, in modern times military operations 
are dependent upon the available railway sys- 
tem. If the defense is tied to railways, the 
attack is even more so. It depends not only 
upon the existence of railways, but also upon 
their condition, because rapidity of movement 
is everything. In distributing the troops we 
must pay the greatest attention to the railway 



lU2 the war of the FUTURE 

system, and, above all, consider the enemy's, 
as otherwise it may happen that the enemy who 
has realized our intentions may be able to bring 
np more troops than we ourselves. 

But, when all is said, the proper distribution 
of tlie troops is an exceedingly difficult prob- 
lem, especially in the defense, for the defender 
is generally compelled to follow his opponent's 
lead, and often has the worse rail and road 
c<)nmiunioations, the reason being that if there 
is any element of surprise in the enemy's 
attack he generally has no time to develop it 
adequately. 

To sum up everything I have said, we shall 
always have to distinguish between open and 
trench warfare, although they often shade off 
into each other. 

In trench warfare our first business w411 be 
to man our lines with the number of divisions 
we think necessary to hold the front involved. 
"We shall dispose the rest of our troops, and 
particularly our infantry, artillery and recon- 
noitering force, at suitable railway and road 
junctions, in order that we can use them if re- 
quired as reserves, or have them available for 
our own counter-attack. Everything else, in- 
cluding material required by the army, we shall 
have behind, close to the railways leading back 



DISTRIBUTION OF THE TK001\S 243 

to thfi homo crjuntry 80 that they will bo handy 
for Bonding up to the armios or can ?jo easily 
moved if required. 

Iji open warfare, on the other hand, our re- 
HervoH will alHO be dintributed among the 
armies, but the distribution will take place at 
the very outset, i. e., before the operations 

start. As we know for certain where we intend 

* 

to send our main force, our reserves can be 
directed from home straight to the point at 
which they will be needed to help in securing 
a decision. The cavalry will, in any case, be 
posted on the wings of the armies and, indeed, 
well ahead. In trench warfare, on the other 
hand, it will be disposed behind the main wing 
of the attack, and then only when a decisive 
break-through is planned, so that the transition 
to open warfare is imminent, a matter which 
we shall discuss in the next chapter. The mass 
of the cavalry will be concentrated at the point 
which is to be the center of gravity of the 
whole attack. As regards the lines of commu- 
nication, the only difference will be that, in one 
case, they are tied to one place, while in the 
other they go forward by stages. The armies 
have to be supplied in either case, and the de- 
pots must therefore be continuously pushed 
forward in open warfare, until at length they 



2U THE WAR OF THE FUTURE 

become a fixture again, so to speak, when trench 
warfare is resumed. It is obvious that in both 
cases they must be in close touch with the rail- 
ways. The railway net ^vill have to be extended 
correspondingly if we think we are likely to 
remain peimanently in contact with the enemy. 
It will be under the control of the Lines-of- 
Communication Inspectorate and be comprised 
in its area. 

I discussed the question of supply in open 
warfare at great length in my book Vom heuti- 
gen Kriege} 

* Tom lieuii^en Kriege, Vols. I, II, Chap. \i. 



CHAPTER Vni 

THE BATTLE 

It is a great mistake, though unfortunately- 
made only too often, to regard the last war as 
being the one and only war, and, therefore, to 
imagine that the next one must be always on 
the model of the past. In the case of the World 
War this is a double mistake, for it is certain 
that we have just opened a new world period, 
and this for two reasons. In the first place, 
the last war obviously represents the beginning 
of a new evolution; it is a war of development, 
not the last chapter of a historical period which 
has ended. We must therefore assume that 
many of its phenomena will undergo very 
material changes before they attain a certain 
degree of permanence, and that the war of the 
future will take forms different from any which 
we have known from past experience. In the 
second place, it must be remembered that the 
last war w^as fought under conditions which 
probably will never recur. 

Germany and Austria stood alone against a 

245 



1!4(; THE WAU OF THE FUTURE 

world ill arms. Thanks to our mistakes of 
policy, all the slatos wlioao power made them 
serious opponents combined against us, and 
even savage races found themselves in the 
enemy's ranks. We defeated Ihem all, until 
at length we succumbed to our own nation, and 
the revolution put tin end to tho war. Wo wore 
cut olT from all maritime communications, sur- 
rounded by enemies on all sides, and our allies 
bore the germ of defeat within them. The re- 
sult of all this was that the war was not con- 
cluded in a military sense but brought to an 
end by politicid occurrences. These circum- 
stances are not in the least likely to recur. Wo 
shall have a dilTorent alliance policy, and there- 
fore occupy a different position in tho world. 
This is not the place to discuss the political 
prospects which are opening for us as the re- 
sult of the present situation. But our inter- 
national position will no doubt undergo a 
change. We must lind allies on whom we c^in 
rely, and, above all, make ourselves so strong 
that we can hold our own and win the conii- 
detice of our neighbors. In future it is highly 
improbable that we shall see another combina- 
tion of all the powers against us and the utter 
collapse of our weak allies. If there is 
another war — and wars will never be altogether 



THE BATTLE 247 

avoided, in Hpito of all socialiHtic theories — 
it will be under different circum.stanceH from 
those of the World War. We can think of in- 
numerable cases in which a war would be 
fought under quite different conditions from 
those in which Germany fought the world. In 
the present world situation it is easy to imag- 
ine war in the most varied conditions, but none 
of them can even remotely resemble the con- 
ditions of the past. 

It must further be remembered that, as we 
saw, every future war will have to be offensive 
if the parties desire to protect their own soil. 
The result is that the present strategic methods 
of our enemies already seem utterly out of date. 
In addition there is the fact that fortresses no 
longer hold out any prospects for the defense. 
It is true that in the last war fortress opera- 
tions took fdace on more than one ocf;asion — 
I need only refer to the siege of Antwerp — 
but, generally speaking, the uselessness of 
fortresses is universally recognized, and, in 
future, no one will be able to rely on holding 
them. Thus there is no reason to devote a 
special chapter to fortress operations. The les- 
sons which could be drawn from the different 
sieges are out of date, because the siege of a 
fortress is not likely to be witnessed again. 



IMS THE AVAR OF THE FITTURE 

In the e^iso of tho Ivittlo for a fortified sector, 
which has taken the place of the old sieg:e, the 
same principles apply which determine the 
form of operations for loeal advantages in 
trench warfare. I mnst therefore refer the 
reader to the special chapter on this subject, 
with the sole distinction, whicli is, of course, 
important, that on the one side the defense 
works will be permanent and therefore rela- 
tively stronir, while, on the other, the artillery 
which is to deal with them mnst comprise cor- 
respond in uly large calibers. We shall have to 
bring np the heaviest gnns on which we can lay 
hands, while onr opponents, for their part, will 
constnict the shelters for the garrison in sneh 
a way that it can endnre even the heaviest 
lire and still remain etYective. AVhich side will 
prove the victor in this dnel is as obvions as 
the fact that hitherto artilleiy has proved it- 
self superior to fortifications, and will certainly 
remain so in the future. On the other hand, 
the defender Avill gain time in all cases, and 
that is a particularly important matter in the 
defense. But if a decision is gained, the fonner 
defender will have to launch a corresponding 
offensive himself. 

Another characteristic of modern war is that 
the issue is decided by the artillery, and that 



TJIK liATTLE 249 

the only function of the infantry in to reap 
the fruitH of the artillery victory. It thus re- 
mainH the queen of urmH, becauHC war in 
incrmccivable without it, and its advance gives 
the rneafiure of the HUCAc/nH attained. A decisive 
victory in irnpoKHible without infantry, but this 
does not alter the fact that a victory can be 
secured only if we pofiscHs an artillery superi- 
ority. 

All these circumKtanfi^'H are peculiar to mod- 
ern war, as we have i^acn it, but without careful 
examination no one can assume that they will 
have the same importance in future. It is 
therefore necessary to study modem war very 
cloHely in order to ascertain which of its char- 
acteristic elements seem pennanent and which 
temporary. It is also necessary to decide in 
what direction we are bound to expect changes, 
and how developments will end. 

The last topic must form the subject of a 
future book, but, so far as the recent war is 
concerned, my task in the present work is to 
discuss its characteristic phenomena — as far as 
is possible in the present state of knowledge — 
in such a way as to give a general picture of 
modern military operations, and also enable 
every one to come to some conclusion as to 
what may be expected in the future. 



250 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE 

The distribution of the troops in war (as it 
is to-day, and in this particular matter has 
ever been) is generally dependent upon the 
plan of campaign. In the last war this plan 
was determined by events which I have already 
described. It was a war which began as a war 
on two fronts — France and Russia — and gradu- 
ally developed into a world war as the result 
of the participation of England, Italy, Ru- 
mania, and finally America — mainly as the 
result of our mistakes, I am sorry to say. In 
such circumstances it was impossible to adhere 
to a set strategic program. Our original idea 
of the war was a two-front war in which we 
intended to stand on the defensive at first in 
Russia until a decision Avas reached in France. 
This situation gradually changed. As the re- 
sult of the transfer of troops from west to 
east, the Battle of the Marne, and the help 
which we had to send to the Austrians, we were 
compelled to stand on the defensive in France 
and take the offensive in Russia, Rumania, and 
Italj^ We won brilliant victories and then 
passed to the defensive in those theaters while 
we made our final attempt to secure a decision 
in France — a goal we unfortunately did not 
reach — before the Americans appeared in 
masses on the western theater and the revolu- 



THE BATTLE 251 

tion broke out in Germany. The result was 
that the last war was essentially a trench war. 
I have already said elsewhere everything that 
needs to be said about its tactical aspects. 

In the west it was the Battle of the Mame 
which made this development inevitable. In 
the east it arose gradually out of the numerical 
superiority of the Russians, which finally dom- 
inated the whole war. In trench warfare, which 
will interest us first, we must assume that the 
two sides are equal and that the equality — 
at any rate, the element of morale — is such as 
can change only gradually. Open warfare, on 
the other hand, ensues where no continuous 
lines have yet been formed, or when one of the 
two sides has succeeded in breaking his oppo- 
nent's line, and thus in reestablishing the con- 
ditions of maneuver warfare. 

As long as trench warfare is in progress, the 
form of operations will be not so much an 
action for a decision as a general forward or 
backward movement of the opposing lines. Of 
course, such movement may involve great dis- 
tances. It may represent a great gain to one 
side and a great loss to the other, but a de- 
cision can never be reached merely by this 
process. Open warfare alone can bring the 
decision. When the attacker is exhausted and 



252 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE 

has to give up the idea of enveloping his op- 
ponent, while the defender succeeds in pre- 
serving the continuity of his line by bringing 
up troops from both sides, there will, of course, 
be a loss of ground and large captures of giins, 
machine-guns and prisoners ; but it will be im- 
possible to speak of a real decision. 

This is what happened to us in all our great 
victories in France. It happened in our great 
offensive in the spring of 1918, in the fighting 
on the Lys — the so-called Battle of Armen- 
tieres — and the capture of Mount Kemmel. 
There can be no doubt that our troops per- 
formed almost superhuman feats, but it was 
impossible to speak of a real annihilation of the 
hostile armies because they succeeded in re- 
establishing their lines locally and tactically. 
From the Battle of the Marne onwards we 
fought the whole war in France without ever 
obtaining a decision, although we won brilliant 
victories at different points and exhausted the 
enemy almost to the point of extinction. We 
must not deceive ourselves on this point in con- 
sidering the war as a whole. In all our battles 
we never succeeded in breaking through the 
enemy, and as far as we can see it would have 
been very difficult for us to do so after 
the Americans had appeared in the western 



THE BATTLE 253 

theater and increased the numbers at the dis- 
posal of our enemies very considerably. By 
that time a complete victory was certainly out 
of the question, but it would still have been 
possible to bring the war to an honorable con- 
clusion. 

It was otherwise in the Russo-Eumanian 
theater. There we succeeded time after time — 
quite apart from the battles at the beginning 
of the war, of course — in breaking through the 
hostile lines and obtaining a decision which led 
to the Peace of Brest-Litovsk after the Revolu- 
tion had prepared the way. 

People may say what they like about that. 
My business is simply to emphasize that a de- 
cision is possible only in open warfare, and that 
everything turns on transforming trench war- 
fare, which may have been necessitated by 
circumstances, into open warfare in which the 
enemy can be enveloped, at any rate, on one 
flank, and his communications threatened. 
Such operations alone are capable of forcing a 
decision, for in no other way is it possible to 
throw the hostile armies into really disastrous 
confusion. In war that is the only goal. 

We must start by considering trench warfare 
with limited objectives, because it represents 
the larger part of modern operations. Next, 



•J54 THE AVAR OF THE FUTUKE 

wo must discuss trouoh warfare which is iu- 
toiidod to load to a docisiou. Last, wo must 
deal with open warfare, because such opera- 
tious aud the docisiou thoy briuc; are the tiual 
goal of war. 

In doing" so. we nuist always remember that 
wo are thinking only of war in its prcseiit stage 
of development, not of the war with whieli the 
future may possibly present ns. 

I. — The STRrGoi>E for Loo.vl, Advantages in 
Truxoh "Warfare 

In considering the subject of actions for local 
advantages in trench warfare (and I take it 
first because such actions are peculiarly char- 
acteristic of modern warV we must realize at 
the outset that they involve a gain of ground 
and their purpose is to intiict on the enemy the 
greatest possible damage or rob him of some 
particularly im]^x>rtant area. In either case, 
the attack will have to be purely frontal. It 
will therefore be necessary to concentrate so 
superior a force for the attack that the defender 
is rendered helpless before the real infantry 
assault begins, and the latter must be accom- 
panied by a barrage which is bound to break 
the last attempts at resistance of the enemy's 
infant ly if it is still capable of the effort. 



THE BATTLE 255 

As I have alrea(3y said, the most diflScult part 
of this proi^ram is the artillery concentration. 
It must be effected without the enemy's notic- 
ing anything. It must be on such a scale that 
the artillery can reduce the enemy to helpless- 
ness in the shortest possible time; the hostile 
infantry mu.st be made incapable of bringing 
the attack to a standstill. The barrage must set- 
tle the defending infantry once and for all. We 
must also arrange that the batteries can at 
once follow the storming infantry, so that the 
hostile artillery has no chance of deploying 
afresh out of our range and, supported from 
the wings and rear if possible, to neutralize the 
effect of our guns. We shall also have to take 
suitable precautions against hostile aircraft. 
Thus the movements which so tedious an opera- 
tion as concentration requires, and our prep- 
arations to cross the so-called "No Man's 
Land," will have to be carried out by night 
only. The arrangements required for crossing 
No Man's Land will be particularly numer- 
ous and complicated. Bridging-material must 
be prepared, roads must be constructed and 
improved, and labor units must be at hand with 
all the paraphernalia they require. In short, 
a huge and complicated operation is needed if 



256 THE WAR OP THE FUTURE 

the attack is to have the element of surprise 
and to be a real success. 

As regards the defensive system itself, quite 
apart from the effects of shell-fire this will fre- 
quently bo made almost impassable to the 
attacker by trenches and mre entanglements. 
In addition, the enormous amount of ammuni- 
tion which the attacker requires has to be 
brought up to the front lines and then sent for- 
ward as the advance proceeds. As regards 
food, however, we shall be able to rely to a cer- 
tain extent on the supplies we shall find in the 
enemy's lines. To trust to these alone is very 
unwise, for we can never tell exactly what we 
shall find. A certain amount of food must 
therefore be sent up to the advancing infantry 
in order to be on the safe side. For the rest, 
it is advisable to select an area for our deploy- 
ment which is as safe as possible from hostile 
observation and enables us to conceal our 
batteries and ammunition dumps. It will thus 
be realized how difficult such a deployment is, 
and what a number of aspects have to be con- 
sidered. The best course, to all appearances, 
is to deploy the artillery in two waves, as I 
said elsewhere. The first must be strong 
enough to fulfill all the duties which the attack 
imposes, while the second (provided with the 



THE BATTLE 257 

necessary ammunition) must be ready to ac- 
company the storm troops immediately they go 
forward. Such a disposition will mean that the 
enemy's guns (a sufficient number of them, at 
least) will never have time to adopt defensive 
dispositions, and the attack will roll forward 
uninterruptedly. The artillery which is subse- 
quently to accompany the infantry with its 
barrage will first participate in the neutraliza- 
tion of the hostile artillery, and only start its 
barrage work when the enemy's artillery can 
be regarded as silenced and our own infantry 
leaves its trenches. 

Turning to the infantry attack, it will be best 
to adopt dispositions similar to those we have 
considered for the artillery. We shall not con- 
tent ourselves with sending our infantry for- 
ward in a single wave which is just strong 
enough to perform its task. We prefer to ar- 
range for several waves composed of the same 
arms, so that when the force of the first is spent 
the second (or the third, as the case may be) is 
immediately available to continue the attack. 
Quite apart from the ordinary artillery dispo- 
sitions, we shall have our infantry accompanied 
by assault batteries, which— as I have said be- 
fore—have the duty of supporting their ad- 



258 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE 

vance directly, though not in the same way as 
the barrage. 

The attack will thus go forward until it 
reaches its objective. The infantry must then 
be strong enough to deal with the enemy's 
counter-attack and hold their ground against 
further attacks, which may become very violent 
after a time. It must be considered a very 
serious mistake to assign too few troops to a 
projected attack or expect more of them than 
they can possibly achieve. Again, the attack 
must never be broken off before we have 
reached ground which is suitable for defense. 
If this rule be neglected we shall find that 
when the force of the attack has spent itself 
we are in an extremely awkward position. For 
instance, if we leave the enemy in dominating 
positions in front of our new line, or if we 
have no observation over his new front, when 
once the attack is over it will be very diflficult 
to escape the enemy's observation or find out 
his intentions. Thus, before we plan our attack 
we must find out how many troops the enemy 
has in the sector itself and how many more 
he can bring up after the moment at which he 
realizes that the attack is coming. 

The enemy will find himself perfectly help- 
less if the attack comes as a complete surprise 



THE BATTLE 259 

to him and is really well prepared. All he can 
do is to bring up reenforcements from the 
flanks or the rear, and these will not be ade- 
quate to hold up our progress if our arrange- 
ments have been good. It is much more likely 
that we shall reach our objective. 

The course of events will be very different 
if the enemy has noticed our preparations for 
the attack and is ready for it. In that case he 
also can bring up infantry and artillery in time 
and confront the attackers with troops some 
of which are, at any rate, of equal value. The 
probability is that an indecisive action will be 
the result if the attack is pressed through. The 
position will be far more favorable for a de- 
fender if, in the particular case, he decides not 
to hold his front line, and from the outset 
confines himself to maintaining another line 
farther back. Of course his enemy must know 
nothing of this intention. The defender will, 
therefore, keep at any rate part of the garrison 
in the front line, and if necessary sacrifice it. 
He will take the same course with part of his 
artillery, which naturally cannot abandon its 
positions altogether without betraying the 
secret. But the defender derives enormous 
advantage in other ways. All his artillery re- 
enforcements, duly provided with ammunition. 



260 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE 

can be concentrated beyond the range of the 
attacker's artillery. The same course may be 
taken with the infantry whose function it is to 
defend the line which is intended to be seriously 
held. The hostile barrage will affect only a 
small part of the defending infantry, and the 
defender knows this beforehand. There will be 
no need to send up ammunition and food as is 
required when the front line is reenforced. In 
short, the defender is in a much better position 
than the attacker, as to a certain extent he can 
settle beforehand what sacrifices he is prepared 
to make. 

Of course, the attacker's artillery will par- 
tially annihilate the infantry force which the 
defender has left in his front line for the pur- 
poses of demonstration. It will also be able to 
silence such of the hostile artillery as has not 
been withdrawni. The artillery reenforcements 
will not be harmed, nor that portion of the in- 
fantry to which is assigned the duty of holding 
the selected main line of defense. On the other 
hand, the attacker's infantry, which has cap- 
tured the first line of defense with obvious ease 
and probably quickly overrun the defender's 
first artillery positions, now comes within 
range of destruction fire from the enemy's ar- 
tillery reenforcements and the main infantry 



THE BATTLE 261 

force, both of which have suffered no injury at 
all, as they were disposed beyond the range 
of the attacker's guns. It may be assumed 
that in these circumstances the attacker will 
suffer the heaviest losses and fail to achieve 
his purposes altogether. He will be able to avoid 
absolute ruin only by realizing his mistake 
in time and refraining from the fatal on- 
slaught on the enemy's main line of defense. 
He will certainly have captured his adversary's 
front lines, but the losses he will have suffered 
will be losses out of all proportion to this 
limited gain. The defender, on the other hand, 
will only have lost ground which need never be 
of great value. The losses he has suffered, on 
the other hand, will be practically nothing in 
comparison with those of the attacker. If this 
process is repeated fairly frequently, in the 
long run the losses of the attacker will be so 
great that he will not dare to venture on a 
decisive battle, and ultimately will find that he 
has lost the war. 

Such a development of events must be 
avoided at all cost, but as it is extraordinarily 
difficult, in spite of all precautions, advantages 
of ground and demonstrations at various 
points, to conceal the preparations for the at- 
tack, especially when the enemy has got wind 



262 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE 

of it and knows how to recognize the signs (he 
will frequently find out that an attack is immi- 
nent by examining deserters and prisoners), I 
can see only one way in which he can reach his 
goal, and that is by combining retirement and 
the attack. The fundamental idea behind this 
suggestion is that the complicated machinery of 
attack should be got ready behind a line in the 
rear which is to be the starting-point for the 
attack itself, so that this line would be quite 
out of the range of hostile reconnaissance and 
observation, not to mention artillery fire. 
When this line had been prepared for the attack 
in every detail the attacker would withdraw 
his front to it and open his attack by surprise 
after the enemy had come forward into the 
open. 

It is essential for the success of such a plan 
that the retirement seem perfectly genuine 
to the enemy, and for that reason it should 
involve a shortening of the front or the aban- 
donment of a position which is strategically 
and tactically unfavorable. As it will also be 
very difficult to prevent the enemy from finding 
out through deserters or prisoners that an 
attack is imminent, we must arrange matters 
in such a way that our own troops themselves 
know nothing about it. 



THE BATTLE 263 

It will thus be seen that the vital point is to 
prevent the enemy from knowing anything 
about the attack, so that it will come as a sur- 
prise and find him, if possible, unprepared. 

We shall attain this end if we select the point 
on our available front for our proposed attack 
in such a way that, as I have said, our with- 
drawal seems natural, and involves the loss of 
an area which must not be too small (without 
leaving the enemy positions which are easy to 
defend). "We must also be entitled to hope that 
the ensuing attack will cause the enemy great 
losses, fatal losses if possible, and also reach 
objectives of strategic importance. 

We shall now construct the real line which is 
to be the starting-point of our attack behind our 
original line, which can be abandoned to the 
enemy for a time without any serious disad- 
vantage. If at all possible, it must leave the 
enemy an unfavorable forward zone, while our 
own (and the developments which are in prog- 
ress behind it) are safe from hostile observa- 
tion owing to the lie of the ground. 

The trenches will be constructed as well as 
the necessary cover. Battery ranges will be 
established and artillery maps drawn up. An 
adequate amount of ammunition will be 
brought up. The divisions earmarked for the 



264 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE 

subsequent attack ^vill be disposed at the 
proper distance behind. The road system will 
be developed. Then the artillery will gradu- 
ally be concentrated. In short, all arrange- 
ments will be made for the attack as inconspicu- 
ously as possible. We shall also pretend that 
we are ourselves expecting a great enemy 
attack, and intend to retire to our rear line of 
defense either when it begins or when we 
know it is imminent. As an example, I might 
refer to Hindenburg's retirement to the Sieg- 
fried Line. 

As no sort of preparation for an attack 
would be made behind the advanced position it 
would be only natural for our own troops to 
assume that we have no idea of such an attack, 
and probably they will say as much. The 
enemy, too, will observe no preparations for 
attack, but will probably discover that a posi- 
tion in rear is being constructed, and assume 
from this fact that an intention to attack is 
out of the question. We may strengthen the 
illusion by making preparations for a great 
attack, at least superficially, behind our front 
line at some other point and taking steps which 
seem to point to such an intention, e. g., con- 
structing field railways, moving columns at 



THE BATTLE 265 

night, bringing up batteries, establishing sham 
ammunition dumps and so on. 

While our preparations for the real attack 
from the roar position are in progress, and be- 
fore we abandon our forward position, we must 
make certain arrangements in the latter which 
will be useful to us during our subsequent 
attack, but the object of which will be unknown 
to the enemy. I refer to the selection of em- 
placements for the batteries which we shall 
rush up to these points when our attack has 
passed our original front line, so that we can 
be certain of having artillery support for the 
next stage of the advance. The artillery maps 
must be ready and the survey posts measured 
and indicated so that it will be possible for 
our guns to get on again with sufficient rapid- 
ity. If circumstances make it desirable similar 
artillery emplacements should be established 
between the front and rear positions so that 
the batteries can be sent forward by stages. 

As I have already said, it is very desirable 
that a second artillery wave should be disposed 
behind the batteries we have earmarked for 
the first attack, so that we can *'lift" our artil- 
lery fire without having to diminish the volume 
of our artillery fire from the first wave — at any 
rate, while the latter is going forward. 



2(>0 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE 

li is nlso (losirablo not to make too heavy 
demaiuls on the atiacUini:: infantry. After a 
war has histed some tinu% the infantry will 
not be so ('llieienl as when it l)ei»an. liattle 
methods require that all Ihe subordinate com- 
manders have a hij»"li (h\4;ree of indepenthMice 
and self-n>liance. As a nuitter of fact, the 
shortai»t> of olllieers and N.dO.'s means that 
these (jualities are to be found only to a limited 
extent, especially when we remember that, 
j^-emn-ally speakina:, little time can be spent 
on trainiuii: men to act on their own uiitiative. 
Moreover, in war we have always to reckon 
with unforeseen circumstances and occurrences 
— the unexpected appearance of hostile re- 
sen'es and so on — and we nuist not forget the 
disinteg'ratini]: aiul, to a certain extent, demor- 
ali//ini»^ effects of modern battle on troops 
which are not a perfect instrument of war. 

It is thus advisable to assemble as many 
infantry waves for the attack as our numbers 
permit and circumstances require. The larger 
the number, the greater will be our prospect? 
of reaeJiing the strategic objective which we 
have set before us, instead of sticking halfway 
because our infantry fails us. It would be 
better to limit the number and scale of our at- 



THE BATTLP: 2G7 

tacks than to impose restrictions upon our- 
selves in this respect. 

As soon as we have made all these arrange- 
mcfnts in the way \ have (IeHcrih(!(], arrange- 
ments which will doubtlcHH be regarded by our 
own troops as preparations for retreat, we 
shall begin our real withdrawal to the prepared 
position in the rear, taking care to destroy all 
shell-proof dug-outs, and carrying out the 
movement by stages, so that the enemy will 
follow us up slowly and have time to bring his 
artillery with him. 

We must do everything in our power to com- 
pel the enemy to follow us up. High ground, 
villages and areas he had previously lost must 
be offered as a bait to his military pride. 
Casual announcements of our intention to with- 
draw must challenge him, and local counter- 
attacks must keep him in check th(i whole time 
the withdrawal is in progress. Before the re- 
treat starts the hostile artillery must be freely 
gassed (with the "yellow cross" gas-shell) in 
order to compel it to leave its emplacements. 
This gassing will not only assist our own with- 
drawal, but its after-effects will make them- 
selves felt in our subsequent attack, for it will 
first make the enemy leave his position as 
quickly as possible, and then prevent him from 



268 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE 

conccntratina; in the same area. Yet it is prac- 
tically immaterial whether the enemy follows 
us very quickly or not. Indeed, it is better to 
give him a few days in which to get up all his 
forces, particularly his artillery, to the se- 
lected spot. 

It is not easy to determine the right moment 
for our attack, for if we are to make full use 
of our advantages of position, it is essential 
that w^e surprise the enemy at the moment in 
which his defensive arrangements — particu- 
larly his artillery and signal system — which 
have been disorganized by the general change 
of position, have not yet settled do^vn again. 
Too much delay will mean letting him get 
too strong and involves a risk to the masses 
of material and ammunition we have assem- 
bled. On the other hand, a premature thrust 
into the void is far more dangerous. It is for 
this reason that, beginning with the first day 
of the retreat, our whole observation system — 
surveying, balloons, aircraft, ground observa- 
tion — ^will be directed unceasingly to discover- 
ing the movements of the enemy, and especially 
the arrival of his artillery. Familiarity with 
the area to be occupied by the enemy — which 
can be obtained by reconnoitering and examin- 
ing the lines before the retreat — will prove 



THE BATTLE 2C9 

very useful to all concerned later on. The 
results of reconnaissance during these few days 
will be the foundation of our artillery work. 

When we have thus arrived in our ''depar- 
ture" position, we shall only allow ourselves 
long enough to ascertain by aircraft and other 
observation that at any rate the bulk of the 
enemy's artillery has arrived. Then, in the 
last night, the attacking infantry and escort 
batteries will take up their position in the lines 
and immediately launch the attack. By so do- 
ing we shall reap the following advantages : 

The concentration of the artillery and the 
deployment of the attack divisions will be con- 
cealed from the enemy. The delicate work of 
reconnoitering and surveying the battery posi- 
tions, fixing the aiming points, and so forth, 
will be done much more carefully out of the 
enemy's range. For the same reason the heavy 
business of concentrating our batteries and 
bringing up ammunition, which will be favored 
by the good roads of the back area, will pro- 
ceed more smoothly and safely, and without in- 
volving wastage in men, horses, equipment and 
ammunition. This advantage will also enable 
us systematically to distribute the concentra- 
tion of the necessary material over the whole 
period at our disposal before the day fixed for 



270 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE 

the attack. This and the strict control of 
traffic, which nnist bo suporvisod by officers 
right ni) to the front lino, will prevent that un- 
usnally heavy traffic in the back area wliicli only 
too often betrays one's intentions. A few re- 
ports of particnbir activity will, as a rule, be 
constrned by the enemy as the construction of 
a position in rear, and, as I have said, tliis 
pretense will help to conceal our purpose even 
from our own troops. 

All the preparations, down to the last details, 
will be under the personal supervision of senior 
officers. 

In this way we shall take the enemy entirely 
by surprise, and find him in unprepared lines. 
We need not expect to meet strong enemy re- 
seiTos at the start, and if they are brought up 
subsequently their intervention can hardly be 
systematic. A deep zone pitted with shell- 
holes is a formidable obstacle. In the area 
just evacuated we shall find a good network of 
roads and light railways. The enemy himself 
will have made great efforts to restore what 
w^e had to destroy. The possibility of bringing 
up heavy artillery to the front line will secure 
our artilleiy preparation the necessary depth, 
so that we can silence even the distant hostile 
artillerj' and deal with occupied positions in 



THE BATTLE 271 

the rear. These preparations may to some de- 
gree be extended to what will be enemy terri- 
tory also. Battery emplacements can be fixed, 
and officers and men familiarized with the 
ground beforehand. The artillery can recon- 
noiter targets, and ascertain suitable points for 
observation and emplacements. The signal 
service will be able to work on the preparations 
'for quickly establishing a signal system in the 
enemy's territory. The lines of approach can 
be repaired and road-mending material can be 
accumulated at inconspicuous points in the 
heart of the enemy's ground. It is even pos- 
sible to accumulate small ammunition dumps 
for the infantry gun batteries in secret places. 
Lastly, the employment of gas batteries on a 
great scale as a weapon of attack is quite pos- 
sible, thanks to the favorable conditions for 
the concentration. 

A salvo of about a thousand trench-mortar 
gas-shells to every kilometer of front will have 
an enormous effect, and in favorable circum- 
stances throw the enemy into confusion even 
a long way behind his front line. The work of 
emplacing these mortars must be started long 
beforehand and carefully concealed from aerial 
observation. The ammunition itself must not 



272 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE 

bo brought up to the line before the uight of 
the attack. 

In these eircuuistaiu'cs, the eoueent ration of 
all our resourees for the attack and the fact 
that the enemy, who will not have hail time to 
dig himself in, is without cover, enable us to 
curtail our artillery preparations very appre- 
ciably and thus secure a gfreat advantage over 
the enemy's approaching reser\^es. As I have 
said before, this artillery preparation itself 
will be extremely violent and may therefore be 
short. The excellent conditions in which the 
concentration has been carried out will permit 
an expenditure of material and ammunition on 
a scale surpassing all previous experience. In 
these conditions a complete success is ex- 
tremely probable, but it will be far from easy 
to repeat such an operation with equal success 
a second time. It is therefore advisable to use 
this tystem of attack once only for a vital 
otTensive, and thus secure the decision of the 
whole campaign. 

In what I have been saying I have invol- 
untarily adopted the German point of view, and 
for the rest described the forms of action which 
practically made up the war and with which I 
myself have been familiar. Yet it must not 
be forgotten that the offensive has other 



THE BATTLE 273 

methods in addition to those I have described, 
while, generally speaking, the defense can- 
not take a form very different from that I 
have outlined in my pages. I cannot, of course, 
discuss these other methods on the same lines, 
because I liave had no personal experience of 
them, and such discussions must be based on 
personal experience. Moreover, T should only 
'repeat myself on very many points if I went 
into them in any greater detail. After all, the 
weapons available are always the same — artil- 
lery, tanks and infantry — though the methods 
of cooperation may vary. It all comes back to 
the same thing. 

In every case surprise will be the vital factor. 
Tanks can be concentrated much more rapidly 
than infantry if an adequate road system is 
available. We can therefore produce the ef- 
fect of surprise much more easily with tanks 
than with infantry. Our enemies seem to have 
succeeded by this method on several occasions. 
But as regards artillery, success depends to an 
enormous degree on the number of guns at our 
disposal. In the last war four European arm- 
ies were united against us, and they were joined 
by the American in the last year, while on our 
side Turkey and Bulgaria only counted in so 
far as we ourselves had to supply them with 



274 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE 

guns and ammunition. Tho industries of the 
whole world wore at tho service of our foes, so 
that it is hardly surprising* that towards the end 
tlioy had a great preponderanoe of tanks and 
guns, i. 0., neither in attack nor in defense did 
they have to employ as many troops as we 
in order to reach the same goal. That was an 
immense advantage, of course, which made it- 
self felt in course of time on every occasion. 

This advantage was conspicuous, particu- 
larly in the last battles of tlie campaign of 1918. 
At the end the enemy's superiority, especially 
in tanks, was very great, and even in artilkny 
the Allies had a heavy preponderance. 

All this must be borne in mind in considering 
tlie later course of events. The longer the war 
lasted, the larger the number of killed and 
wounded on the Oerman side, and the w*orse 
the drafts which came out to take their places, 
the greater became the superiority of the Allies 
in spite of the immense losses which they suf- 
fered. The initiative gradually passed into 
their hands and their offensive itself took more 
varied fonns. The resources of the defender, 
on the other hand, were rapidly vanishing. Ho 
had no new defensive methods with which to 
reply to the tanks and the intensitied barrage, 
and while the uses of technical material were 



TIIK liATTI.F. 275 

coniinuouHly dian^In^ during llio war ho hirri- 
soir had io Hily, lakiri/^ it all round, on the 
sarno oHlabliHlicd nudhodn. Tho (Jof(jnrlor could 
not do nion; than conc(3ntrat(i hiH iroopH tho 
moment ho realized an attack waH coming, adopt 
th(! variouH deferiKlvo rn^ithodH af)pli(5abl(; to the 
enemy 'h methodw of attack, and otherwise; trust 
to the courage of his troopH. (JircumHtances 
•themHelvcB made it imposHibh; for the German 
Supreme Command to adopt new methods and 
recover th(! initiative — while this was easy for 
our enemies. It is possible, on the other hand, 
that it could have organized the barrage better, 
so that the capacity of the guns could have been 
mad(; more use of than was actually the case. 
I will therefore permit myself to add a few 
words on this jjoint. 

II. — The Barrage 

We have seen that no infantry attack is pos- 
sible without the protecting curtain of a creep- 
ing barrage, which is designed to break down 
the last resistance as the storming infantry 
approaches. Unfortunately the great drawback 
to such a barrage is that its rate of progress 
has to be fixed once and for all. Whether the 
infantry advances quickly or slowly the barrage 



276 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE 

goes forward at this regular pace, and thus 
— as frequently happened during the war — 
gets too far ahead of the infantry, and the 
hostile troops recover themselves when it has 
passed and renew their resistance. On the 
other side, it may compel its own infantry to 
go slower than the situation would otherwise 
permit. Thus the problem of the attacl^er is 
to make tlie barrage elastic, so that it will 
automatically accompany the infantry advance. 
In practice, this problem has not yet been 
solved, and I can thus only make suggestions 
which have not yet stood the test of reality. 

If we look at the practical necessities of the 
case, the first and most obvious idea is that the 
regimeutal CO. of the infantry should be able 
directl}^ to influence the pace of the barrage 
ahead of his unit by using some simple foim of 
flare. This scheme seems perfectly feasible. 

The area to be attacked must be divided into 
barrage zones, with which the regimental zones 
must broadly coincide, and be indiciited by the 
same color. 

If we now calculate two regiments in the 
front line per division, only four different col- 
ored flares will be required, and confusion will 
be impossible. If the line of attack is com- 
posed, as it generally is, of more than two 



THE BATTLE 277 

divisions, the alternation of colors in the other 
sectors will have to ha settled, but, in any case, 
red, yellow, white and green will be enough. 
Of course, it is possible that there may be a 
gap between two regiments where, according 
to requirements, the barrage of one is going 
faster or slower than the barrage of the other. 
This, however, can never make much differ- 
ence if the regimental CO. knows his business, 
and the enemy will never be able to use it to 
break through the infantry line. 

If in the course of the attack one regiment 
crosses into an adjacent zone, it must, of course, 
let the artillery commander in this zone know, 
and use the color of the new zone when it 
wishes to signal to the artillery. As it will 
always be doubtful whether the latter will see 
the signal, there must be special observation 
balloons, one per division for example, which 
will pass on the signal to the batteries which 
are supplying the barrage in the sector in ques- 
tion. On seeing a flare of their own color, for 
instance, these batteries would bring back their 
barrage to their last two hundred-meter line 
in fifty-meter stages, each lasting five minutes, 
and then again send it forward automatically if 
no further flares are sent up. Of course, the 
time can be fixed otherwise. Everything de- 



278 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE 

pends on the speed with which the attacker 
thinks his infantry can advance. It is advisable 
not to ask too much of them in this way. The 
reasons are obvious, and besides it is as well 
that a regiment should have working arrange- 
ments with adjacent regiments. 

In any case a slow barrage is to be preferred 
to a fast one. The attacker can be far more 
certain that his infantry will keep up with it 
and will not need to make much use of their 
flares. But it is certain that such an elastic 
barrage will be possible only if it is quietly 
and systematically prepared for beforehand. 
Such preparations can be made only when the 
army has been brought back before the attack. 
Generally speaking, under no other circum- 
stances will the attacker be able to insure that 
no batteries fire out of their proper color-zone, 
and that batteries are emplaced in the direct 
line of fire. It is equally necessary that the 
commanders of the infantry regiments and 
those of the artilleiy be perfectly familiar 
with the zones in question. As a rule all these 
officers will have an adequate knowledge of 
the ground only when they have had an oppor- 
tunity to study it closely and carefully before 
the retreat. 

Thus, in general, the elastic barrage can be re- 



THE BATTLE 279 

sorted to only when a retreat has been planned 
before the attack and when the various color- 
zones are in a straight line, as otherwise it will 
be impossible for the infantry-gun batteries to 
keep one line of fire all the time, though this is 
absolutely essential, allowing for the slight 
variations which are inevitable with every bar- 
rage and particularly the elastic barrage. 

III. — The Decision in Trench Warfaee 

The operations which are intended to bring 
about a decision in trench warfare are to all in- 
tents and purposes the same as those in which 
there is no such intention, but in the first ease 
the attack is mounted quite differently. In 
the one case the distribution of the troops is 
practically uniform along the whole line, though 
the configuration of the ground and the be- 
havior of the enemy may involve a comparative 
concentration of troops at one point or another. 
Such operations will be based on strategic con- 
siderations only if their purpose is to capture 
some particular area. It is a totally different 
matter where the whole mounting of the attack 
is determined by the intention to secure a 
decision. In this case the troops will be massed 
behind tlmt wing on which the decision is 
sought, and at this point a double objective will 



280 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE 

be assigned to them. The front line will have 
the duty of thrusting straight forward and 
throwing back the enemy as far as it can. The 
task of the second line will be to wheel out- 
wards and roll up that wing of the enemy with 
which it comes in contact. 

The object of these moves will be to effect a 
real rupture of the enemy's lines at the point 
of impact, so that there will be a wholesale 
breach of the hostile system of defenses, and 
the troops which are rolled up from the flank 
will be completely separated from those which 
have been diiven straight back. Of course the 
enemy will do his best to prevent this. He will 
bring up reserves from all points in order to 
hinder a complete rupture and close the breach. 
That is exactly what must be prevented, and 
for this purpose the attacker will have reen- 
forcements ready and will therefore make the 
troops he has massed behind the wing so strong 
that if necessary he can hurl a superior force 
into the gap. As a rule, cavalry will be used 
for this purpose, as it can get ahead very quick- 
ly and throw back such of the enemy as it 
finds in the breach. This cavalry will be given 
an adequate force of artillery, so that it can 
deal promptly with the enemy. We can now 
easily understand how it was that the English 



THE BATTLE 281 

and French assembled their cavalry behind the 
battle-line in order to complete and exploit the 
rupture. But they did not use this arm prop- 
erly, for they always sent out their cavalry at 
the moment they met too strong a hostile force, 
and therefore had to attack frontally. Of 
course that must be avoided. The cavalry must 
be held back until the area in question is prac- 
tically free of enemy troops, and must then be 
distributed in two groups which separate in 
wholly different directions. One of them makes 
for that part of the enemy 's line which is to be 
rolled up, and the other for the sector which 
can only be thrown back frontally. Both must 
press forward with the greatest energy in 
order that between them the ground may be 
thoroughly cleared and they themselves may 
have the freedom of movement they require. 

It will therefore be necessary to concentrate 
a large mass of troops at this point and press 
forward as quickly as possible so as to prevent 
the enemy from bringing up reenforcements in 
time. We shall therefore intensify the artillery 
preparation to the highest possible degree, and 
also keep a strong force of artillery, ready 
horsed, which we shall be able to employ at 
once against the portion of the enemy line 



282 THE WAR OP THE FUTURE 

which wo intend to roll up, whilo our main ad- 
vance proceeds remorselessly. 

Our road sj^stom must correspond to the 
groainoss of our (ask, and proper arrangements 
be made for the su[)ply of amnmnition. For, 
of course, an enormous amount of ammunition 
will be required if we are both to make rapid 
progress in front and also have enough avail- 
able for our attack on the Hank. Rapid progress 
at this point is of quite special importance, and 
it will be facilitated to a very great degree if 
we succeed in taking the hostile forces here, 
which must simultaneously be attacked front- 
ally, under a concentric lire, so that we can 
soon compel them to give way and ra«pidly ex- 
tend the breach, into which the cavalry can 
hurl itself. 

The latter must go straight on only until it 
is more or less out of the enemy's range. It 
must then separate into two bodies, as I have 
said, and turn against the enemy's communica- 
tions. The main and field railways in par- 
ticular must be attacked and destroyed, or, at 
any rate, those which might sen^c for bring- 
ing up hostile reenforcements, ammunition and 
troops. Of course they will not destroy the 
sectors which the attacker will subsequently 



THE BATTLE 283 

need himself if he is to press his advance at 
the highest speed. 

It will thus be seen that the most thorough 
preparation is required to effect a real breach 
at any particular point, and that an immense 
amount of thought is necessary if we are to 
see clearly on every point. Nothing may be 
left to chance. Once the breach has been made, 
.everything turns on the operations on the en- 
emy's flanks, for it is only at this point that a 
decisive victory can be secured. Circumstances 
will decide at what point we shall seek this de- 
cision, but as a rule the critical thrust will be 
against that part of the enemy's line which was 
not originally attacked frontally. The bulk of 
the attacker's troops will be employed against 
this sector, because the enemy will be least pre- 
pared for an attack here. It may also be, of 
course, that the sector which is originally at- 
tacked only frontally is intended to be rolled up 
also, so that the center of gravity of the whole 
operation is on the enemy's inner wing. In 
both cases a very large striking force will have 
to be brought through the gap, once it is made, 
in order to keep the action going and force a 
real decision. In the second case there is 
probably greater danger of failure, for, what- 
ever the rate of the advance, the enemy will 



•JSI TllK WAIC OV TllK KUTlHIKi 

.i»'iM»tM-.Mlly MU'i'cH^l in bringiiii;" np roiMifoiTo- 
nuMils io llu* froiil wliioh is iiuMi.'H'(>(l by llio 
fronlMl nUju'U, nnd wi^ shall linvt* (o donl with 

tll«'S(> .Ml t>lUH\ 

N\luM» llu> .mKju'Ium' liMs br«>ktM» lln-oui;li, lio 
must tl(^pU\v on an tniM* t^xltMulini;' froul as lu> 
ailvauoos, in imior io st'curo l»is own oulor 
wijiU's aii'aiust iMivoU>pnuMil. ^IMicy imist ho so- 
oui't^l on ho\\\ siih's, \'ov \\\o iMUMiiy will always 
try to briuij: up roont'orconuMils from both siiK^s, 
niul thus I'liiso Iht^ i;af>. 'V\\o main Ihinii' will bo 
Io thvslroy I ho railways whioh rnn i^aralUM wilh 
iho I'ronl allaok, anil il will oasily ho niulor- 
sltu>(l (hal cavalry nvo bosi lilUnl Tor lliis work. 
Thoy alono aro ablo \o n\o\o wilh Iho spood Ihis 
work roipiiros. II is t^bvious thai iindor those 
oironnislanoos tliov must pross t'onvavd \vith- 
(Mil sto[>piui;" anil livi^ on Iho oonnlry anil Iho 
onomy snpplios thoy mauaiio to liuil, without 
Ironblin;;- about thoir own oonnnnnioalions. It 
will also bo roali/.od how imiiorlanl il is to i^vl 
our railways up bohind Iho troops whioh havo 
brokon Ihronnh. and how Ihorouii'hly this "t'ol- 
low-U[>" uuist bo t>rii'Mui/od it' Iho broak-lhrou^'h 
is to bo a roal suoooss. 

II will thus bo roadily approoiatod that an 
alliMn}^! o( this kind oannol bo t'ro(]nontly ro- 
nowod, so that wo uuisl havo a two or Ihroo fold 



TIIK BATTLK 285 

Huporiorily b<;foro wo tako up thin iwo-cAi/cj] 
weapon which often cornpolH tho corjcontraiiori 
of maHHOK of* Iroofm, and Ihoroforo makoH it 
fiouhJy difficult to conceal Huch a w>nc(intration 
from the enemy. 

ThuH, the rnoHt important preliminary quea- 
tion of all in the point at which the break- 
through is to take place, for upon this will de- 
pend the HUcccHH of the whole operation, apart 
from the f>urely technical preparations. This 
bringH uh to the vital quewtion, What iv the de- 
cisive point? If my reader wishes to look into 
this question more closely, he will find it in the 
approf>riate chapter in the Hccond volume of 
my book, Vom hf'utifjfm Kricjje? 

I will only say here that, on the one hand, it 
deyjends on purely tactical considerations, and 
on the other — as soon as the decision of the 
whole war in in prosyjcct — on qucHtionn of a 
geographical and political nature. The decisive 
point can never be settled by purely theoretical 
considerations. This matter can be illustrated 
only by actual examplcH, because circum- 
stances vary in every individual case. Against 
Russia the vital direction for a German attack 
was against Petersburg through the Baltic 
Provinces, the right flank being adequately pro- 

>VoI. n, TV, Cliap. V. 



286 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE 

tected. From Austria it was from Galicia, 
in the general direction of Moscow. In the west, 
on the other hand, several decisive points must 
be distinguished, each depending upon the po- 
litical situation. As long as England was not 
participating but only threatened us with her 
intervention, or had merely her weak regular 
army on French soil, the direction of Calais 
was undoubtedly decisive, as Count Schlieffen 
had always insisted. On the other hand, as 
soon as the English new armies appeared in 
France the decisive direction was the line which 
separated the English and French armies. 

England was undoubtedly the more danger- 
ous enemy, the adversary whose will was hard- 
est to break. Thus our best plan was to destroy 
the English army first, and thus compel Eng- 
land — ^where the coal shortage could at the same 
time be made absolutely intolerable, because 
she had to supply her allies, practically single- 
handed, with the black diamonds — to make 
peace. After a successful break-through, we 
should thus turn against the English army and 
destroy it, while standing on the defensive 
against the French for the time being. Of 
course we might have gone to work the other 
way: attacked the French army first, while 
adopting a defensive attitude towards England, 



THE BATTLE 287 

if we regarded France as the more dangerous 
opponent. 

When the intervention of the Americans was 
in sight, everything turned on forcing a decision 
as soon as possible before the American army 
could appear on the scene. Whether we were 
really strong enough to attempt this is an- 
other matter which I shall not inquire into 
here. The historical material so far available 
does not enable us to come to any decision. I 
shall therefore pass no sort of criticism on our 
Supreme Command, as their reasons and mo- 
tives are unknown to us. We are simply dis- 
cussing purely theoretical considerations. 

From that point of view the only thing to be 
said is that a particular direction cannot be re- 
garded as vital once and for all, and that each 
case must be decided on its own merits. The 
tactical side of the question must also be borne 
in mind. The tactical advantages or disadvan- 
tages may be so important that they outweigh 
strategic considerations. It is for the com- 
mander in chief alone to decide what particular 
course shall be taken, and his personality will 
play a very important part in the decision. One 
man will venture more than another, and thus 
have greater prospects of success. 

The decisive direction will thus always be 



288 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE 

fixed bj'^ considerations which can be determined 
beforehand. The defender, on the other hand, 
will find it very difficult to ascertain for certain 
at what point his enemy intends to seek a de- 
cision. In certain circumstances all he will be 
able to do is to drag out the war so long that 
the attacker will finally decide to make peace. 
In this case there is no decisive point for him 
except in so far as it is his business to divine 
the enemy's intentions accurately, and to find 
out in time at what pomt of the front he is 
thinking of breaking through. He will then 
send up all his resei'ves to that point, though 
it will be important — as it is always important 
in the case of bringing up reserves — ^not to de- 
train these troops too near to the fighting line. 
If that happens they cannot be sent into action 
systematically, as they will not be concentrated 
in a large mass, nor will they be in a position 
to take up a line in which they can offer an 
effective resistance or themselves pass to the 
counter-offensive. The defender would run the 
risk of putting in his reserves by driblets with- 
out achieving his purpose. 

The defender must further realize his dan- 
ger in time, and must be able to decide whether 
an ordinary or a decisive attack is in progress, 
and therefore how many men he must bring 



THE BATTLE 289 

up. He must know the direction in which the 
decisive thrust will be made and he must be able 
to calculate from a number of thoroughly un- 
certain factors how near he can bring up his 
reenforcements by his lateral railways without 
exposing them prematurely to defeat. H'e is 
thus swimming in a sea of uncertainties. 

At the same time we must concede to the de- 
fender the advantage that all these drawbacks 
make themselves fully felt only when the at- 
tacker succeeds in keeping his preparations for 
attack from his enemy altogether, or at any 
rate so long that the latter is not in a posi- 
tion to take effective counter-measures. Of 
course that is a very difficult task, and doubly 
difficult where it is a matter of effecting those 
immense concentrations of troops which are 
necessary for a break-through and are intended 
to play a part which is to decide the whole war. 
Every conceivable precaution must be taken to 
conceal the intention to attack from the enemy. 
Such a precaution, and the most important is 
the combination of the attack with a previous 
retreat. Thus when we contemplate an offen- 
sive which is to decide the war (because the 
general situation imposes such a step upon us), 
it will be advisable for us to associate it with a 
retreat. That will make it far easier for us to 



290 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE 

concentrate unobserved the great masses which 
are required for such an undertaking. 

IV. — Attack and Defense in Open Wabfake 

Open warfare is always either the sum and 
substance of military operations, or else it has 
a tendency to settle do\vn into trench warfare. 
That is inevitable. As long as the attacker is 
pressing forward he is always endeavoring to 
secure a decision by arms. The defender either 
accepts battle or evades his fhrust. In the first 
case, the defender can choose whether to fight 
for a decision then and there, or to take to 
trench warfare. He will adopt the second 
course when the retreat in which he falls back 
on his reenforcements has brought his forces 
up to such a level that he thinks he will be able 
to accept battle. This was the case with the 
Russians at Borodino. He will take to trench 
warfare when he has enough time and troops 
adequately to prepare the position which he 
proposes to hold. The nature of the ground — 
whether suitable for defense or not — ^will be 
one factor. In this case the ordinary laws of 
trench warfare will apply. 

If open warfare continues, the commander 
in chief must bear in mind the laws which hold 
good for this form of operation, and so the 



THE BATTLE 291 

decision becomes the vital matter. This is what 
actually happened at the beginning of the war, 
as well as in the Russian and Rumanian the- 
aters later on. Where the two sides came in 
collision and there were no continuous forti- 
fied lines, so that there was a certain amount 
of room for maneuver, a decision was always 
sought and very soon secured. It was thus with 
the battles in Belgium and France, Hinden- 
burg's famous campaign in East Prussia, the 
retreat into Silesia, the invasion of Wallachia, 
the advance on Brest-Litovsk, and the campaign 
which ended with the capture of Riga and the 
invasion of the Russian Baltic Provinces. 
These are the operations which alone we are 
considering. In them envelopment recovers all 
its old rights. The greater the range of weapons 
and the fewer the fortifications and other tech- 
nical devices of trench warfare which are en- 
countered, the greater will be the part envel- 
opment will play. 

As regards the strategic aspect of these oper- 
ations, we may certainly stand by what I said 
in my book, Vom heiitigen Kriege, which ap- 
peared shortly before the war, but we must pay 
special attention to the tactical changes which 
characterize this war and distinguish it from 
all previous wars. 



292 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE 

The following points deserve special notice: 
(1) tlie iniprovonient and increase of the ar- 
tillery; (2) the far-reaching changes in infan- 
try and cavalry methods; (3) aircraft; and (4) 
supply; which has become much more formid- 
able owing to the masses employed. Other ele- 
ments do not apply so much to open warfare, 
as they are not likely to be present as a rule, 
owing to the short time available. 

The tanks alone require a special mention. 
No experiences of their employment in open 
warfare are available, but there is no funda- 
mental reason why they cannot be incorporated 
in the march-columns like other troops, and 
subsequently employed in battle for their spe- 
cial functions. We may expect to find tanks in 
open warfare in the future, and particularly 
where the road system is such as to permit un- 
interrupted use being made of them. We must 
be familiar with the methods of operation which 
are uecessarj' in dealing with tanks, and in 
some circumstances we shall use them our- 
selves. How far their employment will extend 
cannot be foreseen at the moment. For that 
reason we must have a very clear idea of the 
future factors which are bound to influence any 
future war. 

In the first place we must concentrate at the 



THE BATTLE 293 

deciHive point a very much larger force of ar- 
tillery than in the past and it must include 
heavy guns, for the attacker will not merely 
have to shake the nerve of the hostile infantry, 
as in the old days, but to silence the defender's 
artillery and render his infantry utterly help- 
less in order to x^ermit the approach of the at- 
tacking infantry to the enemy's lines. Thus 
speed is everything if the enemy is to be pre- 
vented from bringing up reenforcements in 
time. This was equally true of the wars of the 
past, but we must not forget that the enemy also 
will have a very much larger force of artillery, 
so that it will not be as easy to silence it as it 
used to be. The result is that we must appear 
at the decisive point with a relatively far 
greater superiority than hitherto. Yet the fact 
that so much greater a mass of artillery is re- 
quired complicates and retards all movements, 
so that it is necessary to have a road system 
such as was never seen in past wars. Where 
such a system does not exist the preparations 
for the attack will take much longer than hith- 
erto because the roads required will have to be 
made first. It will be essential to keep this 
period as short as possible. 

The second point which we must discuss con- 
cerns the new methods of infantry and cavalry 



294 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE 

fighting. The methods of both these arms in- 
volve the use of machine-guns and hand gre- 
nades on a much larger scale than hitherto, and 
for that reason the attacking infantry- must be 
able to get close to the enemy. Hence the in- 
crease of the artillery. 

As the cavalry will seldom have a chance of 
fighting mounted, but will usually take part in 
action on foot, the decision cannot be secured 
so soon as in the past. After the action, on the 
other hand, this arm will have to make an even 
greater use of its speed in maneuver if it is to 
perform its special functions. It will certainly 
preserve its functions of reconnoitering and 
operating against the enemy's communications, 
with the sole difference that it will make greater 
use of firearms, and therefore the actions will 
not be over so quickly as in former times. 

We shall thus realize how important these 
reconnoitering elements are. During the World 
War we were, of course, practically forced to 
do away with our cavalry, but this was due only 
to bitter necessity because the infantry and 
even the supply and transport personnel are 
more important than the cavalry, and it is im- 
possible to conduct military operations with- 
out them. All the same, cavalry are quite in- 
dispensable if we want to make war with any 



THE BATTLE 295 

prospect of success. I attach special impor- 
tance to this point because I can see that it is 
on this very arm that our modern national bene- 
factors — who know nothing whatever about the 
realities of war — have fixed their eye, and in- 
tend to procure the complete abolition, or, at 
any rate, wholesale reduction, of the cavalry at 
any price. 

It must not be. It is the cavalry which must 
be active in front and on the wings of the ar- 
mies, so as to prevent the enemy from finding 
out what is going on on our side of the line. In 
doing so it must act offensively by preference 
for, from the tactical point of view, it is only by 
the offensive that it can score successes. It will 
fight mounted, if at all possible, for otherwise 
it will not win that speedy victory which is 
strategically necessary. Of course all this de- 
pends to a certain degree upon the action of the 
enemy's cavalry, which will use its firearms 
also, and thus attempt to force an action. In 
such a case it will be essential to try to prevent 
the attack from being frontal and to avoid a dis- 
mounted action by executing a flanking move- 
ment, thus enabling us to continue our recon- 
naissance. We shall have to be very careful 
that in so doing we do not imperil our own re- 
tirement, or allow our screening work to be in- 



296 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE 

terrupted, for as a rule these are the vital ele- 
ments in strategic maneuvers. This double 
object can best be secured by a skillful dis- 
tribution of the troops and by patrols. It is 
safe to bet a hundred to one that the enemy 
will retire when he finds himself outflanked, 
and it is very doubtful whether he will be in a 
position to send out enough patrols to continue 
his own reconnaissance. Boldness is doubly 
necessary for the cavalry. 

The third point which requires consideration 
is the improvement and increase of aircraft and 
particularly its effects on military operations. 
Its existence has put the art of war on quite a 
new footing. Marching in former times was 
ordinarily regarded as a daytime operation. 
Night-marching has now become an essential 
factor in military activity. Of course there was 
plenty of night-marching in the old days. Fred- 
erick the Great, for example, ventured on a 
night-march before the Battle of Hohenfried- 
berg. But this was none the less exceptional, 
whereas to-day night-marching has become an 
ordinary feature of troop movements. Every- 
thing which it is desired to keep from the enemy 
must be carried out at night. It frequently 
happens that one part of our troops — as many 
as the enemy can be allowed to see, if it cannot 



THE BATTLE 297 

be helped — is moved by day, while the rest are 
moved by night. In this way we shall make the 
greatest effort to conceal from the enemy the 
concentration of our forces at what we consider 
the vital point. It is easy to imagine the im- 
mense influence which such methods must have 
on the whole art of war. 

Even more important, perhaps, is our own 
.reconnaissance work and the effort to obstruct 
that of the enemy, particularly in open w^ar- 
fare, where one side or the other will always 
be on the offensive. Everything must be done 
to find out how the enemy's armies are dis- 
tributing while hindering his reconnaissance 
activities. Aircraft can work only by day and 
in a good light. It is almost impossible to ob- 
tain suflBcient knowledge of the enemy's move- 
ments by the use of cavalry under modem con- 
ditions, as in present-day warfare such long 
fronts must be anticipated that the cavalry 
could not reach any point from which the whole 
of the enemy's movements could be seen and 
prompt information brought back. Reconnais- 
sance from the air is, therefore, a necessity, and 
should be combined with cavalry reconnais- 
sance. The reports thus received will give the 
best picture of the development of events which 
is possible under the circumstances. We shall 



298 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE 

send out our aircraft as far as possible over the 
hostile lines so that they can find out, if allowed 
to, what is going- on behind the enemy's front. 
At the same time we shall do everything in our 
power to conceal our own anny and its move- 
ments. Even that will be impossible with cav- 
alry alone, and in any case very difficult if the 
cavalry force is not strong enough. 

Thus we shall not be able to carry out these 
operations — reconnoitering for ourselves and 
preventing the enemy from doing the same — 
unless we obtain such a domination over the 
hostile aircraft that they are unable to per- 
form their functions. The attacker must, there- 
fore, try to obtain the mastery of the air just 
as he must reduce the enemy's cavalry to pow- 
erlessness, and for this reason it will probably 
be advisable in open warfare to attach pursuit 
flights to all the columns. These pursuit flights 
^^dll have the special task of attacking hostile 
aircraft and rendering them innocuous. They 
will have plenty of work. It will be only later 
— when open warfare has come to an end, either 
because a decision has been secured or because 
the transfonnation to trench warfare is com- 
plete — that other types of aircraft, with quite 
different functions, will be required once more. 

In any case, enemy aircraft may cross our 



THE BATTLE 299 

lines even at night. Bombing squadrons have 
done so frequently. But if they do so their 
reconnaissance work will not do us much harm 
because their range of vision will be small. 
It will always be advisable to show no lights at 
night, so that the enemy cannot draw any in- 
ference from their presence. We must also pro- 
tect roads with a certain aircraft screen, for 
even though any particular area cannot be lit up 
'except from a very short distance and when 
flying very low, it is possible to illuminate sec- 
tions of road, and the enemy can thus find out 
whether there is any traffic or not. 

We must also consider the question of sup- 
ply, which bristles with difficulties for the at- 
tacker. Generally speaking, it will be impos- 
sible to live on the land, as no theater of war 
will have sufficient supplies to stand the passage 
of a modern army more than once. All the 
ammunition and food required must, therefore, 
be taken with the troops. My book, Vom heuti- 
gen Kriege, shows how difficult that is. It will 
certainly be necessary to help ourselves out at 
times by making greater use of our iron ration. 
Our columns will always have to do a good deal 
of marching by night, and to a certain extent 
we shall have to make new roads and railways 
to effect the necessary movements. Indeed, 



300 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE 

where the conditions of the battle area require, 
we shall have to take mobile railways with us so 
that we can lay down lines quickly in an emer- 
gency. I discussed this operation earlier on. 
The laying of such lines is undoubtedly an ex- 
cellent method of deceiving the enemy. 

If we establish railway arteries behind the 
whole line of our advance, the enemy can never 
■ tell which of them are serving the main attack, 
especially if the attacker succeeds in screening 
the movements on these lines. It is only when 
the defender realizes where the main blow is 
coming that he can take useful counter-meas- 
ures and develop his own railway system ac- 
cordingly. Even then he will be compelled to 
construct his new lines more or less parallel to 
his front. If he has to retreat he will perhaps 
abandon them to the enemy, while the advance 
of the attacker is favored by the fact that from 
the outset his railway communications lead 
straight and iminterruptedly to the front. 

Turning to the case of the defender, much 
that has been said about the attack will apply 
to him also. In infantry and cavalry opera- 
tions he has the same prospects of success as 
the attacker. This is equally true as regards 
aircraft and artillery. His greatest disadvan- 
tage is the fact that he can effect a concentra- 



THE BATTLE 301 

tion of these arms only in reply to some move- 
ment on the part of the enemy. Thus it is ab- 
solutely vital for him to find out the enemy's 
intentions in time. If he does not do so he can- 
not take effective counter-measures, as I have 
said. He will thus concentrate the infantry and 
artillery required for the defense on the decisive 
wing — distributed in echelon behind the threat- 
ened point — and the bulk of the cavalry will 
likewise be posted there. The disposition to 
be preferred is the concentration on the flank 
and somewhat in rear of the wing, both because 
this gives longer time for the concentration 
than a simple extension of the front and also 
because it enables the defense to be conducted 
offensively after the enemy has begun to at- 
tempt the envelopment of the front with which 
he has established touch. Yet the latter opera- 
tion must always be the attacker's goal, as it 
offers by far the greatest prospect of victory. 

If we succeed in finding out the distribution 
of the enemy's forces in good time, it will be 
advisable to give or accept battle — the battle for 
a decision — somewhat farther back, as the de- 
cision can be secured only by a general reserve 
held ready in the rear. This applies to a mod- 
em campaign even more than to earlier times. 

With regard to aircraft, the chances of con- 



302 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE 

centration and success are fairly equal on both 
sides. On the other hand, the defender would 
appear to have the advantage at first in the 
matter of supply. 

He is falling back on Eis supplies, and need 
not bring them up, as they can be distributed 
as the retiring movements require. This sit- 
uation changes, however, as soon as troops have 
to be transferred unexpectedly to one flank or 
the other. The movement has not been antici- 
pated, and thus no preparations have been 
made. In this case the operation bristles with 
difficulties, particularly when we remember the 
huge masses employed in modern major opera- 
tions. In these circumstances the advantage 
may become an additional disadvantage. 

When we sum up finally the prospects of suc- 
cess for both the attacker and the defender we 
are forced to the conclusion that there can be 
no doubt about the advantages enjoyed by the 
former, in as much as the defender must keep 
his reserves spread over his whole front until 
he knows how his opponent's forces are distrib- 
uted, while the attacker is able to work on a 
definite plan from the stari;. The upshot is that 
we must always take the offensive unless it is 
absolutely impossible. 

It is obvious that the character of the coun- 



THE BATTLE 303 

try will have a great influence on our decision. 
In many cases the determining factor will be 
the roads, in others the stocks of cattle and 
food available. For instance, operations in 
France will take a very different form from 
those in Russia because there is a great differ- 
ence between these two theaters in these re- 
spects. It will also be admitted that operations 
in Russia throw a greater burden on the Gen- 
eral Staff, and make troop movements exceed- 
ingly difficult. Yet the army on the offensive 
has the advantage from all these points of view. 
The only advantage enjoyed by the defender is 
that he usually has more time and greater op- 
portunities to adapt the country to his require- 
ments. "We realized that often enough in Rus- 
sia, where the enemy always succeeded in 
evading our attack or awaiting it in prepared 
positions. As a rule these could not be stormed 
out of hand, and gave the enemy a few days' 
respite in which to make preparations for the 
next stage of his retreat. All this brought it 
home to us forcibly that in the offensive speed 
and surprise are everything. The attacker must, 
therefore, stop at nothing to get forward at top 
speed, and press through every intended at- 
tack without a moment's delay. The factor of 
surprise must be exploited to the full, and thus 



304 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE 

an uninterrupted advance is an absolute 
necessity. 

The aircraft must attack first, last and all the 
time. The army cavalry must develop the high- 
est possible standard of operative nimbleness 
in working roimd the flanks and rear of the 
enemy. It must not hesitate, though it nuist al- 
ways be well informed. The fullest possible use 
must bo made of the railways, both the old and 
the new. But the vittd requirement is that the 
commander in chief be equal to the situation. 
He must know exactly what he intends to do. 
He must have the courage, if circumstances re- 
quire, to denude his front and concentrate the 
bulk of his force against one of the hostile 
wings. 

In other words, he must seek a decision 
w^herever a decision is to be found. 



CHAPTER IX 

CONCLUSION 

I HAVE come to the end. I have described 
war as it really is, and I think I have dealt with 
everything required at the present day for a 
great struggle between nations. I have shown 
that we cannot make war in the same way as 
boys {)lay at soldiers or pirates, but that years 
of ceaseless effort on the part of the whole na- 
tion are necessary to wage it to a victorious 
conclusion. Masses of men must be called upon, 
masses such as have never been seen before. 
What are Napoleon's armies or those of the 
great national coalition against France com- 
pared with this? To-day whole nations are 
called to arms, superficially for the purpose of 
satisfying national and economic ambitions, but 
in reality to struggle for the; highest interests 
of mankind. An artillery will be set in motion 
the like of which the world has never seen ! 
Modern guns have a range of more than one 
hundred kilometers, and can simultaneously 
sweep any selected area in such a way that no 

305 



306 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE 

human being can exist there and make use of 
any weapon ! 

No region is so fertile or well supplied that 
it can support such masses for any length of 
time. None has an adequate railway and road 
system. In addition, everything the armies re- 
quire — enormous masses of ammunition and 
food — has to be sent out to them from home. 
For that purpose railways and roads are es- 
sential, and if necessaiy they must be con- 
structed. Mobile railway material must be taken 
with the troops in order to facilitate a rapid 
transformation to trench warfare where cir- 
cumstances require, or convey the masses to the 
decisive point. 

The technical resources of war have more 
than doubled. We fight in the air and under 
the ground to-day. In the one case we try to 
blow our adversary up sky-high, and in the 
other hurl him to earth to meet death and de- 
struction. We dig deep graves in order to find 
cover against the enemy's fire, and yet get to 
close quarters with him with the hand grenade 
and bayonet in order to overcome him in a 
sheer melee. 

Never have the sacrifices which our nation 
was compelled to make been so great as in the 
recent war; never has so much blood flowed. 



CONCLUSION 307 

The conductivity of the earth has been used to 
discover the enemy's intentions, and we have 
communicated our thoughts over thousands of 
kilometers to the states associated with us. 

War can be waged only offensively if it is to 
have any prospects of success. A pure defen- 
sive leads inevitably to defeat. 

It is perfectly clear that such operations can 
be directed and carried out by experts only, 
and that years of study are required to master 
the whole range of knowledge which is needed 
to conduct a modem campaign. Indeed, the en- 
tire span of a man's life will be required to 
cover all the ground. A man who stages such 
a war in the manner of the dilettante will find 
that it is lost before it has even been begun. 

The course of policy which leads up to such 
a war because it cannot avert it must be in the 
hands of men who know the ambitions of the 
states of Europe, and therefore realize against 
what forces they may have to fight and what 
resources are at their own disposal. They must 
be men who understand how to make war at 
the right moment, and have the courage to see 
things as they are and not merely as they would 
like them to be; men who have sufficient mili- 
tary instinct to know what they are doing when 
they appeal to the decision of arms and appre- 



308 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE 

ciate that they must intelligently follow the 
clircctions of the Chief of the General Staff, 
who will be a permanent adviser. Without 
courage and resolution no one can either direct 
an army or lead a state to its goal in the Euro- 
pean political game. 

May the men who now direct the destinies of 
Germany ask themselves frankly what is re- 
quired for war, and whether their "Five-Mark 
Volunteers," who are possibly serving for the 
pay and that alone, fight as well as old troops. 
Are men who obey only when they want to and 
otherwise do exactly what they like in a posi- 
tion to form an army such as modem conditions 
require, an army such as our enemies will un- 
doubtedly possess? Let them answer the ques- 
tion whether a Soldiers' Council, which does not 
even know what it wants and consists of men 
who have no idea of real war, is better quali- 
fied to conduct a campaign than a Chief of the 
General Staff who has spent his whole life 
studying the question and is advised by the 
most expert helpers. 

Of course I know that for the moment we are 
utterly at the mercy of our enemies, and that 
we are absolutely unable to create a real army 
after our present government has handed us 



CONCLUSION 309 

over, tied and hound, to the power of our en- 
emies. I also appreciate that the present inter- 
ests of our enemies require that we should be 
helpless for as long as possible. 

But I know also that a nation of seventy mil- 
lions, a number which can be appreciably in- 
creased when German Austria joins us, cannot 
be oppressed forever or reduced to the status 
of a race of slaves. I know that there will be 
changes in the political sphere also, that there 
will come a moment — and that soon — when wo 
shall be needed on one side or the other, and 
that this moment will be favorable for our res- 
urrection. I cherish an unshakable confidence 
that our nation, which at the moment seems to 
be sunk in self-seeking, will return to its man- 
hood, and a chastened and ennobled peofjle will 
arise, who can prove themselves worthy of their 
great ancestors and even look on war as it 
really is. 

It is most unlikely that I myself shall ever 
live to see that great day. My life has been 
spent in helping to build up that state which is a 
ruin to-day. Yet I write comforting words for 
the future. What I have written will be appre- 
ciated in the days to come, and my words, which 
hitherto have resounded into the void, will turn 



310 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE 

out to be seeds which have not fallen among 
thorns. In that confidence I lay down my pen 
for the moment. 

Germany will rise again. She has a great 
future before her! 



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THE END 



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